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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the national preparedness to conduct catastrophic incident 
search and rescue (SAR) using organization-specific doctrine, concept plans, 
congressional research reports and testimonies, After Action Reviews, periodicals, 
federal government plans, interviews, a focus group and two benchmark studies. The 
research indicates that individual organizations conduct SAR activities well, but 
combined, joint and interagency catastrophic search and rescue preparations are lacking. 
Should another catastrophic incident occur tomorrow, the SAR results will likely exhibit 
the same unacceptable inefficiency as was found in Hurricane Katrina. Finding the sweet 
spot for response to catastrophic incidents is needed. There are three major findings: 
First, a national strategy for SAR is needed. This epic effort will help to improve the 
interagency coordination between equity holders of the search and rescue 
megacommunity and set the conditions to improve catastrophic incident SAR. Secondly, 
a Joint Air Ground Coordination Center (JAGCC) is critical to effective response 
operations. Two benchmark studies suggest a framework for developing a SAR 
coordination center using experiences of the wildland firefighting community and the 
United States Secret Service. Finally, domestic and international interagency 
coordination through integrated strategy development, planning, training and exercises is 
needed to improve response operations.  
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Individual organizations conduct search and rescue (SAR) activities well, but 
combined, joint catastrophic incident SAR (CI SAR) preparations are lacking. Should 
another catastrophic incident occur tomorrow, the results would likely exhibit the same 
unacceptable inefficiency as was found in Hurricane Katrina.1  
Finding the “sweet spot”2 for a unified response to catastrophic incidents is 
needed3 (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 88–101). Hurricane Katrina showed that the 
nation is not prepared for catastrophic incident SAR and not enough has been done since 
2005 to avoid a repeat of the poor multi-domain search and rescue efforts. Attempts to 
save lives were made within individual organizations rather than a coordinated unified 
command that spanned disparate organizations. It is a tribute to individual 
professionalism and sheer chance that there were no mid-air collisions or severely injured 
rescuers on the ground or in the water during the response to Hurricane Katrina. It will 
never be known how many lives were lost because uncoordinated hasty primary and 
secondary searches were not unified between multiple domains.  
                                                 
1 For more information on this, see the Appendix of this thesis. 
2 The term sweet spot is used to indicate a need for federal decentralization with a distribution of 
capabilities to the State SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) or other local SAR equity partners. 
3 The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commander has mentioned on numerous 
occasions (at the 2008 National EPLO conference and a 2007 all-hands meeting conducted in the 
USNORTHCOM training rooms) that he is looking for the sweet spot with the intent of being neither early 
nor a second late.  
A catastrophic incident will result in large numbers of casualties 
and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens to hundreds of 
thousands. During a catastrophic incident response, priority is given 
to human life-saving operations. 
 
National Response Framework Catastrophic Incident Annex (Federal Emergency 




Some actions have laid the framework for improvement, but those activities are 
also lagging behind where the nation ought to be four years after Hurricane Katrina. For 
example, a Catastrophic Incident SAR Addendum (CI SAR addendum) to the National 
Search and Rescue Manual was fielded in December 2008, but it does not integrate all 
stakeholders and has been neither trained nor exercised. This is not acceptable when the 
consequence of ineffectiveness is the death and injury of United States citizens. Although 
the CI SAR addendum was completed, the effort was through unfunded back-door 
channels that have left the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) 4 authors in 
a position without funding or a plan to train, field and integrate the CI SAR addendum 
into interagency operations.  
Conducting multi-domain catastrophic incident SAR preparatory activities is 
critical to finding the sweet spot so that the most effective and safest response is available 
to the Incident Commander when needed. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
People will die unnecessarily in catastrophic events if the SAR megacommunity 
fails to act efficiently. Individual organizations conduct normal SAR extremely well; 
however, large scale CI SAR requiring an all-domain integrated response is lacking (The 
White House, 2006, p. 38). A need will exist in a catastrophic incident for urgent and 
timely federal support to search for and rescue thousands of distressed persons. When 
directed by the President, the SAR megacommunity must respond quickly and effectively 
to save lives, prevent human suffering and to mitigate great property damage. There are 
many indications that the SAR megacommunity is not prepared as well as possible for  
 
 
                                                 
4 The National Search and Rescue Committee is a federal-level committee formed to coordinate civil 
search and rescue matters of interagency interest within the United States. NSARC is comprised of the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Defense (DoD), 
Department of Commerce (DOC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) and Department of the Interior (DOI). FEMA, Federal Bureau of 




this daunting challenge. This research will help the entire community determine the 
current state of readiness for CI SAR and recommend actions that will improve 
preparedness.  
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Support Function 
9 (ESF-9) Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams, the National Guard, Army, Navy, 
Marines, Joint Rescue Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
service, police, fire, etc., all conducted searches for injured, trapped and isolated people 
during Hurricane Katrina response efforts. Yet these searches and rescues were not 
coordinated in an efficient manner. Many areas were searched more than once and other 
areas not at all. Very little has been done to fix this enormous problem. Should another 
catastrophic incident occur tomorrow, the results would likely exhibit the same 
unacceptable inefficiency as was found in 2005. USNORTHCOM is also a part of this 
problem, as its internal mechanisms for coordinating SAR across components and with 
the interagency community are lacking. 
More can be done to study existing organizations in order to improve the most 
important task undertaken in catastrophic incident response: saving lives. A recurring 
theme of joint and interagency strategic doctrine is the necessity to improve unity of 
effort between civil and military authorities. There seem to be two profound and 
recurring themes in regard to achieving unity of effort for catastrophic SAR. First, those 
in the homeland defense/security field profess unity of effort, but make slow and 
awkward progress to unifying CI SAR responses. Secondly, without having a CI SAR 
strategy and understanding each state SAR requirement, the SAR megacommunity will 
provide a proactive mass response for catastrophic events that, at times, may appear to be 
an uncoordinated federal mob intent on appeasing the political leadership rather than the 
state SAR Mission Coordinator and Incident Commander’s requirements. Federal 
resources will be pushed to the impacted state(s) despite the cost, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)/Unified Command and the economy of force if actions are 
not taken to understand the issues better.  
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Finding the elusive sweet spot for a harmonized response to a catastrophic event 
in the first 96 hours demands that processes be scrutinized and contrasted with supported 
partners’ timely, unique and surge requirements in order to save lives, prevent suffering, 
protect property and act quickly to mitigate or avoid a catastrophe. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary question this research attempts to answer is: How can the SAR 
megacommunity better prepare to conduct CI SAR? The following five elements of the 
primary question are examined: 
 What has been accomplished since Hurricane Katrina to improve 
catastrophic incident SAR? 
 What are the planning effort priorities? 
 Who are the interagency stakeholders? 
 Are there models available to emulate? 
 Who should lead the collaborative effort, and what is the best 
organizational construct? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Unity of effort, synchronization and interoperability within the SAR 
megacommunity are fundamental imperatives to lifesaving operations during catastrophic 
events. A coordinated operational CI SAR response in support of federal, state, territorial, 
tribal and local (FSTTL) partners is vital. SAR operations are the most critical 
undertaking in the early aftermath of any disaster. This research is intended to 
recommend and promulgate concepts, strategies and procedures that will improve 
preparedness for urgent CI SAR requirements. A number of problem areas will be 
addressed in this study: 
1. National and state catastrophic SAR literature is outdated and lacking. 
This research should have influence on officials who are responsible for 
updating and changing these documents. 
2. State and federal SAR organizations will benefit from this research as a 
template for their own SAR priorities and plans. 
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3. Strategic and operational planners and operators will require this research 
as a tool to help them understand gaps, seams and key nodes for 
catastrophic incident SAR. DoD is most concerned with incidents where 
the primary civil authorities are overwhelmed, and this research focuses 
on just such an event. The research will recommend organizational 
constructs, postures and preplanned multi-domain packages in anticipation 
of civil requirements. 
4. Homeland security practitioners and leaders nationally will find this 
valuable for understanding the federal support plan as well as how they 
can best coordinate and communicate with federal SAR officials during a 
catastrophic event. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Research methodology included interviews, two organizational benchmark studies 
and a focus group. 
1. Interviews 
The purpose of the interviews will be to learn where DoD support is likely to be 
needed and how to most effectively coordinate catastrophic SAR strategy, policy, plans 
and operations between the diverse FSTTL partners. Interviews will also be conducted to 
understand technical aspects of SAR and the intra-organizational concerns. The interview 
process will be designed to gain knowledge of whether technical experts and 
USNORTHCOM officials share the same sight-picture on the problem and whether this 
view corroborates the concepts found in the literature. Finally, the interviews will also be 
designed to get recommendations from experts in the SAR community.  
Interviews will yield both a scholarly and operational opportunity along the 
research path that no other academic process can produce. Once the research is 
completed, the SAR megacommunity can make informed decisions to improve CI SAR 
preparations. Key decision makers will be better informed from the interviews of key 
SAR experts. The intent is to leverage the experience, influence and expertise of these 




2. Organizational Benchmark Studies 
Two organizations exist that could be studied and emulated as communication 
and coordination center success stories. Applying lessons learned from these two cases 
will help define the core element for a SAR communications center. The organizational 
benchmarks worthy of study are the United States Secret Service Multi-Agency 
Coordination Center (USSS MACC) and the National Interagency Fire Center National 
Multi-Agency Coordination Center (NIFC NMAC). 
Studying these two organizations will provide a glimpse as to how to organize an 
interagency umbrella organization that is able to plan for a national catastrophe while in 
garrison and deploy to a field site during the crisis to provide integrated all-domain 
incident SAR support functions to an incident commander or SAR coordinator.  
The first outfit is used by the United States Secret Service (USSS) for National 
Special Security Events (NSSEs). The Multi-Agency Communications Center (MACC) is 
the integrated communications hub for these large national-level events. The MACC 
stands up prior to the NSSE to ensure a common operational picture is available to all 
stakeholders (Kroener, 2007).  
The NIFC NMAC is located within the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) 
in Boise, Idaho. The National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (NMAC) is a full-time 
team that allocates the national assets for firefighting to the 11 firefighting regions based 
upon the Incident Commander’s needs and resources available. The NMAC is 
responsible for national coordination to ensure firefighting resources are effectively and 
appropriately managed in a cost-effective manner (National Multiagency Coordination 
Center, 2008). In setting its strategy, the overriding priority in all actions is the protection 
of human life (Kroener, 2007, p. 8).  
These two case studies offer interagency coordination success stories of very 
complex issues. Both organizations contend with problems similar to anticipated SAR 
requirements and both organizations are cooperatives rather than command and control 
entities. For catastrophic SAR, it may be helpful to use these cases to build an 
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organization that is capable of seeing the entire SAR spectrum, organizing and 
prioritizing tasks to save lives in the first critical hours of the incident. 
After conducting the studies, the author’s intent is to analyze each and 
compare/contrast them to the catastrophic SAR model. Evaluation of the two 
organizations should help elucidate how DoD and the SAR interagency community 
should change priorities, prepare plans and organize for catastrophic events. The intent is 
to compare the NMAC to current predisaster SAR community posture and both the 
NMAC and MACC construct to the event response posture of SAR interagency partners. 
This methodology will be used because the NMAC is involved both with planning and 
response activities. While the MACC is an excellent model for a response coordination 
cell, it does not represent a beneficial planning case study. 
3. Focus Group 
The author is currently engaged with a focus group of SAR professionals in order 
to address some of these catastrophic incident SAR issues. Participating in this group, 
“that existed prior to initiation of this research,” during the research process allows the 
author to observe best practices and to influence operational decisions. The focus group 
includes state members, the National Search and Rescue Committee, the United States 
Coast Guard, the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), the Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center, the Joint Director of Military Support, USNORTHCOM and ESF 
#9. Achievements of the group include developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 
to the National Search and Rescue Manual and drafting a new ESF #9 Annex.  
As this research progresses, members of the focus group have volunteered to 
assist with their respective areas of expertise. For example, the National Association of 
Search and Rescue (NASAR) representative assisted with state perspectives while the Air 
Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) representative ensured the research 
included the Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH) viewpoint. The focus group has produced 
a multi-domain, coordinated, accurate and current vision that was unattainable through 
other research methods. The focus group work continues beyond this research effort. 
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In summary, this methodology includes interviews, two organizational benchmark 
studies and a focus group. Each of the three methods provides a unique and important 
contribution to the research effort; correlating the findings from all three methods will 
yield a unique and thorough research product.  
The interview process and the focus group members will yield expert opinions 
that can be contrasted with current SAR policies. The two organizational studies also 
offer best practices of two similar organizations that can be compared to the current SAR 
preparatory efforts. The resulting recommendations will be valuable to both the 
USNORTHCOM Commander and the SAR interagency community. 
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis uses a qualitative approach by introducing the subject, presenting the 
problem, and defining the research question, research methods and evaluative criteria 
used in the subject analysis.  
Chapter I presents the approach and research methodology. Interviews, 
organizational benchmark studies and a focus group are introduced. 
Chapter II presents a literature review of current policies, doctrine, plans and 
practices.  
Chapter III presents a historical review and analysis of how DoD and interagency 
partner capabilities have responded to catastrophic incidents in the past and their current 
planning and response posture for catastrophic incident SAR in accordance with current 
policies and strategic guidance. This chapter also analyzes the existing regulations and 
doctrine for the planning and utilization of a joint, interagency and all-domain SAR 
response to a catastrophic incident. 
Chapter IV presents current focus group initiatives and the results of the 
interviews. The focus group is an ongoing effort to study, plan and prepare SAR assets 
for a catastrophic incident. Interviews of SAR professionals and technical experts are 
used to highlight problem areas and possible solutions.   
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Chapter V further expound on results of the literature study, interviews and focus 
group analysis. Two organizational benchmark studies (NMAC and MACC) are 
introduced. The case studies are used to analyze/compare/contrast the current DoD and 
interagency partner efforts to prepare for catastrophic incident SAR with two 
organizations that have had related successes. 
Chapter VI provides an analysis of the research findings and makes three 
recommendations to improve preparedness for catastrophic incident search and rescue. 
The recommendations include developing a national SAR strategy, formulating a Joint 
Air Ground Coordination Center (JAGCC), and improving interagency coordination 
between the SAR megacommunity members.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. BACKGROUND 
Both USNORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security5 (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 1) have a primary role in catastrophic incident search and 
rescue. Tactics, techniques and procedures for SAR are lacking joint interagency and 
multi-domain guidance. Current literature on the topic consists of organization-specific 
doctrine, concept plans, congressional research reports and testimonies, after action 
reviews (AARs), periodicals and an array of state and federal government plans.  
Before plunging into the literature review, below is the definition of a catastrophic 
incident and historical perspectives that indicate a need for better SAR preparations.  
The National Response Framework (NRF) defines a catastrophic incident as: 
...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in 
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost 
immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, 
and private-sector authorities in the impacted area... [emphasis added]. 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 43) 
This literature review and the problem itself are situated around catastrophic SAR 
versus a progressive layered  response to a more routine event that would require normal 
SAR or single incident limited mass rescue operations (for example: a building collapse, 
commercial airliner crash or a single ship sinking). In less-than catastrophic events, a 
response occurs from locals, both municipal and county, through mutual aid systems and 
then through state/regional response to a federal level as the magnitude of the event 
increases. For a catastrophic event, all these partners are responding immediately (if they 
are not victims themselves), and they need to know how they fit into the catastrophic  
 
                                                 
5 DHS is designated the “Coordinating Agency” for catastrophic incidents. 
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incident response in advance of the event to ensure efficiency measured in lives saved or 
lost. Research indicates that there are deficiencies in the planning for these catastrophic 
events. 
Hurricane Katrina landed on August 29, 2005. Many of the lessons learned state 
that civil and military federal response for this catastrophe were inefficient and 
uncoordinated (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 7, 35 and 65). Catastrophic 
search and rescue operations are specifically included in this harsh criticism and the 
interagency community still has not corrected the problems associated with catastrophic 
SAR planning and preparations.  
SAR was not integrated and did not have a unified command structure. No single 
organization has a common operating picture for catastrophic SAR because of the event 
complexity, lack of planning and exercises (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 
1–7). During the Hurricane Katrina response (the best example of a recent catastrophic 
incident), DoD did not anticipate the need for damage assessment, failed to adequately 
conduct an assessment and then deployed forces without understanding the full extent of 
the damage (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 1–7). As a result, some areas 
were searched twice and some areas not at all in the first days of the catastrophe. 
Ultimately, the survivors paid a very high price for uncoordinated SAR that they should 
never be asked to pay again, and the 1,300 dead will never tell their tale. In an evaluation 
of the Hurricane Rita response, Major General John White, a member of the military’s 
joint task force on Hurricane Rita, commented to President Bush that current plans were 
in disarray and that numerous helicopters could show up at the same time to rescue the 
same person (Associated Press, 2005). There are also indications that strategic guidance 
is inadequate. The GAO reports that interagency strategic planning was inadequate for 
Katrina (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 28 and 29)6 and that DHS has not  
 
                                                 
6 The same GAO report goes on to state that the Secretary of Defense should establish milestones and 
expedite the development of detailed catastrophic plans that specifically address use of SAR capabilities 
and the military’s role in SAR. DoD acknowledged that better integration of interagency and Title 32/10 
assets would have led to greater efficiency for the SAR mission (2006, p. 35)  
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provided adequate guidance to partners and states. Specifically, DoD needs additional 
operational planning information from DHS (Government Accountability Office, 2008, 
pp. 8–16). 
Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina indicate similar findings. The report 
states: “The Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of 
current policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of all federal search and 
rescue assets during disaster response.”7 (Townsend, 2006, p. 57) Some of the SAR 
lessons learned from this report have been corrected, while others have not been 
adequately addressed.   
One example of this would be when the NRF was published in 2008; the ESF #9 
title was changed from Urban Search and Rescue to simply Search and Rescue in an 
effort to include all SAR under this ESF. However, definitive strategic plans are not 
available that explain to DoD what this means and the 28 National SAR teams are still 
called “urban” SAR teams; therefore, the ambiguity of responsibility and function 
continues. There has also been work done with the National Defense Medical System 
(NDMS) to ensure continuity of care for those rescued, but, again, a comprehensive 
interagency strategic plan is not available to determine gaps.  
Another example of some work accomplished in the SAR field is found in the 
update of The National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). The NSP has been updated and 
was endorsed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on July 18, 2007 
(National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007, p. 19), but it does not reference how the 
United States Air Force (USAF) will adopt its new role as a primary agency for SAR in 
the NRF.8 The NSP also has confusing verbiage about incidents of national significance 
                                                 
7 For more information on this, see the Appendix of this thesis.  
8 On page 5 of the NSP (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2008), the USAF is a recognized 
“coordinator” for aeronautical search and rescue, but nowhere is the USAF listed as one of the five primary 
agencies as stated in the NRF in the ESF #9 Annex.  
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that need to be clarified now that the NRF has been approved.9 DHS is charged with 
overall responsibility with SAR. One could argue that the unity of effort and interagency 
coordination improvements needed fall under the purview of DHS and improvements in 
DHS policy and structure may help with interagency improvements. Also, looking at the 
emphasis put on homeland defense versus homeland security and allocating more 
resources (within DoD) to homeland security may help to integrate all national efforts for 
catastrophic incident unified response (Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 5). 
B. LITERATURE SUB-SETS 
Two sub-sets of literature were reviewed on this topic. One set of literature is 
related to the military and the second to the DHS (United States Coast Guard and 
Emergency Support Function #9) and other state level civil organizations. As an 
important theme to this review, emphasis is placed on interagency coordination 
comments found amongst the literature sub-sets because a point to highlight is that 
additional intra and interagency coordination may be necessary to ensure the most 
effective catastrophic incident SAR preparation and response. The literature is 
categorized in this manner to introduce each primary agency doctrine. The doctrine that 
refers to unification and partnership studies is then discussed. 
 
                                                 
9 To make a clarification: the NSP (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007) references 
“…when the NRP is implemented.” Now that the NRF is published, the assumption can be made that the 
same intent exists. When the NRF is implemented: “The NRP covers federal responses to declared 
Incidents of National Significance; this plan covers all civil SAR operations, whether conducted 
independently or concurrently with the NRP. If carried out concurrently, this plan becomes an NRP 
supporting plan by integrating on matters relating to coordination and conduct of disaster response SAR 
operations. When the NRP is implemented, civil SAR operations will continue to be covered by this plan; 
the only difference is that civil SAR services will be coordinated with other NRP operations on scene via 
the Operations Section of the Incident Command Post or Unified Command established under NIMS. 
During NRP implementation, SAR facilities may be tasked to support other operations carried out under 
the NRP on a not-to interfere basis with lifesaving efforts, or assistance for SAR services may be 




1. Literature Related to Military SAR Operations 
The first sub-set of literature is military guidance, specifically the Department of 
Defense Directive (DoDD) 3003.01 titled DoD Support to Civil Search and Rescue. This 
directive is the primary Secretary of Defense policy guidance for implementing military 
responsibilities to support civil SAR in accordance with the NSP. Who is the DoD lead 
for SAR? Has the lead provided strategic guidance and funding to the rest of the 
department for catastrophic SAR planning? Surprisingly, the lead for DoD is the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs. As stated 
in DoDD 3003.01 dated January 20, 2006 (Gordon England, 2006, p. 3):  
Paragraph 5.1 states: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)), under the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy (USD(P)), is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense and USD(P) on civil SAR and will coordinate domestic civil SAR 
policy with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
(ASD(HD)) as appropriate and has designated the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs 
(DASD(POW/MPA)) the Office of Primary Responsibility for DoD support 
to civil SAR [emphasis added].   
DASD (POW/MPA) is further tasked to coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff et al. to develop civil SAR doctrine, guidance and implementing 
measures.  
DoDD 3003.01 was also published prior to the NRF. The strategic guidance for 
integrating joint, multi-national and interagency SAR between local, state, regional and 
federal levels is either non-existent or unavailable. Terminology used in the directive 
refers to the NRP verses the NRF and does not even address the USAF as a primary 
agency for aeronautical SAR operations.  
The USAF (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 5) was designated as the 
primary federal agency (PFA)10 on March 22, 2008, with the release of the NRF 
                                                 
10 The ESF #9 Annex (Department of Homeland Security, 2008) to the NRF states, 
“DoD/USAF/AFRCC serves as the primary agency for ESF #9 during SAR operations for aviation-related 
incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response both in open and wilderness areas and in the vicinity of 
airports and urban areas requiring the coordinated deployment of rescue personnel and equipment.” 
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(Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1). Prior to that time, National Guard and 
federal military response for catastrophic incident SAR did not have a single-source 
strategic document. A 555-page concept plan was developed by USNORTHCOM 
(Department of Defense, 2006) to design the DoD support to civil authorities; however, 
the large unwieldy plan tends to dilute other strategic documents (Wilson, 2007, p. 25). 
The military (National Guard, Reserves and Active Duty) had significant responsibilities 
for SAR prior to the release of the NRF in 2008; however, the USAF had not been 
designated a PFA nor does the literature indicate a great emphasis on a coordinated multi-
domain SAR response plan for catastrophic incidents.  
The most important document for addressing catastrophic incident SAR in the 
recent past is the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue addendum (CI SAR) to the 
National Search and Rescue Manual published first in April 2008 and updated with 
version 2.2 in August 2008 (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2008, pp. 3–88). 
The CI SAR addendum was designed to unify the efforts of all SAR stakeholders 
(federal, regional, state, tribal and local) because of the cultural and organizational 
complexity of this task. The effort to complete the CI SAR Addendum was coordinated 
by the NSARC after hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately, according to the First Air Force 
(1AF) (AFNORTH)/ Commander (Hudson, AFNORTH SAR Plan Hurricane Ike, 2008, 
pp. 99–111), Hurricane Ike was the “first attempt for an all agency / all domain approach 
to SAR.” Even with progress in coordinating the CI SAR addendum for this hurricane, a 
dilemma still exists in that this interagency/multi-domain solution to integrate SAR for 
catastrophic incidents was not funded, advertised, distributed or trained prior to 
Hurricane Ike. 
The United States National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the 
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (NSARC, 2000, p. 
i) was written prior to the establishment of DHS as the planning and standardization 
document for the military, federal agencies and civil authorities for a national SAR plan. 
The current purpose of the supplement is for training and operations associated with civil 
SAR. United States military authority resides with the NSARC. 
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a. Three Elements of Military SAR: Personnel Recovery, Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities and Civil SAR 
Clearly identifying literature related to authorities for military SAR 
operations helps define the starting point for this research. This literature review 
identified three distinct components of search and rescue to which USNORTHCOM has 
concern: Personnel Recovery, SAR for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA 
SAR) and Civil SAR.  
In this research, an assumption is made that CI SAR does not include 
Personnel Recovery11 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. ix). Personnel Recovery assets and 
capabilities must be maintained during CI SAR operations, but they are not part of the CI 
SAR effort for either DSCA SAR or Civil SAR. They are mentioned in this literature 
review to identify the authorities and requirements placed upon the Joint Personnel 
Recovery Center to maintain the capability to conduct Personnel Recovery throughout 
the spectrum of normal SAR, mass rescue operations and CI SAR.  
DSCA SAR is granted under authorities of the NRF and related 
DHS/FEMA authorities. In this capacity, DoD assets will be used to support civil 
coordinating and primary agencies through processes explained in the NRF/NIMS on a 
reimbursable basis. These support operations are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Act 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 US Code [U.S.C.] §§ 5121–5206) and 
the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535–1536). Immediate response authorities are 
provided by Department of Defense Directive 3025.1 paragraph 4.5 (Department of 
Defense Directive, 1993) and Department of Defense Directive 3025.15 paragraph 4.7.1 
(Department of Defense, 1997, Para. 4.7.1) domestically and internationally by DoDD 
                                                 
11 Personnel Recovery is defined by Joint Publication 3-50 as: “Personnel recovery is the sum of 
military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Isolated 
personnel are those U.S. military, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, and DoD contractor personnel 
(and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) who are separated (as an 
individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and 
who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2007, p. ix). 
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5100.4612 (Department of Defense, 1975). The DoDDs do not mention the authority for 
DoD response to civil SAR emergencies under the authorities provided by the NSP and, 
therefore, civil SAR is mentioned separately from DSCA SAR in this literature review.13 
Civil SAR is authorized by the 2007 National Search and Rescue Plan 
(NSP). As mentioned previously, the NSP references legacy organizational structure 
(NRP and incidents of national significance), but the document also provides important 
authorities related to civil SAR. The document indicates that DoD resources are provided 
for civil SAR without concern for reimbursement providing other ongoing military 
missions are not interfered with (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007, pp. 4–5); 
however, the document also allows for DoD reimbursement for SAR resources when 
performing DSCA SAR under the Stafford Act (National Search and Rescue Committee, 
2007, p. 13, Footnote 7). The differentiation between these authorities (DSCA SAR/civil 
SAR) is important to this research because for CI SAR the ambiguities indicate a need for 
clear guidance on when DoD should be reimbursed for SAR. The NSP provides leverage 
to conduct SAR with more concern for SAR and less concern for reimbursement than the 
DoDDs 3025.1 and DoDD 3025.15, which clearly indicate that all DoD support is 
provided on a reimbursable basis. 
In summary, it is necessary to look at DSCA SAR and civil SAR 
separately to ensure DoD reimbursement is sought for all possible contingencies. 
Could/would a coordinating agency ever balk at refunding DoD for SAR based upon the 
NSP? DoD is not funded for DSCA SAR and DHS is funded as the coordinating agency. 
 
                                                 
12 Foreign disaster relief is authorized/governed under a different directive than domestic immediate 
response. DoD Directive Number 5100.46 (1975) titled, Foreign Disaster Relief, is the source of authority 
for providing Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response to areas outside the United States but still within 
the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (such as Bahamas, Caicos, British Virgin Islands and Mexico). 
USNORTHCOM staff is currently conducting an analysis on how to organize and respond should the need 
arise in these areas. Instead of immediate response, the term for a humanitarian assistance or disaster 
immediate response is “relief operations.” Department of State, through United States Agency for 
International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has a primary role in relief 
operation contingencies.  
13 A draft of DoDD 3025.DD is available but not yet released by DoD. The new draft is expected to 
clarify some of the immediate response and DSCA authorities. 
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For all DSCA support, DoD and other primary and supporting agencies are due 
reimbursement after the fact for support provided, but prior to a Stafford Act disaster 
declaration DoD conducts civil SAR operations without reimbursement expectations. 
b. Civil Support Task List 
With the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) funding support, the 
California National Guard has developed a program that will identify SAR DSCA 
requirements (S. Shinn, 2009). The Civil Support Task List (CSTL) is a collaborative 
effort to organize a common vocabulary describing military capabilities that could be 
provided in support of civil authorities to assist their response to disasters. The National 
Guards of several states, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of Secretary of Defense 
and several representatives of state and local emergency management organizations are 
actively participating in the development of this tool, which seeks to bridge military and 
civilian emergency response communities. Nationwide, the states have drafted over 100 
tasks for inclusion in the CSTL. Of the tasks submitted, 17 SAR tasks have been 
identified.  
The SAR tasks have also been entered into the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) database and will impact CI SAR preparations in the future 
for both Title 32 and Title 10 integrated planning. The CSTL development is important to 
this literature review as the tasks may become the basis for future SAR integrated 
planning efforts. 
2. Literature Related to Civil SAR Operations 
In this sub-set of the literature review, DHS, USCG and ESF #9 texts will be 
discussed. 
a. DHS Literature 
Two strategic documents guide interagency coordination for catastrophic 
incident search and rescue between the DHS and DoD. These documents are the 2007 
National Response Framework (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008) and 
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USNORTHCOM’s Defense Support for Civil Authorities Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 
2501-05 released in 2006 (Department of Defense, 2006). Another key document for 
catastrophic incident SAR is the United States National Search and Rescue Committee 
Interagency Agreement and associated NSP (National Search and Rescue Committee, 
2007). 
The NSARC Interagency Agreement grants a federal committee powers to 
conduct search and rescue activities, conduct coordination with national and international 
stakeholders and promote the best practices for SAR (National Search and Rescue 
Committee, 2007, pp. 1–3). A previously mentioned reference, the USAF Rescue 
Coordination Center (AFRCC) CIS published in 2008 (National Search and Rescue 
Committee, 2008) is also an important document to both the military and DHS SAR 
communities. Although some strategic guidance has been developed, the organization 
cultures and the guidance suffer discontinuity. For example, the NSARC Interagency 
Agreement references the National Response Plan which has been superseded by the 
NRF and contains significant SAR changes in both language and substance.  
In Table 1, the confusion in terminology, geographical boundaries and 
scope of responsibilities is highlighted to emphasize the lack of coordination that seems 
apparent in the policy literature. Does the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center 
(AFRCC) have responsibility for Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico? If the NSP indicates a 
different area of responsibility than the AFRCC, then which one is correct? Why does the 
ESF #9 Annex discuss “open and wilderness areas?” Is the AFRCC not responsible for 
inland inhabited areas and non-wilderness areas?  
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Table 1.   Comparison of AFRCC, ESF #9 and NSP Policy Description for SAR 
Air Combat Command 
Web site states about the 
Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center 
(AFRCC): 
The ESF #9 Annex States the 
AFRCC will: 
The National Search and 
Rescue Plan of the U.S. 
indicates  the USAF is: 
As the United States' inland 
search and rescue 
coordinator, the Air Force 
Rescue Coordination 
Center serves as the single 
agency responsible for 
coordinating on-land 
federal SAR activities in the 
48 contiguous United 
States, Mexico and Canada. 
Serve as the primary agency 
for ESF #9 during SAR 
operations for aviation-related 
incidents requiring a 
coordinated Federal response 
both in open and wilderness 
areas and in the vicinity of 
airports and urban areas 
requiring the coordinated 
deployment of rescue 
personnel and equipment. 
The recognized SAR 
Coordinator for the United 
States aeronautical 
Search and Rescue Region 
(SRR) corresponding to the 
continental United States other 
than Alaska. 
b. United States Coast Guard (USCG) Literature 
The mission of the USCG SAR program is to prevent death or injury to 
persons and loss or damage to property in the marine environment. The statutory 
authority for the USCG to conduct SAR missions is contained in Title 14, Sections 2, 88 
and 141 of the U.S. Code (United States Coast Guard , 2007, pp. 1–2). 
SAR policy is established for the USCG through three primary 
publications and one USCG addendum to the NSS: the NSP, International Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, and the National Search and 
Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue Manual (IAMSAR). There is also a USCG NSS addendum that further refines 
USCG procedures relevant to the NSS and IAMSAR (United States Coast Guard, 2007, 
pp. 1–2).14 The NSS is cited as being the “primary U.S. SAR publication” (United States 
Coast Guard, 2008). This is another example of how the doctrine, policy and procedures 
for catastrophic SAR require revision since this primary U.S. SAR publication was 
                                                 
14 The primary USCG source documents are described in the NSS (National Search and Rescue 
Committee, 2008) on page 2 as: the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP), the International 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, in three volumes, the United States 
National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the IAMSAR Manual and the Coast Guard Addendum 
(CGADD) to the NSS. 
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released in May of 2000, preceding DHS, the NRP and the NRF. Certainly, the 
applicability of this document to define federal level interagency doctrine is questionable. 
The USCG recognizes the difference between normal SAR operations, 
mass rescue operations (MRO) and catastrophic incident SAR (Button, 2007, pp. 32–38). 
The coordination division representative, Rick Button, explained to his Victoria, British 
Columbia audience that there is a difference between MRO and catastrophic incident 
operations. Although there is a strong description of what compromises an MRO, but the 
catastrophic incident implications are glossed over.15  
The USCG goes on to recognize the NRF definition for a catastrophic 
incident in the same document briefed to an international community and posted to the 
USCG SAR page (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 1) as an incident where 
there is a large incident with immediate and extraordinary levels of death and destruction. 
Unfortunately, the USCG analysis stops at that point and indicates interagency 
catastrophic SAR guidance is “being developed.” Another interesting item to note is that 
catastrophic incidents as described in the DHS Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) 
also include terrorist events. In a terrorist event, either DoD or the FBI could be in charge 
and this introduces another aspect to the problem.  
Who would be the lead for catastrophic incident SAR if DoD or the FBI 
were the supported agency? Do the processes change if the environment is contaminated 
with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high explosives (CBRNE)? None of 
the literature reviewed addresses these command, control and coordination issues. 
                                                 
15 Office of Coordination for the USCG has this briefing posted to its Web site and it was briefed to an 
international audience (Button, 2007): “MROs are infrequent operations that require the search and rescue 
of large numbers of people. These operations are not normal SAR and do not meet the catastrophic incident 
criteria. They often need to be carried out with a wide response array that may include hazard mitigation, 
damage control, pollution control, traffic management, large scale logistics, coroner functions, accident-
incident investigation and intense public and political attention, etc….Efforts start at an intense level and 
may go on for days or weeks.” 
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c. Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 Literature 
Another example that strategic- and policy-level interagency integration is 
deficient can be found when contrasting ESF #9 Search and Rescue Annex (FEMA, 2008, 
pp. 5–6) to the NSP. Although rewritten in 2007, the NSP omits any reference to the NRF 
or the Post Katrina Reform Act changes written into the NRF, such as designating the 
DoD/USAF as a primary agency for SAR. The 2008 ESF #9 Annex states, The law (Post 
Katrina Reform Act) also requires that federal plans be developed by each federal agency 
with coordinating, primary, or supporting responsibilities under the NRF (ESF #9 and 
DoD/USAF are two of these organizations). The plans MUST include “The coordination 
of interagency search and rescue operations, including land, water, and airborne search 
and rescue operations” (2006, p. 2, Section 653 (b)(4)(C) 2). Plans that include current 
structures and policies of the coordinating, primary and supporting SAR organizations are 
not available or are outdated. Until these agencies16 develop a cohesive and unified plan, 
it is unlikely that joint-interagency and multi-domain SAR for catastrophic incidents will 
be achieved in an organized and efficient manner. This research did not return evidence 
of any documents that would indicate how federal, state, tribal and local catastrophic 
incident SAR is planned or rehearsed (exercised). The best literature found was the CIS 
developed by the NSARC, but that document is also out of date due to fielding of the 
NRF in March 2008.  
At the state level, a wide array of SAR plans exists. Formats of the plans, 
political divisions and procedures differ between states. Two examples include the 
Mississippi and New Mexico plans. The Mississippi plan mirrors the format of the NRF 
ESF #9 Annex, complete with coordinators, primary and support agencies (Barbour, 
2008, p. Mississippi ESF #9 Annex). The information is Web-based and uses 
                                                 
16 The ESF #9 SAR Annex (Department f Homeland Security, 2008) lists coordinating, primary and 
support agency responsibilities as: ESF Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security/Federal 
Emergency Management Agency; Primary Agencies: Department of Homeland Security/Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the 
Interior/National Park Service, Department of Defense/U.S. Air Force; Support Agencies: Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and U.S. Agency for International Development. 
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terminology compliant with the NRF and the National Incident Management System 
language. The New Mexico plan was prepared in 1996 and includes both the SAR Act 
(law) and the state plan. The New Mexico plan is Web-based, but does not have linkages 
to the NRF or the ESF #9 Annex (Search and Rescue) of the framework (New Mexico 
Department of Public Safety, 1991, pp. 1–18). The New Mexico plan states that 
implementation of their agreement must be supported by a memo of understanding 
between state agencies and the AFRCC commander. It is important to point out the 
differences between the two states in order to stress that each state has its own procedures 
for catastrophic SAR. Also important to note is that federal plans and policies must take 
the sovereign state government plans into consideration for coordination and 
collaboration during development of a comprehensive catastrophic incident SAR plan. 
Failure to take state or tribal equities in consideration will doom the efforts before they 
start. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SYNOPSIS 
The GAO (2006, pp. 15, 19 and 35) found that DoD had not adequately planned 
or exercised catastrophic incident SAR response in 2005. With a catastrophic incident 
addendum for SAR fielded and the DoD/USAF recently designated as one of five 
primary agencies for ESF #9 (Search and Rescue), it seems DoD is in the same 
predicament now as shortly prior to Hurricane Katrina. That is, there is guidance 
available for conducting catastrophic incident SAR, but training and exercise programs 
for the stakeholders are not available and have not been developed. Should the USCG 
lead the catastrophic incident SAR planning, training and exercise efforts for the 
maritime domain? Should the USAF lead the effort since it is designated as the single 
agency responsible for coordinating on-land federal SAR activities in the U.S., Canada 
and Mexico (First Air Force, 2008)? Would one want the USAF leading a training and 
exercise program for the maritime domain any more than one would want the USAF 





According to the USCG’s Web site, “The National Search and Rescue Committee 
is a federal-level committee formed to coordinate civil search and rescue (SAR) matters 
of interagency interest within the United States” (United States Coast Guard, 2008). It 
has developed the most comprehensive operational interagency document available that 
addresses catastrophic SAR. Ironically, the CIS (National Search and Rescue Committee, 
2008) was a backdoor effort by a handful of caring representatives, not from a mandated 
or funded source (J. Sokol, personal communication, July 14, 2008). In August 2008, the 
NSARC released the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum (Version 1.1) 
to the National Search and Rescue Manual. This document has been neither trained nor 
exercised within USNORTHCOM or during any Tier 1 interagency exercise. It is not 
clear whether the USCG, ESF #9, the USAF (NSARC) or some other organization 
(USNORTHCOM J7/National Guard Bureau J7) should lead the integrated planning 
effort.17  
The NSP and NRF clearly indicate the NSARC has the federal coordinating 
responsibility for SAR, but DHS has overall responsibility. The NSARC is chartered to 
oversee the NSP and serve as a federal coordinating forum for national civil SAR matters 
(National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007, p. 2). Why has the supplement gone more 
than eight years since the last revision? Does the NSARC have funding and responsibility 
to update plans, policies and publications for the entire federal interagency community? 
Just as important, does the NSARC have the responsibility to train all FSTL partners on 
changes implemented when the doctrine is updated or is DHS responsible? Because of 
the unique, timely and surge capabilities of the DoD to support catastrophic incident 
SAR; should DoD have a primary role as a leader in these efforts?  
                                                 
17 USCG SAR mission is defined: “Search and Rescue (SAR) is one of the Coast Guard's oldest 
missions.  Minimizing the loss of life, injury, property damage or loss by rendering aid to persons in 
distress and property in the maritime environment has always been a Coast Guard priority.  Coast Guard 
SAR response involves multi-mission stations, cutters, aircraft and boats linked by communications 
networks.  The National SAR Plan divides the U.S. area of SAR responsibility into internationally 
recognized inland and maritime SAR regions.  The Coast Guard is the Maritime SAR Coordinator.  To 
meet this responsibility, the Coast Guard maintains SAR facilities on the East, West and Gulf coasts; in 
Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico, as well as on the Great Lakes and inland U.S. waterways.  The 




Because the answers to these questions are not readily apparent in the literature, 
one can assume a lack of preparedness for catastrophic incident SAR. If the doctrine is 
not current and the FSTTL partners are not training together, the SAR megacommunity is 
likely behind in catastrophic incident SAR preparations. In this thesis, a methodology and 




III. ORGANIZATIONS, FUNCTIONS AND ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III presents an organizational overview and analysis of how DHS, 
National Search and Rescue Committee participants, states, National Guard and 
International Search and Rescue Advisory Committee intend to organize and function for 
CI SAR. The information is presented in a manner that helps the reader understand the 
enormity of the CI SAR preparations currently underway, while recognizing that many 
ventures are still needed to declare preparedness. The chapter attempts to clarify current 
and proposed organizations and their respective obligations. 
After describing megacommunity member responsibilities, organization and how 
they fit in, this research goes on to describe three tactical/technical systems used by SAR 
professionals in the USCG to elucidate why better coordination is necessary between the 
disparate SAR organizations and how improving the interagency coordination will 
provide better operational efficiency in a number of ways:  The self-locating data marker 
beacons, the SAR Optimal Planning System and the integrated Flight Management 
System provide technological examples of why SAR would be improved if all partners 
integrated this Coast Guard-specific technology. The technological problems are 
introduced as a catalyst to promote more robust CI SAR preparations. The objective in 
providing these technological and new initiative models is to expose some current weak 
links between equity holders within the SAR megacommunity, and also why additional 
response system redundancy is necessary to improve the managerial process. 
Problem areas are not, however, limited to these technologies. Challenges also 
exist in management of SAR resources for chaotic events, international SAR initiatives 
and strategic planning for these unpredictable highly complex and unexpected challenges 
(Ramo, 2009, p. 30). Introducing some of these difficulties provides a good framework 
from which the organizations can be analyzed in Chapters V and VI of this research 
(Townsend, 2006, p. 57). There was a lack of coordination between the constituent 
partners during Katrina SAR operations. SAR endeavors of individual organizations were  
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conducted well, but expertise for air support to cross over into urban or maritime SAR or 
for urban SAR to carry out searches outside the urban areas was lacking. Exceptional 
efforts to save lives were made in a somewhat uncoordinated manner. 
GAO investigated the military planning as it related to Hurricane Katrina and 
found: 
Uncoordinated search and rescue efforts: While tens of thousands of 
people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in search and rescue 
plans led to operations that, according to aviation officials, were not as 
efficient as they could have been. The NRP addressed only part of the 
search and rescue mission, and the National Search and Rescue Plan had 
not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a result, the search and rescue 
operations of the National Guard and federal military responders were not 
fully coordinated, and military operations were not integrated with the 
search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At 
least two different locations were assigning search and rescue tasks to 
military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans, and no one had the 
total picture of the missions that had been resourced and the missions that 
still needed to be performed. (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 
7) 
Exploring what is done with SAR data once it is received by a single organization 
to ensure the widest dissemination occurs between agencies is of utmost importance to 
efficiency. Current organizational structures and processes to determine methods of 
communication and coordination that might improve the technological advantages these 
technologies bring to the overall SAR effort must be examined and improved upon. This 
chapter examines organizational components of the SAR megacommunity followed by a 
few examples that highlight how the organization for SAR could be improved to take 
advantage science and technology in a rapidly changing environment. 
B. ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS 
1. Introduction 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the CI SAR megacommunity. The red area of 
the diagram portrays the entire SAR megacommunity. The small grey boxes along the 
left side of the chart represent local and state institutions, regional team members, private 
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and volunteer organizations and the international support system. The green box 
represents the federal members of the National Search and Rescue Advisory Committee. 
The purple box is an expanded view of the resources DoD brings to bear. DoD resources 
are subdivided into Title 10 (federal military) and Title 32 (National Guard). Table 2 





Figure 1.   CI SAR Megacommunity
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Table 2.   Description of Acronyms for Figure 1 
Acronym Organization / Acronym Description 
State and Local SAR Assets Local SAR managers, SAR 
Mission Coordinators, ESF #9 and 
other state SAR officials 
State and local SAR organizations. 
Regional SAR Assets USCG Rescue Coordination 
Centers, USAF Search and Rescue 
Regions, maritime search and 
rescue regions, FEMA Regions, 
WFF GACCs, Regional Incident 
Management Assistance Teams, 
Task Forces for Emergency 
Readiness and other regional 
emergency management entities 
Regional ESF #9, Task Forces for 
Emergency Response, Incident 
Management Assistance Teams 
and other regional assets 
PVOs Private and Volunteer 
Organizations 
Organizations such as Citizen 
Corps, the Eagles Wings 
Foundation, Habitat for Humanity, 
etc. 
 
USAID/OFDA/INSARAG United States Agency for 
International Development/Office 
of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance/International Search 
and Rescue Advisory Group 
Through the Department of State, 
these members of the 
megacommunity manage 
international aid 
NSARC National Search and Rescue 
Committee 
Organized under the authority of 
the National Search and Rescue 
Plan, 7 federal agencies coordinate 
federal SAR activities. State and 
National Guard representatives 
also participate 
 
DHS/USCG/FEMA Department of Homeland 
Security/United States Coast 
Guard/Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
DHS is the SAR coordinator per 
the NRF and the USCG leads the 
NSARC. FEMA is one of the 
primary agencies and is also the 
ESF #9 lead agency for SAR 
 
States States are represented through the 
National Association of Search 
and Rescue (NASAR) 
Each state handles SAR in 
accordance with the respective 
laws governing the state 
 
DoD Department of Defense  Department of Defense 
contributions are expanded into 
T10 and T32 activities 
 
DOI Department of the Interior National Park Service and U.S. 
Geological Service 
DOC Department of Commerce National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration 




Acronym Organization / Acronym Description 
DOT Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 
 
FCC Federal Communications 
Commission 
406 MHz beacons, frequencies, 
etc. 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
Distress Alerting Satellite System, 
COSPAS-SARSAT, Beacons, 
space rescue, etc. 
OSD/DPMO Office of Secretary of 
Defense/Defense Prisoner of 
War/Missing Personnel Office 
DoD lead for SAR and Personnel 
Recovery 
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command North American Combatant 
Commander for 50 states, Canada, 
Mexico, territories coastal 
waters/approaches. Some 
responsibilities in Alaska. 
Awaiting designation as the SAR 
Coordinator from the Secretary of 
Defense 
 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command SAR responsibilities for Alaska 
and Hawaii 
 
Military Services Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines 
Military Departments 
AFRCC Air Force Rescue Coordination 
Center 
Single agency responsible for 
coordinating on-land federal SAR 
activities in the 48 contiguous 
states, Mexico and Canada 24 
hours per day. Ties into the 
satellite alert system through a 
U.S. Mission Control Center 
 
JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Center Responsible for planning and 
coordinating personnel recovery 
for military operations within the 
assigned operational area. Provides 
DSCA SAR support on a non-
interference basis 
 
ACCE Air Forces Northern Air 
Component Coordination Element 
Coordinates the movement of Air 
Force assets during natural 
disasters or other contingencies. 
ACCE also supports state and 
federal evacuation, humanitarian 
relief and search and rescue 
missions 
 
CAP/AFAUX Civil Air Patrol/Air Force 
Auxiliary 
Provides search and rescue, 
disaster relief, humanitarian 




Acronym Organization / Acronym Description 
DCOs Defense Coordinating Officers Also includes a staff of 
approximately 40 personnel 
assigned to coordinate T10 
resources in one of 10 FEMA 
regions 
 
NGB National Guard Bureau Coordinates programs with the 
Army and Air Force staffs.  
Develops operating programs for 
the Army and Air Guard. 
Participates with and assists states 
in organizing, maintaining and 
operating their National Guard 
units 
 
States 50 States  States fall under the purview of the 
governor. Alaska and Hawaii are 
supported by USPACOM in 
federal duty status and the 38 
contiguous states fall under 
USNORTHCOM in federal duty 
status. The state organization that 
has responsibility for SAR varies 
between the states 
 
Territories Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands in 
USNORTHCOM’s area of 
responsibility  
USNORTHCOM is responsible for 
military support to these territories. 
USNORTHCOM area of 
responsibility also extends 12 
miles off the coast 
 
2. National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC)  
a. Responsibilities 
The NSARC coordinates national and international civil SAR issues 
amongst federal, state, territorial, tribal, local and international equity holders through a 
national interagency coordinating body. In addition, the NSARC provides a venue for all 
national agencies to meet and develop preliminary positions on SAR matters. The 
committee is led by the USCG under the purview of DHS. DoD is a member of the 
National Search and Rescue Committee18 along with Department of Interior (National 
Park Service), Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation (Federal 
                                                 
18 Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England endorsed the 2007 National Search and Rescue Plan 
July 18, 2007. 
34 
 
Aviation Administration), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), NASA and DHS 
(U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency) (NSARC, 2007). 
The preeminent SAR reference is the International Aeronautical SAR 
Manual (IAMSAR), Volumes 1–3. The IAMSAR and the U.S. National SAR 
Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual along with the National Search and Rescue Plan of 
the United States are the three primary documents orienting the strategic and operational 
efforts of the NSARC19 and SAR megacommunity. Out of these three documents arise 
responsibilities for SAR that are accomplished, not only by the NSARC, but also by other 
FSTTL20 agencies, including DoD.  
b. Organization 
The NSARC (prior to 1999, called the International Committee for Search 
and Rescue) revised the NSP for the first time in 1999. Issues identified in the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina response were the catalyst for another revision to the NSP in 2007 
(Button). The 2007 version of the NSP established SAR Coordinators for the U.S. 
regions, provided for the establishment and coordination of SAR services to meet 
domestic needs and international obligations, and instituted a cooperative SAR network 
that can be coordinated through a single federal agency (Hudson, 2009). International and 
Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, through the 
IAMSAR, identify contiguous SAR regions (SRR) around the globe. Countries are 
responsible for coordinating SAR within each respective region. In the United States, 
SRRs are coordinated by SAR coordinators. The USCG is responsible for aeronautical 
and maritime coordination through nine rescue coordination centers (RCCs), and the 
                                                 
19 The NSARC history began in 1954 when an Air Coordinating Committee was requested by 
President Eisenhower to control and coordinate search and rescue missions. The National Search and 
Rescue Plan (NSP) of the United States was published as a result of the endeavor. Until 1973, The NSP 
languished as no federal organization had been identified to lead the effort. The Department of 
Transportation volunteered to implement the plan under an umbrella organization they called the 
International Committee on Search and Rescue (ICSAR) in 1974. 
20 The National Response Framework and the Emergency Support Function #9 Annex provide the 
framework for SAR response other than the authorities for civil SAR authorized by the 2007 NSP and DoD 
Personnel Recovery authorities. 
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USAF is the inland SAR Coordinator21 through an Air Force RCC at Tyndall Air Force 
Base, Florida, the Civil Air Patrol, state SAR coordinators and other government, private 
and volunteer organizations. The coordinator for Alaska is United States Pacific 
Command (USPACOM) through the eleventh RCC located at Fort Richardson, Alaska.  
c. How the NSARC Fits in the SAR Megacommunity 
The NSARC is the United States lead institution for developing 
aeronautical and maritime search and rescue policy. The NSARC is chaired by the 
USCG.  The NSARC publishes and revises national SAR policy documents, such as the 
Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National Search and Rescue 
Manual and the National SAR Plan. Policy development and revision is conducted 
through a cooperative process with the NSARC equity holders (Button, 2007).   
3. DHS/FEMA ESF #9 
a. Responsibilities 
DHS is charged with overall responsibility for federal CI SAR. DHS has 
nominated FEMA as the primary agency for SAR with responsibility to: “rapidly deploy 
components of the federal SAR Response System to provide specialized lifesaving 
assistance to state, tribal, and local authorities when activated for incidents or potential 
incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response” (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008, p. 1). DHS has also delegated responsibilities to the USCG through the 
NSARC for coordinating federal SAR assets. The Emergency Support Function #9  
 
 
                                                 
21 A draft ESF #9 Annex to the NRF has been prepared and is currently under review at the FEMA. 
The draft recommends the SC be changed from the USAF to USNORTHCOM. The USAF, through Air 
Forces North (AFNORTH) would retain operational SAR responsibilities while USNORTHCOM would 
inherit SC duties (Strategy, Coordination and Resourcing). 
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Search and Rescue Annex22 indicates scope, policies, concept of operations, organization 
and responsibilities of the entrusted SAR coordinator, primary agencies and support 
agencies within the SAR megacommunity.  
The scope of SAR responsibilities is divided into four categories of 
specialized SAR; structural collapse (urban) search and rescue (US&R), waterborne 
search and rescue, inland/wilderness search and rescue and aeronautical SAR. Each of 
these specialized categories of SAR is assigned to a primary agency (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2008, pp. 1–3) as found in Table 3. 
                                                 
22 ESF #9 rewrite has been drafted and is currently (as of May 18, 2009) at DHS/FEMA for approval. 
One change for DoD in the draft is listing DoD instead of DoD USAF as one of the possible primary 
agency solutions that FEMA can choose for a particular incident. The intent is for USNORTHCOM to 
receive responsibility as the search and rescue coordinator (SC) for their area of responsibility (AOR) with 
the exception of AK, which comes under the purview of USPACOM. 
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Table 3.   Overview of Scope and Primary Agency Responsibility per ESF #9 Annex 
































Overview  Structure collapse 
that requires 
US&R task force 












USCG air, ship 






backcountry or rural 
operations that 








require the use of 
aircraft to search 
for distressed 






Note: In the ESF #9 revision dated April 11, 2009, Inland/Wilderness SAR and Aeronautical SAR are 
kluged into the term “Land SAR”. Land SAR is a shared responsibility between the Primary 
Agencies:  Department of the Interior (DOI)/National Park Service (NPS) and Department of 
Defense (DoD) (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, pp. 2–3) 
 
SAR is considered an “Element of Capability” in the 2007 National 
Planning Guidelines (data derived from the 2007 Target Capabilities List). The stated 
outcome for land-based SAR is: “The greatest numbers of victims (human and, to the 
extent that no humans remain endangered, animal) are rescued and transferred to medical 
or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer 
safety”23 (Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 8). 
                                                 
23 Responsibilities for SAR are identified in a number of documents. The general SAR tasks to be 
accomplished by the SAR megacommunity as proposed in the National Preparedness Guidelines are found 
in three primary documents: Target Capabilities List (Department of Homeland Security, 2007), the 
Universal Task List Version 2.1 (Department of Homeland Security, 2005) and the National Planning 
Scenarios (Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Council, 2006).  
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b. DHS/FEMA ESF #9 Organization for CI SAR 
FEMA was established in the executive branch as an independent agency 
pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 (5 U.S. Code) and Executive Orders 
12127 of March 31, 1979 (effective April 1, 1979) and 12148 of July 20, 1979 (effective 
July 15, 1979). FEMA has more than 2,600 employees, and they are part of the DHS 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. FEMA works in partnerships across 
organizations at FSTTL levels. Figure 2 portrays the 10 FEMA regions and 
corresponding regional headquarters.  
 
Figure 2.   FEMA Regions (from United States Army North, 2006) 
FEMA intends to build upon state SAR efforts for catastrophic incidents. 
The federal ESF #9 response assumes the states recognize that emergencies may reach 
such a magnitude as to require federal resources in addition to National Guard and 
emergency management assistance compacts (EMAC) sources. Incidents could exceed 
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the capability of all rescue resources within the state and regional capabilities and that 
federal and international support will be needed and desired.24  
c. How DHS/FEMAFits into the SAR Megacommunity 
FEMA ESF #9 representation is found within the NSARC and the agency 
effort has been instrumental in rewriting the ESF #9 Annex to the NRF, revising the CIS 
SAR addendum, and actively participating in operational NSARC activities. FEMA has 
also recently released the Integrated Planning System (IPS) that was designed to 
standardize federal planning processes and support the Homeland Security Management 
System. Unfortunately, when the IPS was mentioned at the February 2009 NSARC 
meeting, none of the federal partners were interested in adopting the process for the CI 
SAR addendum revision.  
FEMA established the US&R Response System in 1989 to provide vital 
specialized search and rescue task forces to local and state authorities. US&R is defined 
by FEMA as the locating, extraction, initial medical stabilization of a victim trapped in a 
confined space. Entrapment is usually the result of building collapse; however, trapped 
individuals are also found in transportation accidents, mines and collapsed trenches 
(FEMA US&R, 2007). There are 28 US&R task forces nationwide,25 of which two 
American teams are internationally certified. If an event occurs that necessitates US&R 
resources, then FEMA deploys the closest three task forces within six hours. The task 
forces support state and local emergency efforts. A typical team is comprised of 31 
people, four dogs and equipment. 
                                                 
24 The SAR megacommunity has not clearly identified the difference between normal SAR operations, 
mass rescue operations (MRO) and catastrophic incident SAR One assumption is that CI SAR will be 
apparent when it happens. That may be true of a no-notice event, but an event that slowly worsens will 
have progressively worse conditions. A clear and concise point where mass rescue operations cease and CI 
SAR begins is not known. 
25 During the National Hurricane Conference in March 2009, it was announced that additional US&R 




As mentioned in Chapter II, USNORTHCOM is not incorporated well into the 
operational and strategic planning documents for SAR. The USNORTHCOM 
Commander has taken the initiative to prepare for and anticipate CI SAR requirements 
despite the lack of formal tasking or authority. In the next two sections, USNORTHCOM 
and the USAF elements for SAR shall be discussed. 
a. Responsibility 
As directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM 
will provide DSCA SAR, civil SAR and personnel recovery.  
(1)  DSCA SAR.  DSCA SAR is provided under a number of 
separate authorities. Authorities for DSCA SAR include the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief Act, 42 U.S. Code 5121 as amended26 (106th Congress, 2000), National Response 
Framework, NIMS, Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRF and ICS. AFNORTH 1AF, 
as the USNORTHCOM Air Component, will establish a Joint Personnel Recovery Center 
and establish liaison between the primary agency, Joint Task Force and other interested 
equity holders.27 United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters will support the Joint Personnel Recovery Center with this 
cooperative effort (United States Northern Command J3, 2008, p. C-27-10). 
USNORTHCOM intends to conduct SAR in a six-phase operation. The command will 
shape, anticipate, respond, operate, stabilize and transition back to normal operations. 
The phases include deployment of five AFRCC members to the AFNORTH /1AF Air 
Operations Center to establish a Joint Personnel Recovery Center.   
                                                 
26 As amended by Public Law. 103-181, Public Law 103-337, and Public Law 106-390 (Public Law 
106-390, October 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1552 – 1575). 5170b c. 1–6 provide guidance on use of DoD 
resources. Three items to note in this authority are that DoD support many only be carried out for a period 
not to exceed 10 days. Work is on a reimbursable basis and the federal share of assistance shall not be less 
than 75percent, 
27 DoD Organization for DSCA CI SAR is typically from USNORTHCOM (through a Joint Task 
Force, Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Air Component Commander, Marine Forces 
for North America and Maritime components) to the Joint Personnel Recovery Center. 
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For CI SAR, USNORTHCOM will take immediate response 
actions to save lives, prevent human suffering and to mitigate great property damage 
under imminently serious conditions (United States Northern Command J3, 2008, p. C-
27-1) through an expedited version of the six operational phases28 and as authorized in 
the Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRF (Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
Immediate response for SAR is authorized by DoD Directive 
3025.129 domestically and internationally by DoD Directive 5100.4630 (Department of 
Defense, 1975). Local commanders may provide assistance when time does not permit 
higher headquarters approval processes31 to assist with rescue and evacuation or the 
emergency medical treatment of casualties, the maintenance or restoration of emergency 
medical capabilities and the safeguarding of public health. USNORTHCOM will attain 
visibility on immediate response efforts through the National Guard, services and 
Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) as immediate response is reported through 
command channels using the most expeditious means possible and within 72 hours. 
Immediate response for CI SAR is both anticipated and encouraged; however, 
management and coordination of follow-on DoD support will likely be difficult to 
synchronize with these initial efforts. As the catastrophic event unfolds, the governor or 
                                                 
28 The SAR Appendix 27 to Annex C to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (DSCA) is somewhat out 
of date and consideration should be given to revising the document by the USNORTHCOM SAR Cell. For 
example, it does not reference the CI SAR Addendum; it references the 1999 version of the NSP, the 
appendix states inaccurately that T10  SAR Forces will be OPCON or TACON to USNORTHCOM; it does 
not discuss expedited procedures for catastrophic events and does not include discussion of the NSARC 
and USNORTHCOM involvement with other primary agencies. Furthermore, when the revised ESF #9 
Annex is released, this document will not be out of date; it will be obsolete. 
29 DoD 3025 is in draft for approval at Office of Secretary of Defense. 
30 Foreign disaster relief is authorized/governed under a different directive than domestic immediate 
response. DoD Directive Number 5100.46 (December 4, 1975) titled, Foreign Disaster Relief, is the source 
of authority for providing Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response to areas outside the United States, 
but still within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (such as Bahamas, Caicos, British Virgin Islands 
and Mexico). USNORTHCOM staff is currently conducting an analysis on how to organize and respond 
should the need arise in these areas. Instead of immediate response, the term for a humanitarian assistance 
or disaster immediate response is “relief operations.”  
31 United States Corps of Engineers (ACOE) have exceptional authorities under 33 U.S. Code 701N, 
which are somewhat unique. A parallel can be drawn that this ACOE exception and authorities to conduct 




ambassador will request that the President declare a “disaster.” At such a time, the 
Stafford Act allows additional federal support (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005).32  
After determination is made that a catastrophic incident has 
occurred, federal military CI SAR support will deploy in advance of an anticipated 
request for assistance (RFA) from the primary federal agency in order to assist the civil 
authorities.  
DoD is also authorized to provide DSCA SAR by 42 U.S. Code 
5170a and 5170b. U.S. Code 5170a states that the President may direct any federal 
agency to provide DSCA without reimbursement in support of state and local authorities. 
U.S. Code 5170b affirms that the President may authorize federal agencies to provide 
work and services essential to save lives and protect and preserve property on public or 
private land and water. These services include SAR, emergency medical support, 
emergency mass care, emergency shelter and provision of food, water, medicine and 
other essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons. The President may also 
provide services to reduce immediate threats to life, property and public health and safety 
(U.S. Congress, 2007). 
(2)  Civil SAR.  DoD personnel will provide civil SAR to persons, 
ships, and aircraft in distress under U.S. and international law and applicable regulations 
on a non-interference basis with their primary mission, on a reimbursable basis according 
to the Economy Act and Stafford Act. In the U.S., DoD attempts to ensure a 
synchronized DoD CI SAR response by coordinating through the civil authorities 
(Federal Coordinating Officer) and the civil/military state authorities (State Coordinating 
Officer / the Adjutant General of the National Guard) through the staff of the Regional 
DCO.33  
                                                 
32 Other governments and territories are also eligible to request the President declare disasters as if 
they were states. These “states” include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 
American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia are also eligible to request a declaration and receive assistance from the 
U.S. federal government. 
33 DCO staff includes military operators and planners, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers 
(EPLOs), special staff and other liaisons.  
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USNORTHCOM is tasked (Secretary of Defense, 2006, pp. 5-7) to 
conduct a wide array of civil SAR functions (consistent with legal authority and on a 
non-interference basis) such as: 
 Conduct civil SAR with trained personnel. 
 Review security cooperation strategies and plans. 
 Coordinate with headquarters, USCG office of SAR. 
 Be knowledgeable of civil SAR responsibilities to 
complement other agreements. 
 Support SAR operations of other countries. 
 Negotiate and conclude civil SAR agreements with other 
country military counterparts. 
 Provide copies of international agreements to the DoD 
General Counsel and DOS. 
 Do not accept roles as SC or RCC for civil SAR where other 
nations have responsibility. 
 Support civil SAR when requested by other search and rescue 
regions. 
 DoD may support civil SAR when no other suitable facilities 
are available in other SAR regions. 
 Include the USCG liaisons when planning and executing civil 
SAR activities. 
 USPACOM will be recognized as the SAR coordinator for 
civil SAR in aeronautical search and rescue region 
corresponding to Alaska.  
Although the tactical and operational responsibilities are similar 
for both DSCA SAR and civil SAR, the authorities and strategic implications are 
significantly different.  
(3)  Personnel Recovery.  Personnel Recovery (PR) is authorized 
by U.S. Code Title 10, Section 1501, JP 3-50 and DoDD 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery 
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in the Department of Defense.  (Department of Defense, 2009, pp. 1–25). 34 The National 
Security Presidential Directive 12 (February 18, 2002), “United States Citizens Held 
Hostage Abroad,” also refers to PR.  
DoD has the primary responsibility for recovering isolated U.S.35 
personnel who are deployed outside the United States and its territories. It is the DoD PR 
policy to preserve the lives of isolated U.S. military, DoD civilians and DoD contractors. 
USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning and executing personnel recovery 
operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR (United States Northern Command J3, 
2008, p. C-27-2a). Although PR is not a primary concern during CI SAR operations, it is 
mentioned because many of the same assets and organizations for PR are used for DSCA 
SAR and civil SAR.36  
A recent Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) mission 
analysis of the USNORTHCOM Personnel Recovery program made a number of findings 
that are important to this study: 
 Structure PR to more effectively respond to civil SAR. 
 Designate USNORTHCOM as Search and Rescue 
Coordinator for the U.S. aeronautical search and rescue 
Region corresponding to the continental U.S. other than 
Alaska. USNORTHCOM would then delegate operational 
authority to AFNORTH. 
 
                                                 
34 Isolated personnel (IP) are defined by Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense Prisoner of 
War Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) as:  “United States military, Department of Defense civilians and 
contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated 
from their unit (as an individual or group) while participating in a U.S. sponsored military activity or 
mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape”. Personnel 
recovery is described by OSD/DPMO as: “The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for 
and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel” (Department of Defense, 2009, p. 25). 
35 The term “isolated” refers to those people that are in danger or may become endangered, 
beleaguered, besieged, captured, detained, interned, or otherwise missing or evading capture (Department 
of Defense, 2009, p. 2).  
36 The USNORTHCOM commander has implemented a program to establish a fully manned and 
trained Personnel Recovery staff. AFNORTH has been directed to stand-up a full-time Joint Personnel and 
Recovery Center with eight personnel. They will be co-located with the AFRCC at Tyndall AFB, Florida 
(J. Sokol, personal communication, February 27, 2009). 
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 Re-examine United States Pacific Command designation as 
the Search and Rescue Coordinator for the recognized U.S. 
aeronautical search and rescue region corresponding to 
Alaska. 
 Establish AFNORTH Joint Personnel Recovery Center in 
support of both Personnel Recovery and support to civil SAR 
missions. 
 Have USNORTHCOM source Personnel Recovery positions. 
 Provide Personnel Recovery formal education. 
 Develop a concept of operations plan for Personnel Recovery 
(Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 2009). 
b. DoD/ USNORTHCOM Organization for CI SAR 
For CI SAR, the Catastrophic Incident Annex suggests that federal 
agencies may mobilize resources in anticipation of a request for assistance. The purpose 
of pushing federal assets during CI SAR operations is that it takes some time to mobilize 
the resources, organize, stage and prepare the assets for employment. It is imperative to 
move DoD timely, unique and surge SAR capabilities near to the incident because time 
saved equates to lives saved in CI SAR operations (J. Sokol, personal communication, 
February 27, 2009). 
USNORTHCOM has taken many steps to improve CI SAR organization 
recently as the commander attempts to anticipate the DHS requirements and identify the 
“sweet spot” for preparedness. The USNORTHCOM Commander stated at the National 
Hurricane Conference in April 2009 that the best integrated SAR plan in history was seen 
in 2008 with Hurricane Ike. One hundred SAR aircraft were controlled through the Joint 
Personnel Recovery Center and USNORTHCOM provided DSCA SAR in the form of an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (Global Hawk) for incident awareness and assessment. This was 
necessary for situational awareness in the early hours of an event in order to first 
anticipate the need of the civil authorities and then to harmonize the federal response 
efforts (United States Northern Command Standing Joint Force Headquarters, 2009). The 
DoD SAR organization for Hurricane Ike in 2008 provides a recent example that 
demonstrates efforts underway to improve CI SAR readiness (Taleb, 2007, p. xvii). 
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Hurricane Ike did not reach catastrophic levels; however, the SAR 
megacommunity prepared for the eventuality by organizing differently in Texas than had 
been attempted in the past. The formulation of an Air Coordination Group (ACG) 
organization revealed that SAR operational and centralized coordination/communications 
was important. The ACG was very useful to the civil authorities, as the emergency 
managers knew how they could quickly get air support if it was required. The ACG had 
representatives from 35 co-located complimentary experts representing 25 agencies. This 
ACG concept is now a standard in Texas hurricane preparations.  
The ACG was not without problems, however. At Lake Charles, 90 
ambulances waited 14 hours for litters. Some aircraft were left empty. Some aircraft were 
the wrong type and had inappropriate configurations (S. Kavanagh, personal 
communication, April 9, 2009).  
Another problem that an Emergency Preparedness Liaison mentioned was 
that a FEMA Urban Search and Rescue team was sent to Fort Sam Houston without a 
state request (S. Kavanagh, personal communication, April 9, 2009). According to 
Colonel Young, DCO Region VI, a military installation commander called to find out 
who the urban search and rescue team was and why they were at Fort Sam Houston, 
Texas. The US&R team had begun linking with other ESFs in preparation for the 
anticipated employment. Their coordinating efforts had gained the attention of state 
emergency managers who had not requested their assistance and did not know the US&R 
team was even in the state. Emergency managers from Texas Task Force 1 wanted to 
know why the Federal Coordinating Officer was deploying national SAR teams that had 
not been requested.  The state ESF #9 coordinator for SAR was left out of the entire 
deployment/employment discussion. Even though the Hurricane Ike effort shows great 
improvement, there was still a clear lack of unity (Kavanagh, 2009).  
Hurricane Ike SAR organization provides a recent and important proof of 





and useful to SAR managers and coordinators. The Air Coordination Group was a good 
start on working towards a Joint Air Ground Coordination Center that is recommended 
later in this research. 
c. How DoD/USNORTHCOM Fits in for CI SAR 
Civil SAR authorities are provided by the International Aeronautical and 
Maritime SAR Manual, U.S. National SAR Supplement (NSS) to the IMASAR Manual, 
the U.S. National SAR Plan, DoDD 3003.01, DoD Support for Civil SAR (Secretary of 
Defense, 2006) and DoDD 3025.1 Military Support of Civil Authorities and the CI SAR 
addendum to the National SAR Manual. These civil SAR services are provided by DoD 
on a “not to interfere with military mission” basis. Per the National Search and Rescue 
Plan (NSP), DoD has the primary responsibility for Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) 
activities in the continental U.S. and secondary support of civil SAR in the rest of the 
world. The military services have authority for immediate response (J. Hudson, personal 
communication, March 20, 2009).37  
The roles and responsibilities of USNORTHCOM for CI SAR are 
comprised of five general tasks that are at varied levels of maturity. There is initiative 
within the command to work on these five efforts but much remains to be done to ensure 
DoD has clarity of SAR requirements associated with catastrophic events.  
First, DoD has been designated a primary agency by ESF #9 and the 
command must be prepared to fulfill those tasks. Duties related to the designation as a 
primary agency for ESF #9 include strategic coordination/collaboration providing  
 
                                                 
37 USNORTHCOM has concerns with three designated search and rescue regions (SRRs) in the joint 
operations area(JOA). The continental U.S. SRR responsibilities for civil SAR are delegated to the USAF 
(through the USAF, Air Combat Command (ACC)), 1-AF AFNORTH and to the Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center. The second search and rescue region USNORTHCOM has interests is the Alaska 
SRR, as does United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). USNORTHCOM and USPACOM share 
responsibilities in Alaska, but civil SAR is habitually conducted by USPACOM (through 11th Air Force) 
thru the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). The third search and rescue region in the 
USNORTHCOM JOA is a Maritime SRR managed by the USCG (through Pacific Area and Atlantic Area 
Coordinators) to the 10 USCG District RCCs. These USCG responsibilities also include inland waterways 
of the United States. 
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guidance to other DoD operational components for the three SAR categorical 
requirements (DSCA SAR, civil SAR and personnel recovery) (Department of Defense, 
2009).  
Second, USNORTHCOM must execute roles and fulfill responsibilities as 
the national SAR coordinator38 by developing a SAR cell in the USNORTHCOM 
operations directorate to oversee SAR in the USNORTHCOM AOR and to serve as the 
command search and rescue coordinator in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. 
Additionally, the SAR coordinator should represent DoD on the National Search and 
Rescue Committee, set DoD policy in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, 
develop and promulgate an aggressive training program, lead a mission analysis to 
determine DoD roles and responsibilities, and assist with strategy and policy 
development to support ESF #9 operations.  
Third, the USNORTHCOM SAR representatives must maintain 
continuous dialog with appropriate ESF #9 primary agencies and other SAR- related 
stakeholders to identify and ascertain gaps in the FSTTL efforts to prepare for CI SAR.  
Fourth, USNORTHCOM must prepare for deployment and employment 
of SAR forces ahead of or in reaction to CI SAR related requests for assistance (FEMA, 
2004, pp. 1–6).  
Fifth, USNORTHCOM must work closely with the Joint Personnel 
Recovery Center to ensure accomplishment of ESF #9 support missions. This will 
include advocating for appropriate staffing, providing surge manpower as required and 
including them as a full partner in strategic and operational planning efforts. 
The next few paragraphs discuss linked military equity holders that are 
component parts or task organized as part of the USNORTHCOM (DoD) within the 
greater CI SAR megacommunity.  
                                                 
38 The USNORTHOCM commander approved a request to nominate USNORTHCOM vice the USAF 
as the SC for the United States. Previous designation of the USAF was a legacy construct prior to 
USNORTHCOM. AFNORTH agrees with the proposal. According to the USNORTHCOM Standing Joint 
Force Headquarters SAR expert (personal communication, 2009), the proposal was returned by the 
Secretary of Defense requesting more information on the proposal in June 2009.  
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(1)  Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense 
Command Region (CONR) and Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH).  The Continental U.S. 
North American Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR) and AFNORTH ensure 
air sovereignty and air defense of the continental United States. AFNORTH provides 
airspace surveillance and control and directs all air sovereignty activities for the 
continental United States. They are also the air component of USNORTHCOM. Three 
activities of AFNORTH will be discussed for the purpose of this research: the Air Force 
Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC), the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and the 
Airspace Control and Coordination Element (ACCE). 
(2)  Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC).  Although at 
the time of this writing a draft request is pending endorsement by the Secretary of 
Defense to make USNORTHCOM the SC, the 2007 NSP currently designates the USAF 
as the aeronautical SAR coordinator for the continental U.S., other than Alaska (NSARC, 
2007, p. 7). The AFRCC coordinates federal SAR services in the continental U.S. 
(CONUS) with federal agencies such as NPS, the USCG Rescue Coordination Centers 
(RCCs), the states and internationally with Canada and Mexico39. Typically, state SAR 
coordinators will request federal SAR assistance when needed and the AFRCC 
coordinates federal assistance (J. Dallin, personal communication, April 16, 2009).  
The AFRCC has a service chain of command (the USAF) and 
responsibilities commensurate with their assignment as the inland SAR coordinator for 
the country. The AFRCC provides day to day federal SAR services to the 48 contiguous 
states and derive their authority from the NSP and associated references.  
AFRCC responsibilities include: 
 Missing or overdue aircraft 
 Inland emergency beacons 
                                                 
39 The relationship of the AFRCC with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group 
(INSARAG) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is vague. When 
members of the NSARC were asked if they had close ties with the INSARAG during the February 2009 CI 
SAR addendum revision, none had heard of the lead agency for managing international SAR resources. 
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 Coordination of state requests for assistance (J. Hudson, 
personal communication, February 12, 2009).40  
 MOU, MOA and resource database 
 Arrangement of civil SAR services and staff a Rescue 
Coordination Center 24/7 (National Search and Rescue 
Committee, 2007, p. 6). 
The AFRCC works closely with USNORTHCOM and other 
members of the NSARC. As the operational experts for aeronautical SAR, they (and the 
USCG) clearly hold much of the megacommunity expertise that is depended upon for CI 
SAR preparations. The AFRCC is working closely with USNORTHCOM to develop a 
hurricane SAR CONPLAN to improve PR readiness and to prepare for upcoming 
hurricane seasons. It also makes many efforts to engage the states, such as attendance at 
the National Association for Search and Rescue convention May 27–30, 2009, where it 
informs on current efforts and operational intentions. 
There are indications that the AFRCC memorandums of agreement 
and memorandums of understanding with the states need to be updated. The National 
Guard Bureau and the National Association of SAR representative to the NSARC 
indicated that many of those memoranda were abstract with few details and, in some 
cases; the agreements were outdated (the Maryland agreement was last endorsed in 1961) 
(C. Brown, personal communication, February 5, 2009). Also, there are political 
sensitivities and reluctance at the state level to provide public documentation that could 
hint at a lack of preparedness for SAR at the state level (C. Brown, personal 
communication, February 5, 2009). Therefore, it can be surmised that the memoranda 
that the AFRCC has on file only have limited value to state and federal equity holders.  
(3)  Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).  The JPRC is 
activated for joint military operations and for mass casualty scenarios that exceed the 
capabilities of the AFRCC. The JPRC plans, coordinates, and recommends tasking of 
components to support joint rescue personnel recovery missions. The JPRC coordinates 
                                                 
40 At the state’s request, the AFRCC coordinates resources. Civil authorities requiring an immediate 
response from DoD for civil SAR within the 48 contiguous states contact the AFRCC at 1-800-851-3051 as 
soon as a need is anticipated or identified. 
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personnel recovery procedures published in the air tasking order special instructions and 
reviews plans and coordinates joint training and exercises.  
The JPRC is appropriately staffed by participating components to 
coordinate joint personnel recovery requirements for contingency operations 
(Headquarters, Air Forces Northern, 2007, p. 41). The JPRC is in the USNORTHCOM 
chain of command with responsibility as an ESF #9 primary agency for aeronautical 
SAR. Its mission is to coordinate procurement and integration of federal aviation SAR 
assets in response to a disaster to all 50 states. The JPRC authority is derived from the 
DSCA authorities.  
For DSCA SAR, the JPRC has six primary responsibilities. The 
responsibilities include:  
 Coordinate with component commanders for timely and 
effective all domain integrated SAR response. 
 Collaborate with FSTTL SAR authorities to integrate DoD and 
other federal SAR resources toward an all-domain integrated 
planning effort and interoperable response.  
 Coordinate with USNORTHCOM to provide representation at 
the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), FEMA 
Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC), established 
Joint Field Offices, ESF #9, and upon request state, tribal, 
territorial and local emergency operations centers. 
 Manage DoD SAR resources in the affected area.  
 Coordinate provisioning of additional support assets. 
 Provide incident reports, assessments, and situation reports as 
required (Merrigan, 2009). 
The JPRC has derived manpower from the AFRCC as 
contingencies demanded. Efforts are currently underway to provide them full-time 
manning. The JPRC was quite active during preparations for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav 
in 2008. They controlled more than 100 aircraft in FEMA Region VI in anticipation of CI 
SAR requirements for the storms. Fortunately, CI SAR was not required from the USAF 
during these events (United States Northern Command Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters, 2009).  
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(4)  Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE).  The ACCE is 
a deployable team responsible for coordination of air, space and information operations at 
the operational and tactical level for DoD. They also ensure commanders are getting 
required air, space and information support through multi-level integration of military 
planning and execution. The JFACC may establish one or more ACCE teams with 
interagency partners to better integrate DoD air and space operations with the SAR 
megacommunity. The ACCE exchanges DoD information with interagency partners to 
coordinate airspace use with partners through FAA- approved procedures (Headquarters, 
Air Forces Northern, 2007).  
(5)  Civil Air Patrol—Air Force Auxiliary (CAP-AFAUX).  The 
Civil Air Patrol-Air Force Auxiliary (CAP-AFAUX) can support FSTTL authorities with 
more than 55,000 volunteers and a fleet of 550 aircraft nationwide (including Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands). They are typically available within four hours to perform 
reconnaissance, emergency services, homeland security and disaster relief missions. The 
CAP-AFAUX is an auxiliary of the USAF when performing missions through 
AFNORTH. Its AFAUX mission is flown with a federal mission control number. 
Through its aircraft, satellite digital imaging systems , hyper spectral system, ground 
equipment and nationwide communications systems, the CAP-AFAUX can provide 
critical incident awareness and assessment (IAA), transportation, personnel, 
communications and law enforcement support for CI SAR operations (Headquarters, Air 
Forces Northern, 2007, pp. 46–53). 
5. State Civil SAR Responsibilities and Organization 
a. Responsibilities 
Responsibilities for SAR vary between each of the states and territories. 
These fluctuating state approaches to SAR are also the keystone of a harmonized and 
unified all-domain FSTTL CI SAR response. The State SAR Mission Coordinator would 




procedures existed to incorporate federal SAR support into the impacted area as outlined 
in the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National Search and 
Rescue Manual.  
However, standardization of interstate planning is difficult to achieve. One 
reason is that each state has different concerns, authorities and organization. Although 
standardization of plans between states is an altruistic goal, it is more realistic that the 
aim will fall short without some type of unifying approach such as a National Strategy for 
SAR. 
b. State Organization for CI SAR 
Organization for SAR varies between states for an assortment of reasons. 
Typically, law enforcement has a lead function in SAR at the state level. In most cases, 
there is a good relationship between the State SAR Mission Coordinator, ESF #9 lead and 
the state emergency operations center (EOC) operations section. This triad is the bulwark 
for large incident response within the states. It is through these three state officials and 
the unified command that federal assets could be received, staged and integrated into the 
Incident Action Plan (IAP).  
Surprisingly, the state SAR managers are not always full time employees. 
Approximately 13 states have full-time managers, while the rest of the states vary in their 
approach. Most hurricane prone states hire a full-time employee as the state manager. 
Other states assign the SAR coordinator on an as-needed contingency basis. For example, 
Maryland uses a search manager like the operational on-scene SAR coordinator.41 In the 
western states, law enforcement (such as the county sheriff) has responsibility for SAR  
 
 
                                                 
41 The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (National Search and 
Rescue Committee, 2008) defines the on-scene coordinator (OSC) as: “A person designated to co-ordinate 
search and rescue operations within a specified area.” 
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management. In addition, each state manages volunteers42 and part-time workers 
differently. The state political systems determine how SAR is staffed at state level and 
below.  
c. How the States Fit into the CI SAR Megacommunity 
NIMS and the ICS are typically used by SAR managers in each of the 
states. Once the concept of operation and responsibilities for SAR are determined by the 
state lawmakers then the emergency managers and state SAR mission coordinators have 
relatively standard education, certification, expectations and deliverables (NIMS/ICS) 
despite a lack of standardization between the states.  
Some of the states have robust SAR plans and other states, none. Links to 
FEMA catastrophic planning and the FEMA integrated planning system are often ignored 
by the states.43 When a new FEMA planning guide shows up on the desk at local and 
state levels, it is sometimes quickly brushed aside and replaced with local imminent 
requirements demanded from the public and close to home.  
State SAR plans are also wide-ranging and varied. Steps toward 
standardization are being taken, but multi-disciplinary CISAR plans are typically non-
existent except in Gulf of Mexico Hurricane States where CI SAR is a concern on an 
annual basis. Local and state emergency managers are too busy and do not have enough 
money to bother with “black swan” FSTTL integrated planning efforts and gap analysis. 
States would be more likely to focus on CI SAR planning if they had adequate resources 
(personnel/funding) for the exertion. As it stands, states receive FEMA funding for NIMS 
compliance, but not CI SAR integrated planning efforts. State efforts, therefore, are 
largely centered on local events that appear at the top of the inbox.  
                                                 
42 SAR is the only emergency management segment that is comprised of 95 percent volunteers 
(National Association of Search and Rescue Board of Directors, 2005). 
43 When national programs are not well coordinated with the states during the development process, a 
level of frustration becomes prevalent and is currently manifested at state level and below. State acceptance 
of the national planning programs, FEMA gap analysis and standardization efforts could be improved if 




The National Association for Search and Rescue provides multi-
disciplinary SAR certifications to SAR professionals and volunteers primarily from state 
and local levels.44 Through NIMS, ICS and the NASAR certifications; standardization is 
being achieved up to the state level, but each state organizes and funds SAR activities 
using incongruent methods. Lack of standardization between states raises the level of 
difficulty for seamless and harmonized federal CI SAR support operations (Brown, 
personal communication, February 5, 2009). 
Results from two interviews indicated that the Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center’s state memoranda of understanding and agreement are not all up to 
date. State and local political leadership sensitivity exists to developing agreements with 
federal representatives prior to the occurrence of a catastrophic incident. Asking for 
federal assistance can be viewed in the political arena as ill prepared or weak. 
Nonetheless, whether prepared for CI SAR or not, these officials are reluctant to ask for 
federal assistance unless the need is critical. Ironically, this cultural paradigm exists 
despite the fact that federal dollars come with Stafford Act declarations (D. Scott, 
personal communication, February 5, 2009).  
6. The National Guard 
a. National Guard Responsibilities for CI SAR 
The National Guard has a dual mission responsibility with concerns about 
both the federal war-fighting mission and state threats that are either natural or manmade. 
                                                 




The National Guard can operate in three distinct legal duty statuses as indicated in Table 
4 during response operations45 (National Guard Bureau, 2008):  
Table 4.   Distinct Legal Status of National Guard Component 
 Title 32 Duty Status 
(Title 32 U.S. Code) 
State Active Duty 
(Per State Law) 
Federal Active Duty 
(Title 10 U.S. Code) 
Mission Type Domestic Mission State Missions Federal Worldwide 
Command Type State Command State Command Federal 
Command 
Funding Type Federal Funding State Funding Federal Funding 
 
For CI SAR, an assumption can be made that the National Guard will be 
fully involved and helping with the leadership of the overall DoD response. The National 
Guard will have assistance from neighboring states through emergency management 
assistance compact and through the National Guard Bureau (Wright, 2007).   
b. National Guard Organization for CI SAR 
The Adjutant General (TAG) roles vary by state according to the 
respective state law. Six states and the Virgin Islands have TAGs who serve as the State 
Director of Homeland Security and the State Director of Emergency Management, five 
states have TAGs that serve as the State Director of Emergency Management, one state 
has a TAG who serves as the State Director of Homeland Security and in the remainder 
of the states the TAGs serve only the singular purpose as commander of the National 
Guard (Wright, 2007). 
                                                 
45 There are a variety of internal statuses that the National Guard uses to manage civil support. 
Additional Flight Training Periods (ATFP), Active Duty Special Work (ADSW), Active Duty for Training 
(ADT), Annual Training (AT), etc…. Not all these statuses can be used per the letter of the law for civil 
support missions and complications arise for liability, health and life insurance depending on the status 
chosen by the state or federal authorities. The type of mission helps managers determine the duty status that 
best fits the conditions. Some of the anticipated mission anticipated by the National Guard include: disaster 
response, homeland security, homeland defense, critical infrastructure protections, counterdrug, support to 
civil authorities, contingencies, emergency preparedness, humanitarian support and air and missile defense 
(National Guard Bureau, 2008). 
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The National Guard typically provides support to state emergency 
response through the Office of the Governor or the TAG.46  
c. How the National Guard Fits into the CI SAR Megacommunity 
The National Guard will likely be the first DoD assets responding to a CI 
SAR incident and the Guard may be integrating follow-on DoD resources. The National 
Guard is also a full partner in SAR planning with the state leadership and is active with 
both a DoD focus group in USNORTHCOM and with the National Search and Rescue 
Committee. 
The National Guard component of DoD has been working on a civil 
support task list (CSTL) that specifies SAR requirements demanded routinely by state 
authorities. The civil support tasks were developed as part of a larger project to provide a 
common vocabulary to aid in the assessment, request and provision of National Guard 
and federal military civil support capabilities during emergency planning and response. 
The SAR tasks developed as part of this effort are found in Table 5. The National Guard 
has identified 17 SAR critical civil support tasks that include three contaminated 
environmental conditions.47  
                                                 
46 Once NGB assistance is requested (usually through EMAC or a request for assistance from a state), 
the chief of the NGB coordinates with the Army and Air Deputies. The NGB joint staff works through the 
JFHQ-states to provide a recommendation for resourcing decisions to the afflicted state(s). National Guard 
liaisons, joint enabling team (JET) members and liaisons also provide situational awareness at critical 
interagency nodes such as state operations centers, the USNORTHCOM operations center, Regional 
Readiness Coordination Centers and the National Response Coordination Center. 
47 The Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act states the administrator of FEMA shall “…develop and 
submit to Congress annually an estimate of the resources needed for developing the capabilities of federal, 




Table 5.   National Guard SAR Civil Support Tasks 
Proposed National Guard Civil Support (CS) Tasks for SAR 
CS 9.4.4. Provide Rural SAR in a Contaminated 
Environment  
CS 9.1.11. Provide Underground SAR 
CS 9 1 3 Provide Lifting and Hauling  CS 9.1.12. Provide Vehicle Mounted SAR 
CS 9 4 3 Provide Lifting and Hauling in a 
Contaminated Environment  
 
CS 9.1.13. Provide Rural SAR  
 
CS 9.1.2. Provide Structural Collapse SAR CS 9.3.1. Provide Ice SAR  
 
CS 9.1.4. Provide Desert SAR 
 
CS 9.3.2. Provide Dive SAR  
 
CS 9.1.5. Provide Wilderness SAR 
 
CS 9.3.3. Provide Swift Water SAR  
 
CS 9.1.7. Provide Avalanche SAR 
 
CS 9.3.4. Provide Surf SAR 
 
CS 9.1.10. Provide Rope Rescue  CS 9.4.1. Provide Urban SAR in a Contaminated 
Environment  




In a CSTL discussion on May 14, 2009, SAR tasks became a topic of 
conversation. National Guard Bureau operations representatives and the project 
leadership from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense suggested that 
the NSARC be contacted to ask them to determine, “What are the SAR oriented tasks that 
the National Guard will be expected to train/perform? What certifications are required, 
what equipment will be needed… Ask the NSARC to define the role of the National 
Guard for SAR.” After developing the requirement, the CSTL leadership suggested a 
collaborative dialogue about whether the Guard can maintain the highly technical and 
demanding certifications and proficiency or whether they should be employed only as 
generalists (supporting ESF #9/ other experts). These high-level questions indicate a need 







personal communication, May 14, 2009). This is important to mention at this point in the 
research because it demonstrates that the SAR megacommunity is also trying to clarify 
the role of the National Guard.48  
7. The United States Agency for International 
Development/International Search and Rescue Advisory Group 
(USAID/INSARAG) 
a. Responsibilities of USAID/INSARAG 
The International SAR Advisory group was established in 1991, and is 
comprised of more than 80 countries. This group was established with the dual purpose 
of conducting SAR operations at the site of a disaster as well as increasing and 
accelerating the availability of local and international resources to an incident requiring 
international SAR assistance (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, 2000). 
The worldwide informal network is designed to improve SAR efficiencies for both 
responding and receiving countries. 
b. USAID/INSARAG Organization for CI SAR 
INSARAG is recognized internationally by the United Nations for setting 
US&R standards, methods and guidelines. U.S., Canada and Mexico all participate in this 
international effort.49 The U.S. has two heavy50 US&R task forces recognized by 
INSARAG; Virginia Task Force 1 is an international team comprised of approximately 
80 members (Fairfax County Search and Rescue, 2009). The second heavy international 
US&R team, California-Task Force 2, is from Los Angeles County and consists of a 70-
person US&R unique team that has specialized training and equipment for response 
                                                 
48 Also, looking at the emphasis put on homeland defense versus homeland security within DoD, it 
could be argued that allocating more DoD resources to homeland security would help to integrate all 
national efforts for a catastrophic incident unified response and thereby improve CI SAR preparations 
(Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 5). Using capabilities-based homeland security preparedness training, CI 
SAR could be added into a multi-year schedule oriented toward improving this targeted capability 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 37). 
49 These countries are noted because they are in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
50 The designation “heavy” indicates these US&R teams are larger than the light or medium teams, 
have additional equipment and training and an international certification. 
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world-wide (Los Angeles County Fire Department, 2005). The Virginia and California 
task forces partner to provide the USAID Foreign Disaster Assistance program aid for 
collapsed structure SAR for both natural and man-made disasters world-wide. Canada has 
five heavy US&R teams and only one 32-man team based in Vancouver is certified for 
international deployment to assist USAID (Vancouver Urban Search and Rescue, 2006). 
The international team is identified as Canadian Task Force 151 (United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).  
The UN General Assembly Resolution 57/150 endorsed the INSARAG 
recommendations to tailor the organization of these urban SAR teams because of the 
wide variety of situations that they may face during a disaster response. (International 
Search and Rescue Advisory Group, 2000, p. 86) 
The International US&R teams are connected through the global disaster 
alert and coordination system and a Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center. The 
collaborative international tools allow for email, messaging and fax of three levels of 
catastrophe (red, orange and green). The INSARAG Virtual On-Site Operations 
Coordination Center facilitates decision-making for international responders through real-
time information exchange. The Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center is also 
used to facilitate training, exercises and international interagency coordination.52 For 
international purposes, the Virtual Center is used by all 80 countries included in the 
INSARAG, but the United States SAR megacommunity does not seem to be attuned to 
an international standard communications suite.53 More about an international strategy 
will be suggested in the Chapter VI. 
                                                 
51 This is of interest, because it is USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility that Mexico lists a point of 
contact in the INSARAG SAR directory but does not have even one US&R international teams. 
52 In the United States, Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is an attempt by DHS to 
provide a comprehensive all-encompassing tool for electronic communications, but it was rejected by many 
of the state emergency managers and is not used by the international SAR managers operationally. The 
states and many other organizations favor WEB EOC and E-Team. 
53 Since the INSARAG concept of operations impacts both Canada and U.S., it is extremely important 
for the United States SAR megacommunity to immediately reach out to this group to initiate coordinated 
planning for CI SAR. Integrated plans should be developed after establishing a long-term international 
civil-military CI SAR strategy and conducting a resource analysis. 
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C. SAR TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS 
Three technologies used by the USCG will provide a model for the premise that 
technology can support knowledge management and information sharing across stove-
piped organizational cultures and that the current organization for CI SAR needs 
improvements. The three technologies are linked in application and all are used by the 
USCG. They include the self-locating data marker buoy, the SAROPS Computer Drifting 
Simulator and the Rockwell Collins Flight Management System. 
These technologies leverage the SAR community’s ability to locate targets in the 
open ocean to save lives and prevent suffering. The following technology descriptions 
highlight each individual system, analyze the data handling and investigate the entire 
system of information gathering and dissemination. The data will seek to address three 
questions: How is the data for a lost person used once received by a “Coasty” (member of 
the USCG) on the ground? Is the information shared with other SAR partners? How 
could the system be improved? 
The Self-Locating Data Marker Buoy (SLDMB) is a technology first developed 
in 1985 for use by the USCG. This buoy is deployable by boat and all USCG helicopters 
and airplanes. The SLDMB parachutes down and self-deploys if dropped from the air. 
During the following 30 days, it sends GPS position, drift data and water temperature 
with a satellite transmitter every 30 minutes. At the end of the 30 days, the beacon 
scuttles itself. The SLDMB was designed specifically for USCG SAR missions in the 
ocean, and it is currently used by other countries as well as the United States (The Martec 
Group, 2002). In the U.S., only the USCG is using the technology. The display software 
allows the GPS drift characteristics to be visualized and the buoys are automatically 
tracked by the USCG after deployment on the displays.  
Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System (SAROPS) is a relatively new 
computer-drifting simulator fielded in 2006. It simulates 10,000 search objects all drifting 
differently based on winds, currents, tides and forecasted weather taking into 
consideration the drift object composition. A person in the water drifts much differently 
than a 40-foot sailboat. In the past, these computations were done manually. The manual 
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computations for multiple objects were quite difficult and time consuming to map. The 
SAROPS program is able to quickly build a visual depiction of optimal search patterns 
for different sized objects floating in the water. For example, if a luxury liner sank in the 
ocean, the people in the water, the lifeboats and the debris would all drift in different 
patterns.  
The Rockwell Collins Flight Management System (FMS) on each aircraft is 
designed to plug in air and water searches and fly them without pilot manipulation of the 
flight controls. One simply configures the FMS with the search vehicle data, type of 
search, starting point, direction and size, and it does the rest. The FMS will compute the 
most efficient air and sea search patterns. 
Rockwell Collins developed FMS-800 and Mission Planning Ground Station 
flight planning software in order to load previously planned flight data into the aircraft. 
Depending upon the specific FMS-800 FMS configuration, the software allows the 
loading of navigation, communications and refuel location information into the aircraft, 
greatly improving the time on station and performance of the platform (Rockwell Collins, 
2008).  
Leveraging these three technologies changes the way the USCG conducts 
business for maritime SAR. Just a few years ago, it would have been necessary to collect 
information about the incident, manually enter drift computations on a chart and then 
continually update the chart. Optimal search patterns were at the discretion of the crew 
and each time the area was searched by a particular vessel, manual adjustments had to be 
entered into the equations. Presently, not only are the search area and drift pattern 
computations conducted automatically, but the data can be uploaded to the search vehicle 
navigation management system to instruct the computers on the best route and pattern to 
search. Furthermore, as environmental conditions change, the SAR specialist receives 
updated SAR maps automatically. 
A review and analysis of the current capabilities indicates great satisfaction with 
the way these three technologies work together. One interviewee, a pilot, indicated that 
his workload in the cockpit was greatly reduced by the integrated FMS (C. Day, personal 
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communication, September 12, 2008). He is able to program data into the FMS provided 
by SLDMB and SAROPS. His aircraft will download data and program SAR flight 
patterns from the real-time information. Inevitably, these technologies will help the 
USCG save an untold number of lives (C. Day, personal communication, September 12, 
2008). 
1. Sharing Knowledge is Desirable 
There is a missing component to these technologies that is critical to optimizing 
the multi-domain SAR efforts. Research indicates there has been little effort to share this 
information with interagency partners outside of the USCG. One SAR expert at 
USNORTHCOM was consulted (C. Day, personal communication, September 12, 2008). 
The USCG officer confirmed that the SAR data was used exclusively in the United States 
by the USCG crew and was not part of a larger scheme of systems that would 
automatically share with partners to unify the SAR efforts (C. Day, personal 
communication, September 12, 2008). This interesting and perplexing news indicated 
that there is a lack of interoperability and knowledge management between SAR 
stakeholders. The fact that this information is not shared through technological means is 
probably not important for small-scale contingencies but will likely cost people lives in a 
catastrophic event because knowledge is not shared across SAR equity holder 
organizational boundaries.54 
When the USCG deploys to conduct a hasty search for a catastrophic incident, the 
information they gather could be used by a wide array of agencies and departments to 
expeditiously begin primary and secondary searches.55 SAR experts know the first 72 
                                                 
54 Lack of sharing is only one piece of this conundrum. In addition to the lack of sharing there are 
overlapping regional interfaces between the USCG, FEMA and the USAF. There is a lack of agreement on 
which navigational systems to use (military grid/latitude and longitude/area reference system). These 
individual problems may be surmountable during crisis response, but clearly more sharing and uniformity 
would be useful (J. Hudson, personal communication, March 20, 2009). 
55 The Catastrophic Incident Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual states, “Most CIS 
search operations generally progress through a sequence of rapid, primary and secondary searching. These 
search phases may overlap or vary within different portions of the overall search area. Increasing levels of 
search planning are customarily involved as searching progresses to the primary and then to the secondary 
phases” (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2008). 
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hours of an incident are critical to the victim and sharing this technology with local and 
state emergency management officials could save lives. Any time these technologies can 
be applied to a rescue is likely to equate to lives saved in a catastrophic incident. Neither 
the USAF nor the United States Navy (USN) has access to the SAROPS and FMS data 
from the USCG efforts except through manual exchange of information. There is no 
method to incorporate this timely information into the database of the other equity 
holders. USCG crews would have to relay information manually about searches 
conducted to incoming crews of the police, fire, ESF #9, National Guard, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service or a wide variety other megacommunity members in this example.  
2. Operational and Strategic Implications 
Reaching beyond the example of the three aforementioned tactical systems, this 
study indicates that there are technological, organizational and functional barriers that 
hinder information sharing. It should be possible to relay information between disparate 
SAR organizations in order to combine and supplement search teams from a variety of 
organizations for catastrophic SAR. SAR stakeholders would greatly benefit from a 
system that could take advantage of these technological tools, but the knowledge 
management and information sharing between organizations needs improvement.  
This research has shown three useful tactical systems (SLDMB, SAROPS and 
FMS) and disjointed knowledge management at operational and strategic levels. 
Information derived from current technologies is not being shared across cultural and 
organizational boundaries. The inability to share inter-organizationally adversely impacts 
the ability of the nation to strategically respond to a catastrophic event with SAR assets.  
Another high-tech SAR structure is found in the Cosmicheskaya Sistema Poiska 
Avariynyh Sudov56 (COSPAS-SARSAT) system. This model shows clear 
 
 
                                                 
56 COSPAS is an acronym for the Russian, “Cosmicheskaya Sistema Poiska Avariynyh Sudov” that 
roughly translates to: “Space System for the Search of Vessels in Distress.” 
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interdependencies between SAR organizations with another obvious indication that 
information and sharing of the technical data between organizations would greatly benefit 
responders to a catastrophic event. 
3. The COSPAS—Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking System 
(SARSAT) Program 
The COSPAS-SARSAT program is managed by a number of the National Search 
and Rescue Committee members: Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)), DHS (USCG), DoD (USAF), and the National 
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) (Button). This system is described in the 
next few paragraphs in order to highlight the complexity, technological interdependence 
and unity of effort found in the SAR megacommunity for normal SAR. 
The Federal Communications Commission, by way of the NOAA, using low-
earth and geostationary orbiting satellites, operates an international satellite system for 
SAR. The COSPAS-SARSAT system assists worldwide SAR activities by providing 
accurate, timely and reliable alert and location data to the international community on a 
non-discriminatory basis to assist persons in distress (International Satellite System For 
Search and Rescue, COSPAS-SARSAT). The SARSAT relays aeronautical, land and 
marine distress beacons to ground equipment that subsequently retransmits to local SAR 
authorities who will assist persons in distress.  
The system was established by the United States, the former Soviet Union, France 
and Canada in 1979 and now includes 38 nations and two independent SAR 
organizations participating 24 hours a day (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2009). The system provides alerting services for 406 MHz Emergency 
Locator Transmitters, Emergency Position-Indicating Radio beacons for maritime use, 
personal locator beacons and ship security alert beacons. Signals from the low-altitude 
Earth orbit satellites and the geostationary Earth orbit satellites are received by local user 
terminals that receive and process the satellite data and subsequently relay the 
information to the mission control centers, rescue coordination centers and other SAR 
points of contact. 
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In the United States, a mission control center is located in Suitland, Maryland and 
is the focal point for the COSPAS-SARSAT data. Much of the downloaded data is 
handled through automated processes, but the center is staffed 24/7. The USCG or USAF 
officials operate the rescue coordination centers that receive the COSPAS-SARSAT 
alerts sent by the mission control center and each service approaches the process 
differently.57  
 The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Tyndall AFB, Florida: 
Coordinates continental U.S. SAR activities but does not carry out 
rescues. The rescues are carried out by Civil Air Patrol and rescue 
organizations designated by the respective states. 
 Alaska Rescue Coordination Center at Ft. Richardson, Alaska (operated 
by the Air National Guard): Alaska SAR is conducted by the local 
borough SAR teams, state police and Alaska National Guard North of 
Anchorage. 
 USCG: Coordinates and performs maritime SAR. The RCCs are both 
geographic command and coordination centers and parsed between nine 
Coast Guard commands and two rescue sub-centers (RSCs)58 (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2009). 
 The COSPAS-SARSAT program works well through the interagency 
partners for normal SAR and even mass rescue operations, but a number 
of problems may exist when the crisis faced is a frenzied catastrophic 
incident.  
States conduct SAR in a manner consistent with their own policies, procedures 
and legislation. Not all state SAR coordinators are full-time and the agency responsible 
for SAR varies by state. When CI SAR is required and beacons are used across a multi-
state area, then confusion can be expected throughout the impacted area as a variety of 
response options present themselves. State policies will govern the local, state and even 
 
                                                 
57 A related issue is also evident when examining physical regional boundaries of SAR, emergency 
management and wildfire geographic regions. The USAF regional boundaries differ from the USCG 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) regions. Even the Civil Air Patrol within the USAF identifies 
regions that are different than those of the USAF (J. Dallin, personal communication, July 1, 2009). FEMA 
regions and wildland firefighting regions are also different than all others. Defining regions in such a 
manner does nothing improve or to help unify CI SAR response operations (USCG, 2008). 
58 RCCs and RSCs are located in: District 1: Boston, MA; District 5: Portsmouth, VA; District 7: 
Miami, FL; District 8: New Orleans, LA; District 9: Cleveland, OH; District 11: Alameda, CA; District 13: 
Seattle, WA; District 14: Honolulu, HI; District 17: Juneau, AK; Puerto Rico RSC: San Juan, PR; Marianas 
RSC: Guam (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2009).  
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tribal response, but the federal response will be in accordance with DHS directives, the 
CI SAR addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual and the established 
unified command managers. 
A surge requirement will exist for SAR personnel to manage both the CI SAR and 
normal SAR operations outside the impacted area concurrently. Coordinating and 
integrating technologies during response operations, harmonizing disparate management 
systems across organizational boundaries and developing and resourcing a 
national/international strategy for CI SAR is a highly complex task for the NSARC.  
D. ANALYSIS 
This chapter has presented a view of organizations and functions for CI SAR 
followed by an example of SAR technical systems (SLDMB/SAROPS/FMS and the 
COSPAS/SARSAT systems). This final section analyzes the organizations, functions and 
technologies already discussed. The analysis touches on current technologies related to 
CI SAR, initiatives and potential problem areas that were discovered as a result of the 
research. 
In August 2008, the NSARC released the Catastrophic Incident Search and 
Rescue Addendum (Version 1.1) to the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the 
IAMSAR (National Search and Rescue Committee, 2008, pp. 3–88).59 The manual and 
the revision were developed by the NSARC members over the course of many months. 
The NSARC has not received funding for fielding this initiative and those assigned to 
write, edit, revise and publish the addendum do so as an ancillary duty. In addition, this 
document has not been trained or exercised within USNORTHCOM, the USAF, the SAR 
megacommunity60 (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 232) or during 
any tier 1 interagency exercise.  
                                                 
59 Version 2.0 of the CI SAR Addendum to the National SAR Manual is currently drafted. 
60 Megacommunities are defined as:  “A collaborative socioeconomic environment in which business, 
government, and civil society interact according to their common interests, while maintaining their unique 
priorities (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 232).” 
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Therefore, one can understand why the three technologies explored in this 
research (SLDMB, SAROPS and FMS) have great tactical utility but limited operational 
or strategic application to the entire SAR spectrum. That is, there have been limited 
efforts to coordinate between agencies for CI SAR strategy development, knowledge 
management during response operations or integrated operational planning. 
In 2005, the GAO (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 15, 19 and 35) 
found that DoD had not adequately planned or exercised a catastrophic incident SAR 
response. With a CI SAR Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual fielded 
and the DoD/USAF recently designated as one of five primary agencies for ESF # 9 
(Search and Rescue), it seems DoD is in the same predicament at the time of this writing 
as shortly prior to Hurricane Katrina. That is to say, there is guidance available for 
conducting catastrophic incident SAR, but training and exercise programs for the 
stakeholders are not available and have not been developed through a comprehensive 
national/international strategy or single program. This has likely occurred because of 
rapid technological developments that have outpaced legislative and operational 
adaptations in SAR. For instance, the three technologies in the example were not 
available 10 years ago. Computers could not handle large amounts of imagery data, nor 
could the large files be transmitted efficiently to remote locations (such as a Joint Air 
Ground Coordination Center (JAGCC)) for awareness, consumption and action by the 
interagency partners.  
These technological advances are also apparent in other SAR process areas. 
Interoperable communications, global positioning, personal locator beacons and even cell 
phones have improved the ability of searchers to find and rescue victims while 
concurrently increasing the workload of the SAR managers around the world 
(International Satellite System For Search and Rescue, COSPAS-SARSAT). The 
management of this information has not kept pace with the technical advancement. The 




Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina indicate a lack of cultural integration in 
the SAR community. The report states, “The Department of Homeland Security should 
lead an interagency review of current policies and procedures to ensure effective 
integration of all federal search and rescue assets during disaster response” (Townsend, 
2006, p. 57). Some of the SAR lessons learned from this report have been corrected and 
others have not been adequately addressed. 
There are other indicators that catastrophic SAR issues identified in the Katrina 
lessons learned have not been corrected. It is necessary to look for some clues as to the 
lack of integration and how the sharing of technologies might improve while also 
improving command, control, coordination and information sharing.  
DHS is assigned SAR coordinating responsibility in the Catastrophic Incident 
Annex to the National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
Emergency Support Function #9 is further tasked for SAR in the ESF #9 Annex of the 
NRF (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Neither the DHS nor ESF #9 has 
succeeded in unifying efforts of either their own team or the local and state organizations 
they would support (Stockton & Roberts, 2008, p. 5). DoD has an important role in this 
effort because of the unique, timely and surge capabilities. DoD also has a pool of human 
resources that are on-call 24/7 that are not available to the civil authorities.  
Effectiveness may be measured via post-event casualty rates, so the plans put 
together now should place the highest emphasis on and include all available technologies 
such as those used by the USCG. Many large and complex organizations have a stake in 
catastrophic SAR. Centralized oversight from a council or a committee to coordinate and 
unify the efforts of this group of stakeholders may be the best solution to the problem. 
The NSARC does have responsibility to coordinate all SAR activities in the 
operational area for catastrophic incidents, but since DoD is a signatory of the NSP and 
much expertise resides within the community, it would seem worthwhile to approach 





ground coordination center that harmonizes the efforts of the equity holders. DoD should 
help facilitate this effort that ought to be built from the local level up and should be 
facilitated (not controlled) through a consortium of partners.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a diagram and description of the CI SAR megacommunity 
followed by a discussion of responsibilities, organization and place in the system of each 
organization and comments about current efforts and associated challenges. Two SAR 
technologies were introduced that could be used as examples of how information is 
managed at tactical and operational levels. Information gathered through these technical 
tools was useful to the tactical organizations and this research emphasized that it would 
also be useful to the greater megacommunity for CI SAR but inhibitors to inter-
organizational sharing exist. SAR technologies could be better utilized by the 
megacommunity equity holders. SAR managers could leverage stove-piped technologies 
and share the knowledge outside the proprietary organization.  
The chapter concluded with an analysis and subsequent discovery that suggests 
some sort of strategy to unify the megacommunity efforts and a coordination center to 
capture and manage technical rescue data are needed. Some type of communications or 
coordination center would facilitate this interagency coordination during response 
operations for CI SAR. Both the strategy and coordination center would require a great 




IV. INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Between February and May 2009, the author conducted 14 interviews to ascertain 
the current state of affairs for CI SAR and to develop a framework of where the 
megacommunity thought there might be shortcomings and to get suggestions of where 
enhancements were needed to make systemic improvements. Another purpose of the 
interviews was to learn whether the SAR megacommunity61 could identify CI SAR 
tribulations and what measures would be necessary to reduce or eliminate risks through 
investment in human capital and resources.  
The interview process was designed to gain knowledge of whether technical 
experts, SAR managers and USNORTHCOM officials shared the same stance on the 
problems. Finally, the interviews were designed to discover whether or not the 
community was likely to support the policy changes that might be recommended as a 
result of this research. 
Interviews yielded an academic and operational opportunity that no other 
academic process could have produced. Candid discussions with members of the 
NSARC, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Homeland Defense and American 
Security Affairs (OASD-HD&ASA) staff, Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) 
staff, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) staff, the USNORTHCOM staff, 
National Guard Bureau J3, the National Park Service (NPS) and a National Association 
for Search and Rescue representative provided a well-rounded strategic-to-operational 
view of the current CI SAR posture, as well as perspective on a few problem areas and 
recommendations for improving CI SAR processes. The interview method was deemed to 
be the best way to include the interviewees in this ongoing process so that once 
recommendations were formulated; these key leaders would remain enthusiastic 
                                                 
61 Although these problems and solutions are primarily interagency issues, the author’s parent 
organization is USNORTHCOM. Attempts were made to identify issues in all domains while also 
identifying USNORTHCOM roles in the system. 
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emissaries to assist in making catastrophic search and rescue more efficient. Through 
these interviews with key civil-military SAR experts, their concerns and 
recommendations were voiced, captured and incorporated into recommendations found in 
Chapters V and VI of this study. 
The focus group included members of the NSARC, Defense Prisoner of War 
Office, the USNORTHCOM staff, 1AF/AFNORTH and NGB. This group of professional 
experts was formed out of operational necessity for hurricane support operations and to 
update legacy policy documents. The primary purpose of the focus group was to prepare 
for search and rescue necessitated by hurricanes in the USNORTHCOM area of 
operations. Operational and academic research was encouraged by the group leadership 
to facilitate this study. The focus group also provided input to this research that went 
beyond hurricane response. Discussions and strategy sessions included interagency 
coordination and organization for CI SAR.  
Meetings were held as needed in person, via teleconference and through 
electronic staffing. The issues discussed were primarily the DoD role in DSCA SAR, 
civil SAR and PR, as well as how the DoD perspectives are nested within the SAR 
megacommunity. To take this research from an academic problem to a real-world effort 
also requires the support of this same group of professionals. The organizational 
representatives have, in part, proposed the findings identified later in the chapter and 
have participated through this entire study as participants through either interview, focus 
group or both. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the 
interview audience, questions and findings. The second section repeats the process for the 
focus group initiatives. Finally, an analysis is provided that incorporates the findings 




1. Interview Audience 
Participants were selected because of their expertise with SAR and because of 
their positions within the SAR megacommunity. Local, state and federal representatives 
were chosen so the sampling of the group was an accurate cross-section of the 
megacommunity. Table 6 identifies the participants and the level of participation. The 
method used to interview the contributors was face to face for all but two of the 
participants.  
Table 6.   Interview Participants, Agency and Level of Participation 




USNORTHCOM SJFHQ Federal 
USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters Federal 
USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters Federal 
USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters Federal 
Joint Director of Military Support Federal 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense & American Security 
Affairs 
Federal 
National Guard Federal/State 
National Search and Rescue Committee Interagency 
National Interagency Fire Center Interagency 
Air Force Rescue Coordination Center Interagency 
United States Agency for International Development/National 
Interagency Fire Center 
International 
Colorado County Sheriff Local 
National Association for Search and Rescue Representative State 
2. Questions Discussed During Interview 
In the following paragraphs, equity partner comments and concerns relevant to CI 
SAR are summarized. General topics and information that were sought through the 
interviews are identified. Participants were encouraged to elaborate on other areas of 
concern relevant to their own background and experience. In Table 7, a number of the 





Table 7.   Important Interview Issues 
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CI SAR? Does 




prepared for CI 
SAR in a 
CBRNE 
environment? 
LOCAL  YES YES YES YES MAYBE YES NO NO 
ARNG YES  YES YES YES   NO 
DoD YES YES YES YES YES MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE 
NSARC YES YES YES YES YES MAYBE MAYBE NO 
USAID YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO 




Participants felt this research was worthwhile and all felt that a strategy and 
updated plans would be useful to the megacommunity. They were also interested in the 
concept of a Joint Air Ground Coordination Center and finding ways to harmonize the 
SAR response more effectively. None of the participants felt that the nation was capable 
of searching for and rescuing tens to hundreds of thousands of people in a CBRNE 
contaminated environment, and most of the participants felt that DoD should not lead the 
effort.   
The National Guard expressed concern that even with SAR tasks identified in the 
CSTL, the technical expertise required for DSCA and civil SAR missions would require 
unavailable and unachievable time, training and equipment. It was suggested that the 
National Guard and civilian volunteers (such as Citizen Corps) might be organized under 
teams of technical experts and provide manpower for searches while technical rescue was 
left to civil authorities. These comments did not apply to fixed or rotary wing support for 
CI SAR and the aviation community intends to supply this support.  
Training and equipping National Guard aviation for CI SAR is another critical 
component of finding the sweet spot. For example, aircrews ought to be preidentified so 
they can routinely practice hoist and litter operations as part of their annual proficiency 
program. In practicing these missions, costly flight hours and equipment are required. 
Communications and navigation equipment are also expensive but should be identified 
and installed on aircraft that are selected for SAR so the crews can speak with civil 
authorities on the ground, receive clearances/directions and navigate with global area 
reference system (GARS), universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid or latitude and 
Longitude (lat/long). 
3. Significant Findings of Interview Process 
After the interviews, the responses were analyzed, synthesized and evaluated to 
find patterns or replicated areas of general concern. The analysis included kludging 
responses into general areas of concern. An example is the concerns over Homeland 
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Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, which establishes policies to strengthen U.S. 
preparedness for attacks and disasters (Bush, 2003). 
HSPD 8, National Preparedness, identifies the eight priorities for preparedness 
(Bush, 2003). This framework was used to synthesize the responses from the participants 
and blend the conversational topics into categories under each of the preparedness 
categories. HSPD 5 is the companion document to HSPD 8, which discusses management 
of domestic incidents (Bush, 2003). HSPD 5 tasks DHS to develop and administer a 
unified, national system for managing incidents regardless of size or complexity.62 The 
guidance of HSPD 5 was also considered while analyzing the interview records.  
HSPD 8 proved to be a worthwhile analytical tool to help synthesize and 
articulate recommendations for improvements of CI SAR. The eight categories of 
preparedness from HSPD 8 were used as a framework to analyze the interview responses 
below: 
 Development of a National Preparedness Goal  
 National SAR strategy or DHS planning guidance for CI SAR 
response 
 Update SAR plans and policies 
 Increase USAID and Canadian involvement in the SAR 
megacommunity 
 Federal Preparedness Assistance 
 Obligation of funds to provide staffing solutions (NSARC 
increase, SC designation of USNORTHCOM, JPRC full-time 
employees and state SMCs) 
 Provide federal allocations for CI SAR FSTTL funding 
requirements 
 Increase interagency coordination with FEMA catastrophic and 
integrated planning experts 
 
                                                 
62 HSPD 5 (2003) states, “the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary shall establish appropriate 
relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments… The 
heads of all Federal departments and agencies are directed to provide their full and prompt cooperation, 




 Support civil support task list development 
 Inter-organization interoperable standards and procurement 
practices for communications equipment, navigation equipment, 
aircraft, aircraft special equipment, contracts and special tools etc.) 
 Predesignation of organizations so equipment costs can be 
minimized and proficiency with the equipment maximized through 
routine training 
 New initiatives funding (NIF) like the Canadians for CI SAR 
improvements 
 Training and Exercises 
 All-domain exercises driven by local and state SAR mission 
coordinators 
 Develop and integrate CI SAR Training programs with national 
level exercises 
 Develop a standard domestic and international lessons learned 
process and provide results to senior leaders 
 Ensure SAR tasks are included in the CBRNE consequence 
management response forces training  
 Federal Department and Agency Preparedness 
 Develop and rehearse a process for incident awareness and 
assessment, response integration and management through Joint 
Air Ground Coordination Center 
 Identify contaminated environment requirements for SAR 
 Use of integrated planning system (IPS) and catastrophic incident 
planning for CI SAR 
 Identify links to other critical lines of operations (emergency 
medical, mass evacuation and IAA) 
 Citizen Participation 
 Take additional steps to incorporate the public sector, private, 
businesses and volunteer organizations into CI SAR planning and 
response at the national strategic levels 





 Public Communication 
 Strategic communications/interagency coordination strategy for 
planning and response is needed as displayed at Table 8.  
 Need to use technologies better to improve knowledge 
management (KM) and information flow 
 Assessment and Evaluation 
 Rigorous honesty reporting CI SAR preparedness to the President 
through DHS: 
 Ensure all CI SAR equity holders have input 
 Report normal, mass rescue and CI SAR preparedness 
 Identify and report CBRNE SAR capabilities and shortfalls 
 Air to Ground communications capability reporting 
procedures (numbers that can and can’t communicate air to 
ground) 
 Aircraft and aircrew special mission training and 
equipment status 
 Interagency issues and friction points 
 Taking lessons learned and integrating improvements into 
the other seven preparedness goals (i.e., if exercises 
indicate air to ground communications do not work, how 
will the correct radios be identified, installed, maintained 
and exercised in the future? Who leads the effort?) (Bush, 
2003). 
Using HSPD 8 as a framework to analyze interview responses facilitated 
development of a general framework for categorizing the information derived from the 
subjects. These un-prioritized findings are further refined in Chapter VI in order to 
develop the study recommendations.  
C. SAR FOCUS GROUP 
1. SAR Focus Group Membership 
The focus group activities conducted as part of this research were important for 
two reasons. First, these SAR experts were working on operational level problems that 
dealt specifically with this topic. Operational problems were observed and incorporated 
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into the research findings. Secondly, the operational endeavor produced revised policy 
documents such as a revision to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CI SAR 
Addendum) to the National Search and Rescue Manual and a revised ESF #9 Search and 
Rescue Annex to the National Response Framework.  
Participating in the focus group activities from both an academic and operational 
perspective was a unique opportunity to keep abreast of both current operational efforts 
and unresolved friction points63 while concurrently conducting academic research. 
Furthermore, it was possible to contrast some of the interview responses with operational 
activities underway. The group activities are mentioned here because both interview and 
focus group findings are intertwined. 
2. SAR Focus Group Vision and Philosophy 
The USNORTHCOM group formed because of recognition that individual 
organizations conducted SAR extremely well; however, CI SAR requiring integrated 
response operations were lacking. Process improvements are needed to ensure DoD 
readiness to support the civil authorities. USNORTHCOM is not well positioned and 
organized to support CI SAR, nor is USNORTHCOM well integrated with FSTTL SAR 
planners.  
The vision for the SAR focus group has been to build capacity for 
USNORTHCOM to provide policy and strategic oversight of the full spectrum of civil 
SAR and personnel recovery in the USNORTHCOM AOR by establishing 
USNORTHCOM as the SAR coordinator and to evolve the capability for 
USNORTHCOM to fulfill the primary agency responsibilities in ESF #9. 
                                                 
63 The focus group works in a multi-domain environment marked with a number of tensions. There are 
interagency concerns and friction points within the emergency management community. Cultural and 
interagency problems exist that hinder effective DoD support to civil authorities. There are friction points 
between the Army National Guard and the regular Army, between DHS and state emergency managers, 
between National Guard Bureau and State Joint Force Headquarters, between DHS and FEMA and, finally, 
between the political parties. Unless the many friction points are addressed, DoD will remain only 1/16th of 
an unbalanced and uncoordinated response.   
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The focus group philosophy is based on the belief that there is no time to waste 
for CI SAR. Time is the enemy and any delays in readiness will result in unnecessary 
death and injury to people in distress. Time-driven objectives guide the megacommunity 
partnership’s actions in all domains and at all FSTTL levels. The group has already been 
effective at implementing some change within USNORTHCOM by hiring full time staff, 
developing CONPLANS and supporting Texas Task Force 1 during Hurricanes Ike and 
Gustav with SAR experts and liaisons. 
a. USNORTHCOM SAR Focus Group Actions and 
Accomplishments 
This focus group has been involved with actions that reduce friction points 
and improve CI SAR readiness. Some of the recent accomplishments include: 
 Providing support to the USNORTHCOM SAR Cell 
 Assisting with the rewriting of the National Search and Rescue Plan 
(NSP) 
 Helping develop a CI SAR addendum to the National Search and 
Rescue Manual 
 Drafting a new Emergency Support Function #9 annex to the NRF 
 Standing up USNORTHCOM as the search and rescue coordinator 
vice the USAF64 
 Supporting an Air Coordination Group (ACG) for Hurricanes Ike in 
2008 
 Practicing the ACG concept in conjunction with a defense 
coordinating officer (DCO) exercise in San Juan Puerto Rico from 
March 24–27, 2009 
 Drafting SAR PSMAs in conjunction with the USNORTHCOM J35, 




                                                 
64 Memorandum endorsed by General Renuart (Commander, USNORTHCOM) was sent to the 
Secretary of Defense and under consideration as of August 19, 2009. 
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 Beginning a rewrite of the USNORTHCOM policy on personnel 
recovery 10-210 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 65 
 Participating in the rewrite of DoDD 3002.01E personnel recovery in 
the Department of Defense 
 Providing input to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
 Conduct recurring meetings and conducting interagency outreach 
 Drafting a hurricane SAR concept plan (P. Merrigan, personal 
communication, April 24, 2009). 
b. Near Term Objectives 
The SAR focus group has been successful in establishing permanent 
manning in USNORTHCOM for a two-person SAR cell and an eight-person fulltime cell 
in the JPRC.66 Personnel in these positions and other members from USNORTHCOM 
SJFHQ have become the core element for the SAR focus group. The group has 
established the following near term objectives: 
 USNORTHCOM SJFHQ provides leadership for SAR until the 
fulltime SAR cell is able to contribute to SAR megacommunity 
policy and strategic decision-making 
 Clarify PR and DoD support to civil SAR roles and responsibilities in 
the USNORTHCOM AOR 
 Rewrite, review and coordinate DoD SAR policy documents 
 Conduct interagency coordination with FSTTL SAR partners 
                                                 
65 JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), states on page I-1, “Military commanders 
must prepare for, plan, and execute recovery operations for isolated personnel. Within the US, coordination 
for such support should be made with the appropriate regional rescue coordination center (RCC) that has 
responsibility for the operational area. Commanders may provide support to civil authorities during search 
and rescue (SAR) missions for other than  isolated personnel as long as that support does not interfere with 
the military mission and is accomplished IAW the U.S. National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan. DoD 
supports domestic and international search and rescue efforts of the general public IAW the US National 
Search and Rescue Plan.” Appendix A to JP 3-50 describes lead responsibility of the United States Coast 
Guard and the military support to civil SAR and principles of the National Search and Rescue Plan. The 
NSP integrates the U.S. SAR into plans that exist for the rest of the world. DoD support of civil SAR is 
based on a noninterference basis with primary military missions in accordance with the NSP and DoD 
policies. The NSP is synchronized with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization (ICAO and IMO respectively) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, Appendix A1-A4). The 
2007 JP 3-50 also references the NRF predecessor, the NRP, and describes processes that are now out of 
date for SAR. 
66 The process to select and employ personnel is underway as of August 3, 2009. 
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 Promulgate standing response policy and objectives for CI SAR 
 Develop and harmonize a regional approach to SAR 
 Coordinate the Catastrophic Incident SAR Addendum (P. Merrigan, 
personal communication, April 24, 2009) 
c. SAR (Cell) Focus Group Long Term Goals 
 Attend all of the National Search and Rescue Committee and other 
strategic (some operational) meetings 
 Build a an operational network of SAR mission coordinators  and 
SAR coordinators 
 Provide strategic direction to the JPRC 
 Define USNORTHCOM SAR response into the DSCA CONPLAN 
3501 
 Improve cooperation with the SAR international community 
(especially Canada) 
 Develop a SAR Military Use Handbook (J. Sokol, personal 
communication, July 14, 2008) 
This section has introduced a research observation that the 
USNORTHCOM commander recognizes a need to expend DoD resources in anticipation 
of CI SAR requirements and he does so by supporting the efforts of this focus group. 
This group has the willingness and capability to lead and solve CI SAR issues despite a 
lack of civil authority to do so. Unfortunately, DoD is only one segment of the 
megacommunity and both improved interagency coordination between all equity holders 
and a binding national SAR strategy are needed to align and guide the larger 
megacommunity efforts to improve CI SAR. 
D. MAJOR FINDINGS  
While researching the primary CI SAR organizations and their functions, a 
number of recurring themes became apparent. These discoveries were discussed during 
interviews and with SAR focus group members between February and May 2009. These 
findings are quite broad and require some manner of prioritization that will be discussed 
in Chapter VI. The general findings of the research follow:  
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 CI SAR awareness, anticipation and preparations can be improved through 
development of a national strategy for SAR. 
 A flexible and scalable Joint Air Ground Coordination Center concept 
must be institutionalized by DHS and DoD to ensure efficient CI SAR 
management. The JAGCC must take advantage of the technologies and 
communications systems of participating members to coordinated CI SAR 
response at the national and international level. 
 The NSARC should develop a strategic interagency engagement plan with 
all equity holders. (This outreach can only be accomplished if DHS and 
USNORTHCOM fund additional full-time positions for this critical 
national outreach effort).  
 It is necessary to eliminate delays in DoD deployment by developing 
integrated SAR plans and using predisaster declarations when possible. 
 The SAR megacommunity must strive to reduce deployment times for CI 
SAR by organizing more effectively and developing time driven 
objectives. 
 NSARC members should empower the umbrella organization (through 
funding and additional authorities) to collaborate, coordinate and train 
with regional and state partners to ensure they understand how the federal 
government intends to support state and local authorities. 
 National and international resources must be deployed and employed 
efficiently; therefore, processing time of requests for assistance must be 
reduced by planning and exercising the use of expedited FEMA mission 
assignments (MAs), the use of SAR Prescripted mission assignments 
(PSMAs) and DoD use of verbal orders of commanding officer (VOCO) 
authorities. 
 DHS (through the NSARC) must create a more robust regional 
interagency organizational construct to prepare for CI SAR. 
 USNORTHCOM must create a robust SAR cell in the operations 
directorate to ensure the significant DoD resources are brought to bear in a 
timely manner. The cell must include linkages to the components, 
National Guard, FAA and other critical equity holders. 
 USNORTHCOM must develop a plan to kludge DSCA and civil SAR and 






 DHS, through the NSARC members, should encourage greater 
coordination between state SAR planners, FEMA catastrophic planning 
officers; FEMA integrated planning officers, USNORTHCOM planners 
and state SMCs. This coordination can be accomplished through planning 
efforts, conferences, memoranda of understanding or other outreach 
methods. 
 DHS should create and manage a more robust national SAR budget and 
include incentives for initiative similar to the Canadian New Initiatives 
Fund. 
 The NSARC should develop a better relationship with the INSARAG and 
USAID for more robust international CI SAR preparation (especially with 
Canada). 
 The NSARC and USNORTHCOM should identify CI SAR Civil Support 
Task List requirements to the National Guard Bureau and the states. 
Supporting the CSTL effort will encourage National Guard SAR 
resourcing and training through the Defense Readiness Reporting System. 
 The NSARC and USNORHCOM should leverage additional volunteer 
support for SAR (such as Citizen Corps / the Eagles Wings Foundation) 
through integrated planning, training and exercises. 
 DHS and USNORTHCOM should develop CI SAR FSTTL training 
scenarios. 
 DoD (through USNORTHCOM) should clarify civil SAR, PR and DSCA 
SAR roles in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
 USNORTHCOM should review, rewrite and coordinate DoD PR/SAR 
policy documents and author concept plans and concepts of execution 
(CONEXs). 
The Participation Planning Matrix for SAR (Table 8) is designed to demonstrate 
the requirement and value of an interagency outreach strategy within the SAR 
megacommunity. Developing a coordinated interagency outreach plan including SAR 
equity holders will enhance recognition of the proposed changes and improve both the 
change process and the end product (national SAR strategy and organizational 
reconstruction). Developing an interagency outreach strategy will also help each of the 
equity holders determine for themselves where they fit into the SAR system. Each 
organization can determine if more or less involvement in the change process is needed 









The synthesis and analysis of interviews, interaction with the SAR focus group 
and the earlier research affords 17 major findings that are valuable to the SAR 
megacommunity. These findings will improve readiness to provide FSTTL CI SAR 
response in a manner consistent with public expectations. Taking these actions will also 
help the partners better anticipate the requirements for CI SAR. The sweet spot for CI 
SAR will become more apparent to federal and state equity holders.  
In this chapter, the interviews and resulting discoveries were discussed. The 
USNORTHCOM SAR focus group was introduced to point out DoD current efforts and 
future intentions. An analysis of the research data yielded 17 general recommendations 
for consumption by the SAR megacommunity, with special interest to the federal and 
DoD equity partners in particular. In the next few chapters, an effort is made to identify 
which steps should be taken first and how managers can approach the work to undertake 
these 17 recommendations. 
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL BENCHMARK STUDIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Whether a crisis is environmental, political, human, or technological in nature, it 
demands preparation, response, and resolution at a level of organizational complexity that 
matches the needs of the situation. We must remember that crises are nonlinear; their 
inputs and outputs are not proportional; the situation is not equal to the sum of its 
constituent components; it is difficult to see the boundaries of their scope. Therefore, the 
response to a crisis must possess the capacities to deal with nonlinear, chaotic, 
multidimensional realities through intense collaboration and coordination with reasonable 
potential to draw on all available resources to respond effectively. (Hillyard, 2000, p. 6) 
When the need for federal assistance is obvious and immediate because of a 
catastrophe, SAR organizational leadership must deploy assets in anticipation of requests 
for assistance in order to search for and rescue what may be hundreds of thousands of 
victims (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. CAT 2-6). Temporary 
suspension of the request for assistance process is anticipated and the prompt anticipatory 
response of federal, state, territorial, tribal and local partners may be an uncoordinated 
attempt rather than an integrated and unified team unless SAR managers can find a way 
to coordinate the interagency, joint, multi-component effort for catastrophic events. A 
scalable, flexible and adaptable Joint Air Ground Coordination Center may provide the 
best organizational construct to conduct this time-critical CI SAR management and 
coordination.  
During preparations for Hurricane Ike in 2008, USNORTHCOM SJFHQ, the 
Joint Personnel Recovery Center and Air Force Rescue Coordination Center formed an 
ad hoc coordination center. Fortunately, CI SAR was not needed for Hurricane Ike and 
USNORTHCOM was able to take lessons learned from this initial effort and apply the 





a standard methodology are needed to share time-critical lifesaving information. The 
JAGCC will provide that very important venue for the most important mission—saving 
lives. 
A predetermined communications and synchronization methodology is necessary 
for catastrophic67 SAR to coordinate communications, resources, personnel and supplies. 
For a catastrophic event, the SAR megacommunity intends to respond immediately and 
the equity holders need to know how it fits into the bigger picture to ensure efficiency of 
the response. 
The many lessons learned from hurricane Katrina assert that civil and military 
federal responses for this catastrophe were inefficient and uncoordinated (Government 
Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 7, 35 and 65).  Catastrophic search and rescue 
operations are specifically included in this harsh criticism and the interagency community 
has not corrected the problems associated with catastrophic SAR planning and 
preparations. Both USNORTHCOM and DHS68 (Department of Homeland Security, 
2004, p. 1) are primary stakeholders in this community. DHS holds accountability as the 
SAR coordinator for the nation and DoD because of the responsibilities for Defense 
Support for Civil Authorities SAR, civil SAR and personnel recovery. A collegial 
approach to SAR requires interdisciplinary leadership that values consensus building, 
teamwork, and participation as part of a system of systems. 
1. Overview 
For CI SAR, no single organization has a common operating picture for 
catastrophic SAR because of event complexity and intensity. There is also a lack of 
valuable planning and exercises (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 1–7). 
                                                 
67 Before plunging into analysis of need for a JAGCC, there is a need to look at the definition of a 
catastrophic incident. The NRF (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 43) defines a catastrophic 
incident as “...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of 
mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 
economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained 
national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available 
to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area....”  
68 DHS is designated the coordinating agency for catastrophic incidents. 
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During the Hurricane Katrina response (the best example of a recent catastrophic 
incident), DoD did not anticipate the need for damage assessment, failed to adequately 
conduct an assessment, and then deployed forces without understanding the full extent of 
the damage (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 1–7). The GAO reported that 
interagency strategic planning was inadequate for Katrina (Government Accountability 
Office, 2006, p. 28 and 29)69 and that DHS has not provided adequate guidance to 
partners and states. Specifically, DoD needs additional operational planning information 
from DHS (Government Accountability Office, 2008, pp. 8–16). Lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina indicate similar findings. The report states, “The Department of 
Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current policies and procedures 
to ensure effective integration of all federal search and rescue assets during disaster 
response” (Townsend, 2006, p. 57). Some of the SAR lessons learned from this report 
have been corrected and others have not been adequately addressed.70 Table 9 provides 
recommendations and an analysis of the status of the recommendations.  
 
                                                 
69 The GAO report goes on to state that the Secretary of Defense should establish milestones and 
expedite the development of detailed catastrophic plans that specifically address use of SAR capabilities 
and the military’s role in SAR. DoD acknowledged that better integration of interagency and Title 32/10 
assets would have led to greater efficiency for the SAR mission (Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
70 In an evaluation of the Hurricane Rita response, Major General John White, a member of the 
military’s joint task force on Rita, commented to President Bush that current SAR plans were in disarray 
and that numerous helicopters could show up at the same time to rescue the same person (Associated Press, 
2005).    
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Table 9.   Status of White House Katrina Lessons Learned as of May 30, 2006 
Hurricane Katrina SAR 
Lessons Learned 
(Townsend, 2006, p. 57) 
Status Current Status of the Recommendations 
44:  DHS should lead an 
interagency team to review and 
revise the NRP to ensure the 
integration of all federal search 
and rescue assets. 
Partially 
Addressed 
The NRP is revised and the label for US&R is now 
changed to include civil SAR, however the nation 
falls far short of having integrated urban and civil 
SAR functions in a manner that would encourage 
all-domain integrated response for CI SAR. 
Furthermore, this research indicates that all SAR 
functions (aeronautical, inland and maritime of the 
FSTTL partners) should be integrated and 
coordinated, not just federal assets. 
45.  The National Search and 
Rescue Committee should revise 
the National Search and Rescue 




The NSP was revised in 2007, however, it is 
quickly becoming outdated and airspace control 
and coordination measures are still topics of 
discussion for CI SAR71. 
46.  Each state and major city 
should incorporate Search and 
Rescue and US&R annexes into 




State SAR plans are at various levels of 
completeness. The plans are not integrated and 
many do not address a CI SAR environment 
(Brown, NASAR Reprentative to NSARC, 2009). 
47.  DHS should expand the 
National Preparedness Goal’s 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) 
Capability: Urban Search and 
Rescue to require Federal Urban 
Search and Rescue teams and 
State and local entities to train, 
equip, and exercise for civil 
search and rescue missions. 
Incomplete This research indicates there are inadequate 
FSTTL integrated CI SAR training and exercises. 
Furthermore, the finding leaves out the military 
component and does not suggest CI SAR versus 
normal SAR training and exercises are important 
or different from the sequential and layered SAR 
response training and exercises at severity levels 
less than catastrophic.  
48.  DHS should create a 
national search and rescue 
volunteer certification 
program. 
Incomplete A comprehensive SAR volunteer support 
system trained in CI SAR response operations 
does not exist at the national level.72 
 
                                                 
71 During a February 2009 NSARC discussion, it became clear that not all partners agree on 
navigational systems: latitude/longitude, global area reference system (GARS) or universal trans mercator 
(UTM) between air, land and maritime resources. Using a mix of these systems will cause confusion and 
difficulty that may adversely impact airspace control and coordination.  
72 Organizations such as the Eagles Wings Foundation for Disaster Relief could provide incident 
management teams and manpower for searches during catastrophic incidents. During discussion with Mr. 
Scott P. Lewis, President of the Eagles Wings Foundation for Disaster Relief, on April 9, 2009, he revealed 
that coordination with the foundation for CI SAR has been negligible and the volunteer organization 
leadership has not been exposed to the CI SAR Addendum to the NSM (P. Lewis, personal communication, 
April 9, 2009). 
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2. Recent Examples Indicating a Need for a JAGCC 
Progress was made to improve SAR operations during Hurricane Ike in 2008. The 
First Air Force Commander (Morrow, 2008) briefed the USNORTHCOM staff that the 
JPRC and AFRCC had full coordination with USCG, National Guard Bureau and the 
state of Texas. It was divulged that Texas was using a draft SAR plan and this was a first 
attempt for an all agency/all-domain SAR effort. Members of the USNORTHCOM 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters were deployed to support the effort without having 
had benefit of either training or exercises for CI SAR deployments. Fortunately, Texas 
Task Force 1 was not required to conduct CI SAR for Hurricane Ike. Had Hurricane Ike 
caused catastrophic damage, integrated SAR across multiple domains would likely have 
been impossible.  
Another example is that the SAR megacommunity has recognized a need for 
some type of organization to coordinate SAR response to catastrophic incidents was 
found in the exercise Vigilant Guard Puerto Rico (VGPR) that took place March 24 
through March 26, 2009. A hypothetical catastrophic earthquake and tsunami demanded 
CI SAR. An ad hoc coordinating center was established by DoD. The coordination center 
was staffed by JPRC members, Defense Coordinating Element members and 
USNORTHCOM liaisons, but the tie to the National Guard and state EOC was lacking. 
The exercise even taught bad habits because the federal response was not immediate as it 
would be for a real-world event. The CI SAR addendum to the National SAR Manual 
received no attention during the exercise in the state EOC. The exercise was designed in a 
manner that taught both civil and military authorities inaccurate and improper processes 
for a unified response to a catastrophic incident. Mission assignments were processed as 
they would be for a less than catastrophic event and the DCO was not involved with 
immediate coordination of federal assets. An interagency coordination element could 
have helped solve the enormous CI SAR problem associated with this exercise. VGPR 
provided another indicator that operational elements continue to recognize that some type 
of coordination or incident management team for SAR is needed. 
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This was another forward step towards a desperately needed Joint Air Ground 
Coordination Center, but the air coordination group is in the early stages of development 
and lacks standards and structure. The Air Coordination Group was first conceptualized 
for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav in 2008. The effort is staffed and coordinated by the land, 
air and maritime components of DoD and the USCG. It is led by the JPRC with 
USNORTHCOM strategic support through liaisons. For this exercise, the group 
conceptualized a DoD centric response to the catastrophe. This was an excellent effort as 
far as it went; however, it did not include interagency and multi-level representatives. It 
was a DoD rescue coordination cell that planned to divide the impacted area into sectors 
then parse out the DoD resources to those sectors.  
This excellent coordination center effort was sorely needed and represented a step 
in the right direction, but it did not develop a multi-domain solution to CI SAR issues. 
The DoD response still looked sorely like the Hurricane Katrina effort with many assets 
in the JOA providing resources in an uncoordinated and inefficient manner. The SAR cell 
was also completely and artificially separated from the National Guard exercise since the 
VGPR series is designed and funded for the National Guard only. This added artificiality 
taught the National Guard and federal SAR responders that sequential CI SAR processes 
should be anticipated rather than expecting an immediate unified response from the 
primary federal partners (as explained in the CI SAR Addendum). For Puerto Rico, this is 
tragic because it is already so far away from mainland assistance that pushing critical 
SAR assets to it will stretch EMAC and federal logistical and transportation capabilities.  
Instead of a unified local, territorial, and federal CI SAR response, the exercise 
injects for VGPR dealt only with the National Guard, while an ARNORTH exercise of 
the same name was underway in the FEMA building in downtown San Juan a few blocks 
away. On top of the confusion of having two exercises occur at one time, FEMA was 
evaluating the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency. The result was that Puerto 
Rico civil authorities, the National Guard, the DCO and the SAR coordination center 
were separated geographically and artificially through the exercise and throughout the 
communications systems.  
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Not only were these key nodes not talking or working together, they were 
working against each other. This exercise did little at the territorial and municipal levels 
to promote CI SAR learning opportunities. The exercise confused civil authorities and 
demonstrated that the National Guard and federal military systems are still separate and 
have difficulty unifying the DoD effort. 
The wildland firefighting (WFF) community and the USSS have communications 
and coordination center models that might be useful to CI SAR managers. In the next few 
pages, a comparison of the WFF and SAR megacommunities is provided using a 
framework based upon five principles of crisis management. Using the five principles, it 
becomes clear that some type of communications or coordination center is necessary for 
CI SAR. Finally, it is recommended that the DHS/FEMA begin developing a concept for 
a JAGCC modeled after the USSS MACC and the NMAC.  
B. COMPARISON OF WILDLAND FIREFIGHTING (WFF) AND CI SAR 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
1. Introduction and Overview 
Research has shown that the SAR megacommunity is in need of a management 
concept that can provide comprehensive strategy, policy-maker support, and long-term 
focus in a manner that includes skilled equity holders working together through minimal 
barriers and across their respective agency boundaries (Hillyard, 2000, pp. 35–36). An 
authoritative national strategy from DHS could facilitate this effort and will be discussed 
more in Chapter VI. However, with or without a national strategy for CI SAR, a 
collaborative strategy similar to that of the National Interagency Fire Center seems like it 
could incorporate the equities of the many partners through a holistic approach that will 
dovetail with NIMS/ICS to ensure the largest number of lives saved. Substantial 
involvement of the megacommunity would be required to develop a comprehensive 
solution to the CI SAR problems and the organizations involved must all share in what 
may be substantial obligation. The innovative and flexible approach will require intense 
coordination, communication, commitment and dedication of a core group guided by a 
national strategy of some sort.  
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There are organizations that have experience organizing coordination and 
communications functions for large public tragedies. This section presents the 
Emergency Support Function #4, WFF community, organization for public crisis 
management and compares five WFF management principles with the CI SAR 
management method. Using Michael J. Hillyard’s (2000) study of Public Crisis 
Management, How and Why Organizations Work Together to Solve Society’s Most 
Threatening Problems, an organizational benchmark is identified that provides a model 
for managing intense, complex and even chaotic catastrophic incidents. Using Hillyard’s 
five principles of crisis management: common purpose, authority, incentives, culture and 
structure (Hillyard, 2000); a need for a Joint Air Ground Coordination Center to manage 
CI SAR becomes apparent. 
a. Common Purpose 
The wildland firefighting community pre-event coordination is based upon 
a total asset mobility concept. The manager’s organizing efforts deliberately deliver its 
mobile assets on time in order to control and suppress wildfires. This is similar to the 
requirement placed upon SAR managers in that the common purpose is to arrive in a 
timely manner with the right mix of managers, workers and resources to do a job (search 
for and rescue distressed persons). These assets could include incident awareness and 
assessment, management teams, as well as air and ground equipment. The WFF 
community manages the resource dependence of separate organizations using the NIMS 
through national and geographic regional coordination centers. The common purpose 
comes from the resource dependence and needs of many independent organizations for 
limited resources and the National Response Framework (Hillyard, 2000, p. 46). In both 
organizations, timely response is critical to saving lives. Failure in the CI SAR or WFF 
response efforts will result in lives lost. The common purpose drives the need for national 
umbrella organizations in both the WFF community and the SAR megacommunity 
(NIFC/NSARC); however, the two lead federal organizations do not manage the demands 
in a similar manner.  
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Eight federal agencies and organizations are organized by memorandum 
of agreement under the NIFC for efficiency, cost avoidance and operations coordination 
through the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) (National Interagency 
Coordination Center, n.d.).  The NICC accomplishes the coordination through local 
services (such as as-needed or on-call contracts with public businesses) within eleven 
geographical areas and at the national level. National WFF coordination is managed 
through the National Multi-Agency Coordination Group (NMAC).  
Similarly, seven federal SAR organizations are signatory to the 2007 NSP 
and organized under the NSARC.73 The NSARC, to date, has not organized at the 
national level in a manner similar to the NMAC even though the common purpose of the 
two organizations (NMAC/NSARC) clearly depicts analogous requirements. Independent 
states have not developed common standards and similar response plans. At the regional 
level, interagency coordination centers for SAR do not exist that are similar to the WFF 
geographical area coordination centers (GACCs).  
A unifying national SAR strategy could help drive legislation and policy 
to provide the NSARC additional resources that would help them organize the SAR 
megacommunity and operate in a manner similar to the NMAC. Advantages that could be 
realized if the NSARC adopts a role similar to the NMAC include: 
 Inventory and classification of SAR assets across the SAR spectrum. 
 Standardize similar SAR practices and techniques in all organizations. 
 Meet the desire and need to conduct interagency SAR coordination pre-
event and during CI SAR events. 
 Develop common training and evaluations74 across the 
megacommunity. 
 Fund priority regional and state needs that promote standardization. 
                                                 
73 A number of relatively recent external and internal pressures are driving change in the SAR 
community. External factors influencing the NSARC include the NRF, Katrina lessons Learned, Post 
Katrina Reform Act, HSPDs, DoD becoming a primary agency in ESF #9, US&R teams becoming S&R 
teams in the NRF etc. Internal pressures include SAR technological developments (COSPAS/SARSAT), 
resource dependence for unique capabilities, limited key resources, growing population centers etc. 
74 Improved standardization beyond NIMS including: training, certification, deployment standards, 
navigation methods, techniques, organization, procedures and configuration of equipment. 
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 Develop regional interagency agreements and centers to form SAR 
geographic area coordination facilities similar to the eleven GACCs75 
(National GACC Website Committee, 2008). 
 Improve coordination with the International Search and Rescue 
Advisory Group in a manner similar to the NIFC coordination with the 
Canadian International Forest Fire Center (CIFFC) (Canadian 
International Forest Fire Center , 2007).  
b. Authority 
Legal authorities for CI SAR were discussed at length in Chapter II and III 
for DSCA SAR, civil SAR and PR. There is also a rational authority that is the basis for 
the legal authorities (Hillyard, 2000, pp. 84–92). American society accepts that lifesaving 
operations are necessary and that organizing to accomplish the rescue and saving the 
lives of distressed persons is important.  
The SAR megacommunity is decentralized so much so that additional 
central involvement at regional and national levels may help to unite the states and 
regions.76 Additional network coordination and central influence for prioritization and 
resource allocation during CI SAR response operations could help FSTTL members 
manage and prioritize critical timely resources. Authority would be needed by regional 
geographic centers and the NSARC. These additional authorities (more than the 2007 
NSP provides) should be sought from local and state establishments through contracts 
such as memoranda of agreement or understanding. These types of agreements have been 
effective in the WFF community and within DoD. DoD has also used comparable inter-
organizational and multi-level constructs such as Joint Interagency Task Forces,  
Humanitarian Support Operations Centers, Civil-Military Operations Centers, Regional 
Joint Task Forces, etc. for national building, humanitarian support operations, disaster 
response operations and non-combatant evacuation operations. 
                                                 
75 The USCG has regional coordination centers (RCCs), ESF #9 is represented in the FEMA regions 
and DoD has regional defense coordinating units, but there is not a regional interagency construct similar to 
the GACCs. A regional construct with Web-based portals to each region could greatly enhance CI SAR 
response effectiveness.  
76 Regions could be defined as SAR regions, FEMA regions, firefighting regions or other methods of 
centralizing coordination and communications centers in a manner that CI SAR resources could be 
efficiently requested and employed. 
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In the WFF community, operational authority is divided into two 
categories: resource management and incident command. The NMAC establishes the 
national priorities, leadership and direction to the participating community members. As 
the magnitude of a fire event grows, both resources and incident command flow first 
from local responders through the geographic area coordination centers, then continues 
through the National Interagency Coordination Center to the National Multi-Agency 
Coordination Center. As part of the national response, these operational authorities are 
provided through the NRF, ESF #4 and memoranda of agreement. Response is 
coordinated through the Department of Agriculture/Forest Service to save lives, protect 
property and the environment—in that order77 (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
Operational SAR authorities are more ambiguous. The coordinated sharing of resources 
through ESF #9 does not have the same structure or operational authorities as the WFF 
community. Without a CI SAR organization managing resources at a 
national/international level, a unified CI SAR response will be difficult to manage. 
In sum, the authority for resource allocation is horse trading between 
firefighting regions. Organizations participate and recognize operational authorities out of 
necessity to share resources. The WFF community follows the principal that events 
happen locally first, but it readily accepts regional and national aid to save lives, prevent 
suffering and protect property and the environment. In contrast, national and regional CI 
SAR centers do not exist to assist with resource and incident management even though a 
need is recognized. A team of SAR experts has not been acknowledged as an identified 
incident management team, while in the WFF community, teams of incident managers 
are trained and ready in scalable teams. 
c. Incentives 
Allocation of resources and reciprocity from other participating 
organizations is the biggest enticement to participate in a public crisis management 
                                                 
77 The National Response Coordination Center establishes communications with the NIFC and 
regional representatives (GACCs) for assessment within two hours. Managers analyze the situation, 
prioritize, mobilize, deploy and employ resources in a unified and coordinated manner. 
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cooperative (Hillyard, 2000, pp. 121–143). The benefits of participating in an 
organization such as the NMAC or the NSARC include shared resources only available 
to members, shared funding, technologies and the reciprocity that others in the collective 
bring to bear for any of the members in a time of need. 
At the national level, fewer incentives exist to participate in the NSARC 
than can be found in the WFF community. Providing the NSARC and the constituent 
members a more robust budget to integrate a wider array of participants would increase 
interest and improve their ability to reach out to the megacommunity from the national 
level. The expectation would be that the NSARC and USCG regional rescue coordination 
centers would become more like the NMAC and GACCs. National and regional 
coordination centers would develop more interagency appeal to the SAR community. 
Without funding to deliberate or implement an organizational structure similar to the 
NMAC or GACCs, there is little likelihood that organizational change could occur. A 
federal budget would also support efforts to group resources, provide jurisdictional 
incentives and fund special priority programs to fill niche requirements. 
Incentives for participation in a more robust SAR megacommunity would 
include the grouped resources, special program funding and the desire for reciprocity. 
Currently, the NMAC has a much greater attraction because of the national resource 
incentives and the recognized ability to reciprocate. The NSARC could have the potential 
of becoming this attractive to the SAR megacommunity if a national strategy provided 
resource and budget authorities that made clear the advantages of participating to the 
states and territories. 
d. Culture 
The WFF community and the SAR community each have a macro culture 
that drives them to perform very hard tasks in extreme conditions. There is a bottom-up 
appreciation in both environments because of the highly technical and dangerous job of 
the tactician. There is a high degree of respect for the tactical response teams from 
national level managers as a result of an intrinsic desire to find and help people in 
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distress. This macro culture is obvious in the esprit de corps in both organizations. Both 
the WFF and SAR megacommunities have certification programs and the leadership 
elements of their respective teams. Other similarities of the two include the ability to risk 
manage, training/certification processes, and safety awareness and professionalism. 
These desires can be leveraged to form a CI SAR bottom-up strategy that will ensure the 
community is prepared for an event where hundreds of thousands of people may need 
assistance. An inter-organizational culture is trying to emerge in the SAR community as 
was found during Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and exercise Vigilant Guard Puerto Rico. 
The community has recognized a need for some type of national coordination or 
communications center, but a standard template for organizing seems to elude the SAR 
professionals. A method is needed to manage the CI SAR resourcing, supplies and 
personnel just like in the WFF community.  
e. Structure 
A highly intense and complex environment can be expected when CI SAR 
is needed. Technological advancements promise additional layers of complexity as 
numerous organizations respond to the calls for help. The SAR megacommunity has 
choices about how to organize for these intense and complex events. Resource typing 
helps at all levels but does not leverage the private or public volunteers that may also be 
available to assist. Resource typing does not currently include the National Guard and 
other DoD assets that would be a large part of the CI SAR response (FEMA, 2005). 
The structure chosen must be effective in the existing National Incident 
Management System and must also be a collaborative approach similar to the WFF 
techniques. Clear communications that are accessible and direct between distressed 
persons and rescuers will be the hallmark of the effective system.  
Using Hillyard’s five principles of public crisis management to look at 
both the WFF and SAR megacommunities, it becomes apparent that some type of 
coordination center or communications center for CI SAR will be helpful. Two examples 
exist that may prove helpful to organizing CI SAR Joint Air Ground Coordination Center 
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for an extreme and multifarious catastrophic situation. These include the NMAC that has 
been discussed at length in this chapter and the United States Secret Service Multiagency 
Communications Center  used in managing communications between a wide array of 
disparate organizations for National Special Security Events (NSSEs).  
C. NATIONAL MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION CENTER (NMAC) 
The NMAC is responsible for national strategic coordination to ensure 
firefighting resources are effectively and appropriately managed in a cost effective 
manner (National Multiagency Coordination Center, 2008).78   
The NMAC can be thought of as the managerial part of command and 
management mentioned as component IV of the National Incident Management System. 
Regional and National Multi-Agency Coordination Centers have responsibilities that 
include managing resources, people and time to sustain the incident commander and the 
staff through resource allocation. NMAC is comprised of representatives from six 
organizations: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Bureau of 
Land Management, United States Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs and the 
National Association of State Foresters79 (National Association of State Foresters, 2000).   
Table 10 shows the National Multi-Agency Coordination Center (NMAC) and 
Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) members as of June 6, 2008. The process 
that these members follow on a daily basis during fire season is described because a 
similar process could be useful to CI SAR managers. 
                                                 
78 The NMAC is responsible for establishing national and geographic area practices, national level 
management, and resource allocation to regions. Members include Department of Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, United States 
Forest Service, U.S. Fire Administration, and National Association of State Foresters (many of the 
organizations also sit on the NSARC and conduct CI SAR ops) (McManus, 2008). 
79 NASF is a nonprofit organization that represents the directors of forestry agencies from the 50 
states, eight U.S. territories and associated states and the District of Columbia. 
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Table 10.   NMAC and Geographic Area Coordination Centers (GACC) NMAC 
Representation (National Geographic Area Coordination Center, 2009) 
National Representatives in the NMAC 
National MAC Group (NMAC) NMAC Chair 
Geographic Area CG Advisory Council GACAG) NMAC 
National Incident Management Organization 
Implementation Team (NIMO)80 NMAC 
National Predictive Services Group (NPSG) NMAC 
National Coordinators Group (NCG) NMAC 
National IC/AC Group NMAC 
Geographic Area Command Liaisons in the NMAC 
Alaska Fish and Wildlife Service Representative 
Eastern Area 
National Association of State Foresters 
(NASF)  Representative 
Eastern Great Basin Bureau of Land Management Representative 
Northern California US Fire Administration Representative 
Northern Rockies National Park Service Representative 
Northwest Area Bureau of Indian Affairs Representative 
Rocky Mountain NASF Representative 
Southern Area 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Representative 
Southern California US Fire Administration Representative 
Southwest Area USFS Representative 
Western Great Basin Bureau of Land Management Representative 
Prior to the daily NMAC meeting, national NMAC executives contact their 
respective regional multi-agency coordination centers to understand the incidents 
underway in their region, resource requirements, and analysis and projections. After 
receiving the regional information and analysis, the NMAC conducts a daily meeting 
(more often, as-required) during the wildfire season. A wide array of stakeholders is 
invited to attend the weather and situational updates. Afterwards, only the senior 
executives remain to hear specialist comments such as fire behavior issues. NMAC 
members then receive the NICC analysis and recommendations. With data reflecting 
regional and national analysis, weather and resources available in hand, the NMAC 
                                                 
80 NIMO teams are comprised of seven professional members that manage complex incidents. NIMO 
teams are available year round for incident management. The CI SAR community does not currently have 
such a team structure for deployable operations (National Incident Management Organization, n.d.) 
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executives prioritize their resources and efforts (D. Shinn, personal communication, 
March 5, 2009).  Once resources are prioritized, notifications are made for movement of 
the resources. These resources could include air or ground forces, international aid, civil 
or military assets. There are significant similarities between the wildland fire resources 
and those resources that would be required for CI SAR. The similarities include the types 
of equipment, personnel with a high degree of technical knowledge and both rotary wing 
and fixed wing aircraft. Technical assets are also being used in the fire community in the 
form of unmanned aerial vehicles for incident awareness and assessment. The fire service 
has found a method that enables them to share time driven technical information 
effectively while the SAR community lags behind in this regard.   
Four national incident management organization (NIMO) teams81 (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2007), four area command teams, 17 type I incident 
command teams and 37 type II incident command teams are relied upon by the NMAC to 
manage and command large wildfires. As a general rule, type I national teams manage 
highly complex and very large wildland fires with over 600 people assigned. Type II 
teams are involved when less complex fires are ignited and less than 500 people are 
assigned to fire mitigation (Wildlandfire.com, 2008). The SAR community has not 
planned for this type of command and management overhead structure, nor has the SAR 
megacommunity exercised using the WFF management organization during exercises for 
CI SAR management.  
These managerial teams not only deploy to wildland fires, but they are allocated 
for a wide array of large incidents needing incident command and management. As 
examples, they have been used for New Castle Disease outbreak of 2002, Pentagon and 
New York City on 9-11, Columbia disaster in 2003, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The 
teams have standard procedures, depth and a rotating schedule for 24/7 availability (T. 
Frey, personal communication, February 19, 2009). 
                                                 
81 Four teams assist the NMAC with a seven-man type I capability. The NIMO teams work with the 
NMAC to identify opportunities, evaluate performance and determine the future direction of their team. 
These teams deploy to large incidents and assist with the incident command teams apply efficient, risk-
based solutions or they can be employed in a garrison environment as educators.  
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One example of how to improve interagency management of CI SAR is found 
with the USFS NICC national incident management teams. The four national incident 
management organization (NIMO) teams may be available for national and international 
incidences; they are comprised of 10 primary members and up to 27 members in a long 
configuration. NIMOs are similar in nature to type I incident management teams with 
years of technical incident management experience for very large incidents. The teams 
may not be available for all-risk events since their emphasis is on fire service rotational 
needs; however, the expertise they have should not be ignored when determining incident 
management structure. 
The NIMO teams could leverage their experience to help with planning, check-in, 
operations management and unified command. The groups could also assist with setting 
priorities and asset ordering using the standard ICS forms (T. Frey, personal 
communication, February 19, 2009). They could be used as the hub in a catastrophic 
incident or on the periphery of the event to help sector commanders unify efforts, report, 
plan and order resources. They are also familiar with status check-in reporting processes 
and could run the check-in group. The teams could be a key resource in getting 
everybody to stop individual or singular efforts and concentrate more effectively on a 
unified response effort. It was also stressed that rehearsal and practice is what makes the 
teams effective, and it is this lesson that should be taken to heart as the SAR community 
plans the DoD response effort for CI SAR. 
According to a USFS expert, an example of how the NIMO teams could be useful 
for SAR is found in their 2005, Hurricane Katrina response at the New Orleans, 
Louisiana airport. NIMO leadership found that there were many organizations conducting 
their own activities to help the citizens of New Orleans but the efforts were 
uncoordinated. The NIMO team, recognizing this lack of teamwork, visited with other 
organizational leaders. Under the NIMO leadership, a number of organizations developed 
a unified command that spanned each group in the vicinity of the airport. Process 
integration was achieved and the overall impact was unification of effort and a 
synchronized response to mitigate the effects of the hurricane. The NIMO team turned 
104 
 
operational chaos into an integrated operation at the federal level. Leveraging the type I 
teams already in existence should be part of the comprehensive federal CI SAR planning 
effort (D. Shinn, personal communication, March 5, 2009). The SAR community has not 
yet developed a plan for CI SAR incident management teams. SAR professionals 
currently rely on the NIMS/ICS structure, knowing that SAR assets will immediately 
self-deploy on life-saving missions prior to receiving mission assignments leaving an 
information void about who is in the area and what life saving actions were taken. If 
consideration were given to developing a managerial CI SAR management team structure 
similar to the wildland firefighting area, type I, type II and NIMO teams, a more unified 
allocation of resources, more efficient searches and more lives saved could be realized. 
Through coordination with the NMAC, it may be possible to employ the current teams as 
a starting point for SAR type I/II team development (D. Shinn, personal communication, 
March 5, 2009). 
D. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE (USSS) MULTIAGENCY 
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER (MACC) 
The MACC manages operations for NSSEs82 (Kroener, 2007). The MACC is a 
communications coordination center that stands up for a NSSE in close proximity to the 
activities. Tactical, operational and strategic stakeholders are invited to participate in the 
multi-domain center. Stakeholders staff the center and have access to computers, Internet 
                                                 
82 The Assistant Director, Office of Protective Operations, Timothy J. Koerner described the MACC 
in an August 10, 2007 subcommittee meeting: “The MACC serves as a central 24-hour communications 
hub throughout the event and is staffed by representatives from all participating law enforcement and 
public safety agencies, as well as personnel from public utilities, public works departments, district 
attorney’s offices, and other organizations that have unique roles in the overall security plan. The primary 
purpose of the MACC is to provide the timely dissemination of information to all entities participating in 
security operations, and to serve as the centralized coordination center for security-related activities. In 
addition to being an information collection and dissemination center located in close proximity to the event 
site, the MACC also shares connectivity with command posts and with emergency operations centers of 
agencies throughout the area and nationwide. The MACC shares information and situational awareness 
with the following coordinated components: the Joint Information Center (JIC), Intelligence Operations 
Center (IOC), Airspace Security Operations Center (ASOC), Principal Federal Official’s Cell (PFO) and 
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Typically, the MACC is also virtually connected to the following 
national operations centers: the Secret Service Joint Operations Center (JOC), FBI Strategic Information 
Operations Center (SIOC), DHS National Operations Center (NOC)—which includes the FEMA National 
Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the DoD Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), among 
others” (document provided to author by USSS agent). 
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and telephone through the USSS architecture. The purpose of the center is timely 
information- sharing and coordination of all participating agencies involved in the 
operation. The center also serves as a center for security-related activities. Another 
important contribution of the MACC is that participants share connectivity with 
command posts and emergency operations centers in the local area and also nationwide. 
This connectivity promotes information sharing and situational awareness that spans all 
domains.  
As an example, USSS MACC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
intelligence operations centers were co-located for both the Republican National 
Convention (RNC) and Democratic National Conventions (DNC). Approximately 70 
agencies were represented in the RNC and 63 in the DNC respective MACCs in 2008 
(Gottfried, 2008) as presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3.   2008 Multiagency Communications Centers for RNC and DNC 
 
The MACC is a good example of a field communications hub used by voluntarily 
participating agencies. The USSS stands up and manages the MACC to ensure 24-hour 
operational support for the duration of an event. This same type of concept could be used 
for development of a JAGCC.  
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The SAR megacommunity should consider contacting the USSS to evaluate the 
MACC in order to conduct a feasibility study. For example, the NMAC organization and 
facility could be used as the prevailing organization for steady-state operations. The 
MACC construct could be used as a deployable operational coordination center. This 
concept is not unheard of in the emergency response community.  
Department of Transportation or Emergency Support Function #1 uses a crisis 
management center for day-to-day operations, but when a crisis occurs then the ESF #1 
Secretary deploys an emergency response team to a field site and establishes a 
coordination center near the incident site (Lowder, 2009, pp. 10–31). Furthermore, the 
Department of Transportation uses a regional construct that is aligned with the FEMA 
regions. FEMA also plans to send coordination elements forward while retaining a 
national operations center. The USSS MACC may prove to be an advantageous model for 
the SAR megacommunity to consider for a forward deployed JAGCC. 
The USSS MACC organizational benchmark would be most applicable to 
response operations in a deployed location while the NMAC model would best suit pre-
event coordination and a non-deployable national center for CI SAR requirements.  
Figure 4 provides a picture of how a SAR JAGCC could organize and coordinate 








The CI SAR megacommunity has identified a need for some type of 
communications or coordination center. The need is recognized by USNORTHCOM, 
AFRCC, JPRC and the National Search and Rescue Committee; however, additional 
effort is needed to ensure that a Joint Air Ground Coordination Center is able to 
coordinate lifesaving operations in the first few days of an incident, which, in turn, 
requires CI SAR. A JAGCC is necessary for catastrophic83 SAR, as opposed to a 
progressively layered response to a more routine event, because, in a catastrophic event, 
all partners respond immediately, and the responders need to know how each 
organization fits into the response to ensure efficiency—measured in lives saved or lost. 
A deployable, scalable and modular team with equipment could coordinate 
between CI SAR stakeholders, interpret disparate organizational technologies, and 
manage and parcel out resources, personnel and supplies. This would ensure all searches 
and rescues are conducted in the well-organized manner. 
Replicating the NMAC and MACC benchmarks could provide a starting point for 
the NSARC to develop a robust national-level coordination center. The benefit of 
building a robust JAGCC that emulates the NMAC and MACC is that lives could be 
saved and unnecessary suffering prevented through more efficient CI SAR. A JAGCC 
would help the SAR mission coordinator see across the entire CI SAR spectrum. This 
would improve resource-ordering processes, organization and communications and could 
save lives in the crucial hours of the incident. 
                                                 
83 Before plunging into analysis of need for a JAGCC, it is prudent to look at the definition of a 
catastrophic incident. The NRF (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 43) defines a catastrophic 
incident as “...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of 
mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 
economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained 
national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available 
to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area....”  
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study was designed to examine whether the search and rescue (SAR) 
megacommunities are prepared to respond in an expedient and efficient manner to 
calamitous events. The research effort, which was derived from a literature review, 
interviews, a focus group and organizational benchmark studies, points toward a need for 
a national SAR strategy, a multi-disciplinary center to coordinate CI SAR activities and, 
finally, improved coordination between the equity holders. 
The SAR megacommunity is driven by plans and policies that do little to 
harmonize the efforts of the partners. While plans exist, many are outdated at the national 
level. A strategy is needed to bind and organize those equity holders to ensure SAR 
managers at all levels are aware, trained and equipped to provide and/or accept federal 
SAR support for catastrophic events. A national strategy for SAR is needed that will span 
all scenarios and focus on time-driven objectives, rather than the scenario that caused the 
catastrophic event. An important part of the strategy will be to identify how the disparate 
organizations will communicate and harmonize response efforts to efficiently task-
organize for CI SAR. 
A communications hub, as part of a JAGCC, is needed to harmonize the 
difficulties managing the SAR during “Black Swan” events. Joshua Ramo (2009) 
suggests in The Age of the Unthinkable that the world is more likely to suffer calamitous, 
unforeseen and interconnected catastrophes as a result of diplomatic, informational, 
technological, economic and social interdependencies. As a result, it is necessary to task-
organize a decentralized SAR megacommunity that is able to rapidly assess, 
communicate and respond to all disasters (regardless of the scenario) (Ramo, 2009, pp. 
10–35). The hub could be modeled after the USSS MACC or the NMAC. It must be 





manner that supports their planning and response operations. It is critical that the center 
be able to leverage different technologies and communications methods into one 
harmonized common operating picture. 
Improved coordination between equity holders is the third strategic 
recommendation made in this research. This is a broad and general category that captures 
the need for outreach, planning, training, exercises and an approach that might be used to 
successfully motivate the megacommunity equity holders to prepare for the CI SAR 
necessitated by an extremely large, chaotic and intense event. 
These three major recommendations incorporate the research, as outlined in 
Chapter III, into bins that are designed to capture the important undertakings identified as 
“findings.” Table 11 recommends one approach to integrate the findings into the three 
above-stated primary recommendations (a national SAR strategy is needed; a JAGCC 
will help manage communications and additional interagency coordination is critical). 
The table incorporates the research findings into three recommendations and suggests a 
federal office of primary responsibility, and the inclusion of all equity holders, the 
National Search and Rescue Committee and DoD/USNORTHCOM, in pursuing 
resolution of the issues.  
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Table 11.   Findings and Relationship to a National SAR Strategy, JAGCC and Improved Interagency Coordination 
All Equity Holder Findings 
Finding National SAR Strategy JAGCC Interagency Coordination 
1.  National and international resources 
must be deployed and employed 
efficiently; therefore, processing time of 
Requests for Assistance (RFAs) must be 
reduced by planning and exercising the 
use of expedited FEMA Mission 
Assignments (MAs), the use of SAR 
Prescripted Mission Assignments 
(PSMAs) and DoD use of Verbal 
Orders of Commanding Officer 
(VOCO) authorities. 
 
2.  DHS should create and manage a 
more robust national SAR budget and 
include incentives for initiative similar 
to the Canadian New Initiatives Fund. 
 
3.  DHS and USNORTHCOM should 
develop CI SAR Federal, State, 
Territorial, Tribal and public sector 
training scenarios. 
The strategy should provide 
integrated planning guidance for 
concept plans and concepts of 
execution for the 
megacommunity. Standard 
procedures and resource 
packages should be pursued.  
The strategy and resulting 
concept plans should be based 
upon synchronized time-driven 
objectives. 
 
Funding and budget issues 
should be addressed by policy-
makers in the strategy to ensure 
cost sharing is encouraged. 
 
Training and exercises should be 
addressed in the national 
strategy. DHS and 
USNORTHCOM exercise 
planners should be consulted to 






prescripted mission assignments, 
predesignated forces for CI SAR 
coordinated through a National 
center will ensure efficacy of the 
response operations. 
 
Training and exercises of 
participating JAGCC members 
will require financial 
commitment from host 
organizations.  
 
The JAGCC participants must be 
educated, trained and exercised 
in international procedures to 
send and receive international 
SAR aid.  
 
A fund source to reward SAR 
initiatives should be considered. 
Canadians have a New 
Initiatives Fund (NIF) that is 
utilized to fund priority 
enterprises. 
Integrated planning and a 
more robust regional 
organizational construct are 
needed. Equity holders need to 
identify the best assemblage to 
provide timely, unique and 
surge capabilities to state and 
local officials. 
 
A predisaster declaration 
process can be codified that 
will ensure equity holders 
have ample time to pre-
position resources for timely 
employment. For no-notice 
events, this coordination is 
important so that supported 
SAR mission coordinators 
know what to expect from the 
federal response.  
 
Training programs already 
exist and synchronized event 
lists could be developed and 
put into existing exercises. 
Funding for these efforts and 




NSARC Directed Findings 
Finding National SAR Strategy JAGCC Interagency Coordination 
1.  NSARC members should empower 
the umbrella organization (through 
funding and additional authorities) to 
collaborate, coordinate and train with 
regional and state partners to ensure 
they understand how the federal 
government intends to support state 
and local authorities. 
 
2.  DHS (through the NSARC) must 
create a more robust regional 
interagency organizational construct 
to prepare for CI SAR. 
 
3.  The NSARC should develop a 
better relationship with the INSARAG 
and USAID for more robust 
international CI SAR preparation 
(especially with Canada). 
 
4.  The NSARC and USNORTHCOM 
should develop a strategic interagency 
engagement plan with all equity 
holders. The effort should leverage 
additional volunteer support for SAR 
(Citizen Corps / The Eagles Wings 
Foundation) through integrated 
planning, training and exercises 
(funding of full- time positions in the 
NSARC and USNORTHCOM is 
needed for this initiative). 
 
These relationships need to be 
spelled out in the strategy. The 
NSARC should make these 
recommendations based upon 
analysis and consensus of the 
NSARC signatory organizations. 
 
USAID/OFDA/INSARAG 
equities should be considered 
when developing the strategy. 
Canadian, Mexican and 
territorial jurisdictions must be a 
part of the strategy development 
process. 
Many organizations may need to 
participate in the JAGCC for 
extremely large events or the 
center may only require a few 
key experts in other 
circumstances. Proficiency in 
right-sizing the center will only 
come through training and 
standardization. 
 
Determination of which 
organizations should have a seat 
in the JAGCC and what 
circumstances trigger the stand-
up of the center should be part of 
a DHS/DoD concept plan. A 
standard operating procedure 
will be needed.  
An interagency coordination 
strategic 
communications/outreach 
matrix will help organize this 
effort.  
 
A combined strategic, 
operational and tactical 
outreach and coordination 
effort should be pursued to 
develop the three 
recommendations of this 
research… Develop a National 
SAR strategy, develop an 
concept of operation and 
implement an interagency 
JAGCC and continually refine 
and improve the process 
through interagency 
coordination between multi-
disciplinary equity holders.  
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DoD/USNORTHCOM Directed Findings 
Finding National SAR Strategy JAGCC Interagency Coordination 
1.  USNORTHCOM must create a robust 
SAR cell in the operations directorate. 
 
2.  DoD should clarify civil SAR, PR and 
DSCA SAR roles in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR. This effort may include kludging 
DSCA and Civil SAR and also combining 
the JPRC and AFRCC.  
 
4.  USNORTHCOM should review, 
rewrite and coordinate DoD PR/SAR 
policy documents and author Concept 
Plans (CONPLANs). 
 
5.  Eliminate delays in DoD deployment by 
developing integrated SAR plans and 
predisaster declarations. 
 
6.  The NSARC and USNORTHCOM 
should identify CI SAR Civil Support 
Task List (CSTL) requirements to the 
National Guard Bureau and the states 
through the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System. 
USNORTHCOM has made 
significant investment in 
improving CI SAR preparedness 
in anticipation of the 
requirement, however, much 
remains to be done.  
DoD and USNORTHCOM have 
revised some plans and 
directives, but more remain to be 
revised. A CI SAR concept plan 
needs to be developed. A 
military use handbook and 
mobilization guide may also be 
useful to the megacommunity.84 
 
USNORTHCOM should support 
CSTL development to identify 
SAR supporting tasks in the 
event of a catastrophic event. 
Civil authorities, through the 
NSARC, should be asked to 
identify type, quantity and role 
of DoD T32 and T10 support. 
This gap analysis should be tied 
back into the FEMA gap 
analysis, catastrophic plans and 
the National SAR Manual. 
The JPRC, AFRCC and 
USNORTHCOM have been 
engaged in establishing ad hoc 
centers in the recent past. The 
expertise of these organizations 
and interagency partners 
(USSS/ESF #4) should be 
consulted to determine best 
practices as options for the 
JAGCC are determined. Both 
DoD and DHS have national 
coordination centers that should 
also be part of a deliberate 
analysis on how to manage CI 
SAR complexities. 
 
Standard procedures can be 
developed and codified for use 
in the JAGCC. These procedures 
could provide catalogues of SAR 
resources from the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System. 
Using a database of available 
T32 SAR resources will improve 
response times and efficiency of 
DoD. 
Plans development must 
include gap identification by 
civil authorities.  
 
Solutions must include the 
public, private and volunteer 
sectors of the 
megacommunity.  
 
DoD must ensure equity 
holders understand capabilities 
and limitations of the military. 
CBRNE, IAA and aviation 
support are unique and limited 
commodities. Ensuring all 
stakeholders understand 
capabilities and limitations 
will ensure the best practices 
are put forward. 
 
The USNORTHCOM SAR 
cell and focus group should 
lead the effort to ensure all 
DoD components are involved 
in CI SAR preparations. 
                                                 
84 The WFF community uses a series of checklists and a timeline for mobilization and employment of Department of Defense resources. They have 
also developed a military use handbook to facilitate deployment, integration and employment of Department of Defense personnel into the unified 
response (National Interagency Coordination Center, 2006). 
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B. A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SAR IS NEEDED 
1. Introduction 
The search and rescue megacommunity (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 232) lacks a 
National Strategy for Search and Rescue85 (Button). National strategies exist for a 
number of other functional areas. It is surprising that the mission listed on most incident 
commander (IC) incident action plans (IAP)86 as the top priority, saving lives, has not 
received senior level attention or emphasis through a strategy development process that 
aligns demands for SAR with innovative national and international resourcing solutions. 
To satisfy shared intersecting interests of the catastrophic incident search and rescue (CI 
SAR) megacommunity (Gerencser et al., 2008); a national strategy for search and rescue 
is needed.  
The national strategy for SAR must stress the critical lifesaving lines of operation 
demanded of the stakeholders87 for catastrophic incidents rather than focusing on the 
types of events or causes of the tragedy. CI SAR time-driven requirements remain 
relatively constant despite environmental complexity in Black Swan type events88 (Taleb, 
2007, p. xvii).  
2. Purpose 
The purpose of the strategy will be to build a wider CI SAR coalition, create ideas 
and energy for strategic action, organize the stakeholders and to fund and implement the 
strategy to produce actions that posture the community for timely and effective CI SAR 
in all environments (Bryson, 2004, p. 28). Energizing the megacommunity to take actions 
                                                 
85 The national strategy for SAR should include requirements for catastrophic incidents and 
international incidents as these are the most dangerous contingencies and the most likely events to demand 
DoD support.  
86 ICS Form 202. USCG IAP for Katrina period beginning September 12, 2005 listed “Saving” as the 
number one priority. Most incident managers address saving lives, preventing suffering and protecting 
property as the first three objectives during the first hours of an incident. 
87 Critical timely, unique and surge capabilities that DoD may be asked to provide during the first 
hours of a catastrophic event include: search and rescue, emergency medical support, mass evacuation 
support and incident awareness and assessment. 
88 A chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high explosive (CBRNE) event will provide 
significant additional complexity to the integrated CI SAR response. 
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strategizing against CI SAR anticipated requirements is the main effort89 since the 
interagency coordination is also a key element needed to improve CI SAR groundwork. 
3. Limited Centralization and Traditional Format 
There are two important considerations for the development of the CI SAR 
strategy. First, the CI SAR effort will be comprised of a megacommunity with distributed 
power and limited centralization (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 19). According to a 
number of SAR experts interviewed for this research, state SAR plans vary significantly 
as do the political environment, legislation, funding and organization for SAR at the state 
level. The national strategy must account for the various open components within the 
system to be valuable to federal, regional, state, territorial, tribal and local and 
international SAR organizations. Furthermore, the strategy must recognize that the 
stakeholders will be unable to quickly change the way state SAR operations are 
conducted due to these exogenous realities. The second characteristic of the strategy is 
that it will be somewhat bound by the community conformation requirements. That is, the 
end product must look and read in a similar manner to other national strategies and 
approaches to ensure it is understood by the readers. 
4. Anticipated Effects and Methodology 
Currently, the 2007 National Search and Rescue Plan plunges into operational 
guidance and task organization without the benefit of a national strategy promoting 
adequate national and international strategic coordination, policy or funding. If The 
National Strategy for Search and Rescue is formulated, it would help the National Search 
and Rescue Committee90 get the attention of law-makers, department secretaries and 
cabinet heads to highlight the importance of this critical mission. A SAR expert in 
USNORTHCOM believes that The National Strategy for Search and Rescue must allow 
for variance of state plans while standardizing the overall CI SAR efforts, thus improving 
                                                 
89 Please note that an end product was intentionally omitted as the main purpose for the effort. Instead, 
the result will be a valuable derivative of the all-important interagency coordination and planning 
procedure that develops the objet d'art. 
90 The NSARC will need contract or other full-time personnel support to assist with writing the 
strategy.  
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efficacy. The state individuality must be encouraged and supported while expectations of 
federal response efforts should be coordinated through a standard process with state SAR 
mission coordinators (Merrigan, 2009).  
The strategy must be developed around the SAR sweet spot to take advantage of 
best practices of the pre-existing networks, ideologies, communication systems and 
leadership of the SAR community (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 88–101). In this 
context, the term sweet spot is used to indicate a need for federal decentralization with a 
distribution of capabilities to the regions and state SAR coordinator or other local SAR 
partners that have local and municipal institutional knowledge and tactical experience. 
For CI SAR, the federal assets would deploy under federal authorities and they would be 
employed by state, territorial, tribal, regional or local incident management/command 
systems (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 181–196). The difficult and esoteric facet of 
this approach is how to remain connected with the supported and supporting 
organizations to ensure air and maritime safety while distributing assets to a 
geographically dispersed and devastated region. Adequate interagency coordination and a 
center for managing information in a catastrophic environment are keystones of the 
strategy. 
5. A Decentralized Strategy is Essential 
A strategy must be proposed and formulated as a Web-based solution versus a 
vertical solution (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 155–158). It is critical for the strategy 
to work horizontally and vertically simultaneously to enable the megacommunity 
empowerment and to manage the exceptional influx of federal SAR assets in a 
coordinated manner. To organize a coordinated multi-domain response, a multi-level 
coordinated and decentralized approach should be agreed upon by the strategic 
planners.91 
The strategy must also include the social reality of the stakeholders and disparate 
members. CI SAR will be time driven and the federal organizations will have to deploy 
                                                 
91 The strategy will be characterized by a decentralized Web-like task organization of multi-
disciplinary FSTTL and international organizations synchronized through a JAGCC to efficiently manage 
the response. 
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without the benefit of coordinated requests for assistance. The strategy will ensure the 
SAR community avoids unfavorable reports like the GAO (2005) findings (Figure 5). 
The strategy must recognize this unique process and environment. A decentralized 
approach that addresses the need for federal authorities to provide a supporting role to the 
impacted state or region will suit the environment better than a traditional strategy using a 
structural (hierarchical) strategic approach (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 209–212).  
 
Figure 5.   GAO Reports SAR Inefficiencies Related to Hurricane Katrina 
The SAR focus group members stressed that the NSARC should consider an 
approach to leverage the interconnected technologies and communications systems of the 
megacommunity. During response and recovery operations the hasty, primary and 
secondary searches must be conducted quickly and efficiently to ensure survivors are 
located and moved to a final place of safety. Only a strategy that leverages the multi-
domain dissimilarities will match the intensity and chaos that will be present in the 
catastrophic environment. The primary goal of the strategy will be to ensure that the 
GAO investigated the military planning as it related to Hurricane 
Katrina and found… 
Uncoordinated search and rescue efforts: While tens of 
thousands of people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in 
search and rescue plans led to operations that, according to aviation 
officials, were not as efficient as they could have been. The NRP 
addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and the National 
Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a 
result, the search and rescue operations of the National Guard and 
federal military responders were not fully coordinated, and military 
operations were not integrated with the search and rescue operations 
of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At least two different locations 
were assigning search and rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots 
operating over New Orleans, and no one had the total picture of the 
missions that had been resourced and the missions that still needed to 
be performed  
Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 7 
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searches and rescues can be performed in a timely manner.92 Finally, CI SAR must be 
stressed in the strategic document since normal SAR and mass rescue operations (MRO) 
are typically managed satisfactorily and the challenges highlighted in this research refer 
primarily to CI SAR (J. Sokol, personal communication, February 27, 2009). 
6. Strategic Anticipation of “Black Swan” Events 
This approach is intended to span organizational boundaries of the 
megacommunity as well as to ally the three components of DoD (Government 
Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 8–16). At the operational level, it is also necessary for 
CI SAR to span the National Incident Management System (NIMS) operations, plans, 
logistics and administrative/finance sections to unify the SAR effort. By focusing on 
demands and requirements of the FSTTL partners, “preparedness” may be discovered 
through the strategy development process. The strategic document will be the apparatus 
that identifies that pathway to CI SAR preparedness as proposed in HSPD 8.  
Breaking from the DHS/FEMA 15 planning scenarios concept where a SAR 
annex is prepared for each plan and is focused on the demands of the supported FSTTL 
organizations will require a paradigm shift. The value of an innovative approach is the 
opportunity to identify and prepare for DoDs four critical lifesaving lines of operation. 
These time-driven objectives will provide for the demands of the FSTTL stakeholders 
while pushing the entire SAR megacommunity to a multi-disciplinary preparedness that 
has eluded them so far (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 209–212). This approach will also 
take the planning out of the hands of the planners and ensure the operators are a large part 
of the strategy development process. The result will be that equity partner approval will 
occur during the interagency coordination as part of the staffing process.  
As depicted in Figure 6, CI SAR system links are strong in some cases and weak 
in others. These strong and weak links occur between and within response levels. For 
example, one state may have a strong tie with a state SAR mission coordinator from the 
                                                 
92 Examples of single event situations are the 15 national planning scenarios. Using a scenario-based 
strategy does not address the Black Swan eventuality of not being able to predict the type of event. A 
functional strategy using time driven objectives will ensure CI SAR assets are available for all scenarios 
encountered. 
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sheriff’s office through integrated planning. In other cases, a state may only have a 
protocol for SAR that is unrehearsed. In both weak and strong link examples, the 
megacommunity benefits through a JAGCC because the communications and 
coordination channels are streamlined. 
 
 
Figure 6.   A National SAR Strategy Will Strengthen Interagency and Intra-Agency 
Links (from Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 134) 
120 
7. Four Critical Lifesaving Lines of Operation 
A number of interviews indicated that the federal partners must set objectives and 
provide SAR resources while the operational team concurrently sequences, synchronizes 
and integrates those capabilities into the incident objectives effectively. There are three 
additional lines of operation that are beyond the scope, but closely related, to this 
research. During the strategy development, these other lines of operation, which include 
emergency medical support, mass evacuation (assisted and unassisted) and incident 
awareness and assessment (J. Sokol, personal communication, February 27, 2009), will 
need to be considered because they are linked closely to CI SAR. These four critical 
functional requirements recur for a wide array of events, yet the emergency management 
community’s approach to solving these problems has traditionally been through scenario-
based planning. All four critical lines of operation should be addressed in The National 
Strategy for Search and Rescue because the four priorities suffer overlapping resource 
competition and occur at the beginning of event response operations (J. Sokol, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009).  
8. The National Approach 
In the proposed strategy, DHS (through the NSARC) should strive to overcome 
strategic implementation hurdles (Table 12). They should endeavor to approach the SAR 
megacommunity in a manner that encourages a cognitive revelation (waking up to the 
need for a strategic shift), motivational awakening (encouraging voluntarily embracing 
and executing the strategic shift), resource mobilization (convincing that major change 
does not require significant additional resources) and political empowerment (tackling 
opposition from powerful vested interests). Accomplishing these four goals will increase 
momentum and improve preparedness for CI SAR (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 147–
171). The keys to successful strategy implementation are leadership involvement at all 
levels, SAR megacommunity participation in strategy development and willingness to 




Table 12.   Advantages that May be Derived from a Strategic Planning Process 




Leaders do what 
they know is the 
best for 
constituents 
Social Trust from 
State SAR Mission 
Coordinators thru the 
NSARC 
Interagency Coordination and 
participation in development of 
the processes gains FSTTL 
support through reason  
Motivational Multi-disciplinary 




of saving lives 
Must be done or lives 
will be lost 
unnecessarily 
Knowing changes are being 
made that will save lives is 
important as a catalyst to 
change 
Resources Manpower costs 
to put the “right” 
people in place to 
ensure 
“preparedness” 
Costs will be 
minimized and 
reciprocity maximized
Costs are worthwhile and all 
community members receive 
an opportunity to state what 
they need. Change is for the 
best and costs are sensible 
Politics Lifesaving is the 
highest priority 
and focus on the 
priority is 
obvious to the 
leaders 
Local and State 
support will welcome 
a well-coordinated 
national approach 
Common purpose, authority, 
incentives, culture and 
structure will improve the crisis 
management mechanisms 
9. Regionalization 
A regional approach to building SAR capacity is necessary during the strategy 
development. Leveraging the FEMA regional construct, WFF regions, USAF, CAP or the 
existing USCG rescue coordination centers will enhance SAR preparedness. This can be 
accomplished by engaging the respective regional leadership, DCOs and National 
Guard93 to analyze the best course of action. The regional approach will also highlight 
gaps and strengths (emergency management assistance compacts) between state and 
regional equity partners that might not otherwise become apparent during strategy 
development. 
                                                 
93 Also plan to leverage the task forces for emergency readiness (TFERs) as they mature and adopt 




The National Search and Rescue Strategy should be developed to meet the 
community equity holders’ anticipated requirements for CI SAR. The strategy should 
fulfill the anticipated gaps for Black Swan events. These gaps will become apparent by 
analyzing the time-driven priorities and critical lifesaving lines of operation (J. Sokol, 
personal communication, February 27, 2009). 
C. JOINT AIR GROUND COORDINATION CENTER 
The wildland firefighting provides a benchmark that can be used for catastrophic 
incident management. The management processes and the methods used by the NMAC, 
GACCs and incident command to collaborate and communicate have many similarities to 
those that exist for CI SAR.   
Interviews and focus group discussions indicate that communications and 
information sharing improvements could be made in the CI SAR community and the 
NMAC organization and management system may be a good example for the CI SAR 
community to follow. CI SAR could be rendered ineffective if the megacommunity does 
not learn how to share technical information and communications between organizations 
more effectively than in the past. SAR effectiveness will depend more on a significant 
interagency solution than is currently planned. Using the NMAC model is an alternative 
that should be studied to help understand and remedy the technology and 
communications sharing issues. SAR coordinators might benefit from a site visit with the 
NMAC to further evaluate this analysis and note additional best practices.  
The NSARC, AFRCC, USNORTHCOM and JPRC have attempted to coordinate 
through a variety of methods including: exchange of liaisons, telephone and email. Some 
success was seen for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, however, this research indicates that 
difficulties still exist that will emerge as federal authorities move their timely, unique and 
surge capabilities forward in anticipation of a catastrophe. The NMAC and the USSS 
MACC have been able to overcome these obstacles through integrated planning, 
adherence to NIMS and ICS, an embedded resource ordering and tracking system, 
interoperable communications, standardization of equipment, training and, finally, a 
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decisive method of prioritization and allocation of resources. This recommendation 
incorporates suggestions from a number of interview subjects and focus group members 
to advocate that the SAR megacommunity should consider adopting the NMAC WFF or 
the USSS MACC processes for CI SAR management (T. Frey, personal communication, 
February 19, 2009). 
D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
1. Introduction 
The 2008 NIMS does not provide a definition for interagency coordination, 
however, the NRF states: “…many incidents require virtually reflexive activation of 
interagency coordination protocols to forestall the incident from becoming worse or to 
surge more aggressively to contain it” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 8). 
Interagency coordination is defined by the DoD Joint Staff as: “the coordination that 
occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of 
Defense (DoD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2006). The Government Accountability Office recognizes that interagency coordination 
is critical to strategy development (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.   The GAO Finds Effective Interagency Coordination Critical During 
Response Operations 
A recent example of a SAR interagency coordination strategy is found in the 
USNORTHCOM Commander’s communication strategy for Hurricane Ike. The strategy 
for Hurricane Ike stated that SAR was conducted as an interagency operation that 
included FSTTL governments, private sector, non-governmental organizations and 
international partners. Timely and effective civil support was provided through unity of 
Without effective interagency coordination and planning and 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that 
NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to respond to 
an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 33. 
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effort using mission and international partners to meet the theater objectives. Mutually 
supportive and effective interagency coordination was necessary to save lives, mitigate 
suffering and to conduct coordinated SAR operations (USNORTHCOM Strategy 
Integration Group, 2008). In other words, interagency coordination is a critical 
component of a harmonized and unified response to any crisis. The more intense and 
chaotic the event; the more important relationships, familiarity and collaboration become 
to solving associated complexities. 
Although the USNORTHCOM report indicates headway in developing an 
interagency coordination process for SAR, the GAO reported that the SAR 
megacommunity was not prepared to respond to catastrophic disasters (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007). The GAO found that improved SAR capabilities were 
needed for catastrophic disasters and GAO-07-395T recommended using the National 
Response Framework, National Incident Management System and the National 
Preparedness Goals as the standards (Government Accountability Office, 2008, pp. 9–
33).  
Interagency coordination and integrated operations are the hallmarks to success 
for the strategy development process, organizational change and the CI SAR incident 
management. In this section, a recommendation is made to continue efforts that will 
improve FSTTL interagency coordination practices. This recommendation was also 
echoed by the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer assigned to the Texas Task Force 
1 Air Ground Coordination Center for Hurricane Ike in 2008. 
Interagency coordination and collaboration is a difficult iterative process 
domestically and will be even more difficult should the need to integrate international 
efforts arise. As the domestic initiative to develop a national strategy unfolds, the 
Canadian and Mexican governments should also be invited to participate in the 
interagency discussions through the United States Agency for International Development. 
The northern border has significant vulnerabilities and promises extreme complexities 
should a cross-border event occur in one of the large metropolitan areas. 
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2. Developing Objectives, Training and Exercises 
CI SAR strategy development will require identification of interagency time-
driven objectives (J. Sokol, personal communication, February 27, 2009). Priority 
information requirements in the first few hours of a catastrophic incident are critical to 
ensuring appropriate and timely federal response. Decision points must be developed 
based upon saving the maximum number of lives, preventing suffering, protecting 
property, minimizing financial expenditures and advancing the recovery process. These 
interagency decision points must be embedded with FSTTL SAR plans and the national 
SAR strategy.  
Equity holders ought to understand logistical timelines of organizations in 
addition to their own. Activation, deployment, employment and transportation times must 
be coordinated between the various state SAR mission coordinators so that a 
comprehensive understanding is achieved on the time lag between a request for assistance 
and when an asset becomes available to the incident commander. Interagency 
coordination and integrated planning with focus on time-driven objectives will ensure 
that equity holders understand the capabilities and limitations of the SAR collegial 
organizations.  
An example of a priority information requirement driven by time is provided in 
Table 13. In this example, interagency strategists and planners could confer regarding 
requirements, capabilities and timelines in order to synchronize response operations for 
catastrophic events. This process would ensure that the interagency community has a 
clear understanding of each organization within the entire SAR system.  
According to a number of interview subjects, synchronized interagency training 
and exercises should be developed to test CI SAR strategy and plans as they are 
developed. The training opportunities provide ideal venues to refine priority information 
requirements of the SAR community members. Interagency training should involve 
master scenario event lists that test these proposed timelines as well as the incident 
manager/commander’s knowledge of comprehensive CI SAR response plan. State SAR 
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mission coordinators must understand the local, state, regional, federal and international 
assistance plans. It is critical that the state SMC have a trained, exercised and rehearsed 
integrated and coordinated CI SAR plan.  
The time-driven objectives, priority information requirements and decision points 
must be understood by the incident commanders/managers (Table 13). Training, 
exercising and adjusting timelines will ensure the megacommunity identifies and finds 
the sweet spot for CI SAR operations. 
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Table 13.   Example of Time Driven Objectives and Priority Information Requirements (J. Sokol, personal communication, 
February 27, 2009)  
Example of Time-Driven Priority Information Requirements  
2 Hours  4 Hours 6 Hours 8 Hours 
Size of Affected Area SAR Hubs (Lily Pads) Environmental Safety Updates to previous priority 
information requirements 
Environmental Conditions Shelters of Last Resort, 
Hospitals/Nursing Homes 
Dam/Levee integrity Initial SAR Plan availability 
Impedance (water depth, 
airports or seaports closed, 
contamination etc…  
Available SAR Resources HAZMAT risk Real-time Tracking & 
Accountability of SAR 
Assets/Forces/Teams 
Travel Routes in/out 
(road/bridge) 
First Responder shelters Fires, Location & Intensity Environmental Update 
Staging bases Environmental updates SAR Forces/Resources 
changes 
Incident Management and 
Command 






Increased collaboration between CI SAR equity holders through an intentional, 
measured process will improve the readiness for low probability, but high consequence 
events. Standardization of procedures and processes for this outreach effort will improve 
through training and exercises that promote collaboration both domestically and 
internationally. Time-driven interagency objectives are an important aspect of CI SAR 
interagency endeavors (J. Sokol, personal communication, February 27, 2009). 
Engaging FSTTL and international partners will ensure the megacommunity is 
involved in strategy development and subsequent planning efforts that may involve 
organizational and/or process changes. Leaders will be able to adopt best practices of the 
many constituents by ensuring that a wide array of participants work on the national 




VII. FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
First, this thesis did little to discuss chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosive environments that could be present should a weapon of mass destruction be 
used against the United States. This research indicated that the nation is less ready for 
CBRNE CI SAR than a conventional problem such as a natural disaster.  
For example, as a part of this research, Department of Defense, National Park 
Service and FEMA ESF #9 professionals were interviewed and asked if they could 
perform ground searches in a contaminated environment. None of these organizations has 
a robust CBRNE capability. The National Park Service and ESF #9 US&R teams have 
proximity suits that allow them to operate in the vicinity of a contaminated area for a 
short period of time or to protect the rescuer until a hasty exit from the contaminated area 
can be accomplished. DoD has some limited capability but nowhere near the capability to 
search for and rescue thousands of people needing assistance in a CBRNE environment.  
Secondly, little time was spent discussing the international aspects of CI SAR. 
The United States Agency for International Development through the Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance and the International SAR Advisory Group have established 
international protocols that the SAR focus group and other SAR experts interviewed were 
unfamiliar. A better understanding of international processes for humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response is an area that could also use additional research.   
Finally, the SAR megacommunity would benefit if further study was done to 
understand linkages between international, national and state organizations. In this 
research, it was found that very loose links exist between catastrophic planning efforts 
underway in FEMA, integrated plans being developed in FEMA regions, the 





Support Task List as examples. All of these efforts will have an impact on CI SAR 
capabilities and studying how to strengthen those linkages would be beneficial to the 
entire homeland security community. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
CI SAR preparations have momentum as evidenced by the NSARC development 
of the CI SAR Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual, USNORTHCOM 
reorganization to better support civil SAR, DSCA SAR and personnel recovery. 
Momentum is also seen in updating policy guidance such as the 2007 National Search 
and Rescue Plan and DoDD 3003.1 DoD Support to Civil Search and Rescue and through 
exploration of an ad hoc air ground coordination cell for Hurricane Ike in 2008. Despite 
this momentum, significant effort is still required to improve CI SAR preparedness.  
A national strategy for CI SAR is needed to define priorities and objectives for the 
SAR megacommunity. The strategy process will help align time-driven objectives with 
equity holder capabilities. The strategy will also drive interagency coordination through 
the entire spectrum of partners. The strategy development process will provide local to 
international disciplines a venue for recommendation of best-practices and techniques. 
The strategy will provide a base document for CI SAR training and evaluation standards 
tied to NIMS, ICS and the national preparedness goals. 
A Joint Air Ground Coordination Center is a tool needed by the CI SAR 
megacommunity to manage intense and chaotic incidents. The wildland firefighting 
community has significant experience that can be tapped for regional, national and 
deployable domestic and international incident management and command experience. 
Finally, both domestic and international interagency coordination necessitated by 
the strategy development and integrated planning will facilitate multi-disciplinary 
training, operations and exercises that, in turn, ensure the SAR megacommunity equity 





APPENDIX: HURRICANE KATRINA SAR CRITICAL 
CHALLENGES 
This appendix is an excerpt from Appendix A of the Katrina Lessons Learned. 
Search and Rescue is listed as a critical challenge in the document. Recommendations 44 
through 48 are found below (White House, 2006, pp. 101–102): 
Critical Challenge: Search and Rescue 
Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security should lead an 
interagency review of current policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of 
all Federal search and rescue assets during disaster response. 
Recommendations: 
44. DHS should lead an interagency team to review and revise the NRP to 
ensure the integration of all federal search and rescue assets. This review should: 
a. Expand ESF-9 to ensure the coordination of all federal search and rescue 
operations, not just urban search and rescue. Under this new construct, both the urban and 
civil search and rescue coordinators would report to the Operations Section Chief under 
the Incident Commander. This structure is consistent with the National Search and 
Rescue Plan (NSP) requirement for the civil search and rescue coordinator to serve as the 
search and rescue representative to the Incident Commander, as well as with NIMS and 
ICS principles that place both urban search and rescue and civil search and rescue under 
the Operations Section. It would allow both coordinators to support each other and share 
resources, depending on the nature of the incident. Ideally, the ESF-9 coordinator in the 
Joint Field Office (JFO) should have extensive training and education in both urban 
search and rescue and civil search and rescue. 
b. Require coordination throughout Incident Command to ensure continuity 
of care for those rescued. The ESF-9 coordinator should work with the logistics section 




Emergency Services Branch (including ESF-8: Public Health and Medical Services) to 
ensure victims receive medical care and are transported to an adequate housing shelter.  
c. ESF-9 must include the United States Forest Service’s (USFS), DOI and 
EPA capabilities to perform search and rescue operations. USFS is given the role as 
primary agency under ESF-4: Firefighting and as supporting agency under ESF-9. DOI is 
a principal partner with USFS in carrying out ESF-4 functions. As firefighters make up a 
large percentage of FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams, their expertise and 
capabilities should also contribute to search and rescue operations. Under ESF-9, the 
mission statements of USFS and DOI should include the availability of firefighting 
personnel, not just equipment and supplies, for use in search and rescue operations. ESF-
9 must include the capabilities of all participants in the National Search and Rescue 
Committee. 
45. The National Search and Rescue Committee should revise the National 
Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) to include disaster response operations. The NRP 
references the NSP as a supporting operational document. However, the NSP is confusing 
because it specifically states that it does not cover overall response to disaster operations, 
as called for in the NRP. The NSP should therefore be revised to clarify its role in 
disaster response operations. The revision should specifically address air traffic control 
and coordination. 
46. Each State and major city should incorporate Search and Rescue and 
US&R annexes into their overall disaster response plans. Federal grant assistance should 
require each state, under the State Homeland Security Grant Program, and urban area 
under the Urban Areas Security Initiative, to develop a search and rescue annex within its 
specific disaster response plan, as part of its concept of operations. This search and rescue 
annex should be scalable, modular, organized along ICS principles, and be all-hazards in 
scope. It should also specifically delineate which agencies have primary responsibility for 
each aspect of search and rescue. The plan should specify in what order Federal 




Assistance Compact) will be requested and detail how search and rescue coordination 
will be integrated into incident command. These search and rescue annexes should 
identify where victims are to be taken in the event that federal, state, and local logistical 
support to the victims is required. Representatives of National Search and Rescue 
committee organizations should assist the development of state and local search and 
rescue plans. 
47. DHS should expand the National Preparedness Goal’s Target Capabilities 
List (TCL) Capability: Urban Search and Rescue to require Federal Urban Search and 
Rescue teams and State and local entities to train, equip, and exercise for civil search and 
rescue missions. Currently, this capability only focuses on urban search and rescue and 
does not include any of the types of civil search and rescue, such as maritime rescue. An 
expanded capability should use the NSP as the guide for including civil search and rescue 
performance standards. State and local entities not currently in the national civil search 
and rescue community could then use the expanded search and rescue capability as a 
reference to plan, train, and exercise for both urban search and rescue and civil search 
and rescue missions. Funding for urban search and rescue teams should reserve a portion 
of their funding allocated to train and equip FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force 
members for civil search and rescue operations.  
48. DHS should create a national search and rescue volunteer certification 
program. This national certification should be used to verify the identity and the level of 
skills and training of search and rescue volunteers. Volunteers could report to “reception 
centers,” which should be established along the perimeter of any impacted area to receive 
spontaneous volunteers. A national certification program would speed the incorporation 
of these individuals into the unified search and rescue command structure and greatly 
increase the effectiveness of the response. Voluntary organizations such as the National 
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